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Abstract
The mid-sixteenth century witnessed religious and political upheaval across much of Western Europe,
particularly in the British Isles. In 1565, a good portion of the Scottish nobility rebelled against their
sovereign, Mary, Queen of Scots. The roles played and decisions made by the nobles during this revolt,
known as the Chaseabout Raid, provide important insights concerning the converging issues of feuding,
factionalism, and religion in Scotland. My reconstructed narrative of the Chaseabout Raid indicates that
there were, in fact, no firm factions determined by ideology, but rather shifting allegiances in the midst of
conflict, determined by complex and interrelated factors, personalities, and motivations. The primary
motivation for the coalitions formed during the Chaseabout Raid was selfish personal ambition—base
desire for individual gain still superseded any proto-nationalistic ideas or purely ideological commitments.
Using this incident, I offer new conclusions regarding the origins of the Scottish kirk and national identity,
the rise of the modern notions of loyalty and allegiance, and the construction of the modern Scottish
state. With respect to the broader study of history, these conclusions discovered through an empiricist
approach may demonstrate the validity of this method for reexamining other riots, rebellions, and revolts
across history.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION TO SCOTLAND IN 1565

In 1565, thinking “their nation dishonored, the[ir] Queen shamed, and [their]
country undone,” nobles took up arms against the constituted authority of the realm, the
anointed monarch.1 Mary, Queen of Scots is remembered in popular history, not to say
myth, as a tragic figure: her tumultuous life makes for a dramatic read, and the changes in
Scotland during the period of her reign, particularly with respect to religion, resulted in a
massive increase in the number of documents that were written and that have survived to
the present day. Mary has accordingly been studied extensively by prominent scholars of
Scottish history.

Though their accounts and analyses are often admirable, a closer

examination of the most abundant sources from the sixteenth century reveals that extant
scholarship does not adequately address or accord proper importance to an event in the
middle of her personal reign, the 1565 rebellion known as the Chaseabout Raid.
A close analysis of this minor rebellion will illuminate larger issues and trends
during this crucial period of Scottish history.

Carefully examining the events,

circumstances, and, in particular, noble personalities and motivations of the rebellion will
expose the complex interplay and effects of feuding, factionalism, religion, and dynastic
and land claims among the elite in post-Reformation Scotland. A focus on the most
prominent individuals involved in the rising will enable new conclusions regarding this
understudied rebellion as well as larger implications regarding the protestant Reformation
in Scotland, the rise of the modern notion of allegiance, and the development of the

1

Randolph to Cecil (3 May 1565), Calendar of State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of
Scots, 1547-1603 [henceforth cited as CSPS], II: 152.
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modern Scottish state.2 Indeed, the study of a smaller rising will also facilitate the
understanding of the fundamental question of rebellion against authority, a puzzle that
appears throughout history. What is it precisely that motivates people to rebel against
constituted authority?
A brief description of the conditions in Scotland in 1565 is necessary to
appreciate the significance of the Chaseabout Raid.3

Mary herself was born on 8

December 1542, the only child of James V, King of Scots, and his French wife Mary of
Guise; she succeeded to the crown upon her father’s death six days later.4 During her
long minority, Scotland was governed first by the Duke of Châtelherault and later by
Mary’s mother, serving as regents. Mary was raised at the French court from the age of
five and married the heir to the French throne, who succeeded his father as Francis II in
1559. When she became queen of France, “it was assumed she would remain in her
adopted country for the rest of her life…[and that] Scotland would be left to its own
devices.”5
In 1560, a coalition of protestant nobles known as the Lords of the Congregation
successfully introduced the Reformation to Scotland.6 After successfully fighting the

2

Throughout the thesis, the word ‘protestant’ is not capitalized due to the wide spectrum of beliefs the term
encompasses.
3
Several essential works for the study of Mary, Queen of Scots include: Gordon Donaldson, All the
Queen’s Men: Power and Politics in Mary Stewart’s Scotland (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983);
Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: The Shaping of the Nation (North Pomfret, VT: David and Charles, 1974);
Gordon Donaldson, James V to James VII (New York: Praeger, 1966); John Guy, My Heart is My Own:
The Life of Mary Queen of Scots (London, Fourth Estate, 2004); and Jenny Wormald, Mary, Queen of
Scots: Politics, Passion and a Kingdom Lost (New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2001).
4
Not only did Mary lack any legitimate siblings, but in a society that placed great importance on the
significance of blood relationships, she possessed no lawful aunts, uncles, or first and second cousins in
Scotland. The lawful kin she did possess represented both the Hamilton and Lennox families, and they
were descendents of James II, Mary’s great-great-grandfather. Though she lacked lawful kin, Mary
possessed many illegitimate relatives, including numerous half-siblings. See Donaldson, All the Queen’s
Men, 56-57.
5
Jane E.A. Dawson, The Politics of Religion in the Age of Mary, Queen of Scots: The Earl of Argyll and
the Struggle for Britain and Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 112.
6
For a recent and thorough examination of the protestant Reformation in Scotland, see Alec Ryrie, The
Origins of the Scottish Reformation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006). For more on the
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regent Mary of Guise, the rebels called a parliament; the Reformation Parliament met in
August 1560, at which time it forbade the Latin mass, abolished papal authority, and
adopted a reformed Confession of Faith in the realm.7 The ultimate success of this
religious rebellion can be attributed to the assistance provided by Elizabeth I, Queen of
England, desirable allies against the increasing dominance of Catholic France.8 Though
protestantism had gradually gained strength in Scotland in the 1550s, particularly with
the preaching of John Knox, the events of 1560 marked a sharp and immediate shift in
religion, a crucial aspect of sixteenth century life.
Following Francis’s unexpected death in December 1560, Mary returned to
Scotland. Though various factions attempted to persuade the young Catholic widow to
adopt their respective political stances, she ultimately chose to return to Scotland under
the guidance of Lord James Stewart, later the Earl of Moray, her illegitimate half-brother
and a leader of the Lords of the Congregation.9 She landed in Leith on 19 August 1561.
Moray advocated a religious compromise and close friendship with England.
Though he staunchly supported the protestant settlement, he offered Mary the opportunity
to practice the Catholic faith in her own household in exchange for the continued
existence of the protestant kirk throughout the country. Days after arriving in Scotland,

Reformation, see also Ian Cowan, Scottish Reformation: church and society in sixteenth century Scotland
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982) and Gordon Donaldson, The Scottish Reformation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1960). For effects on Scottish culture, see Margo Todd, The Culture of
Protestantism in Early Modern Scotland (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
7
See Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, ed. Thomas Thomson and Cosmo Innes, 12 vols (Edinburgh,
1814-75). Throughout the thesis, the word ‘parliament’ is not capitalized because there is no continuously
sitting body or even regularly summoned assemblies. The exception is the singular ‘Reformation
Parliament.’
8
In addition, notably, the treaty that formally ended the conflict, the Treaty of Edinburgh, was concluded
between England and France. Scotland was not a separate entity in the negotiations. The situation was also
simplified by the death of Mary of Guise in June 1560.
9
Lord James Stewart did not receive the title of Earl of Moray until 1562, but for the sake of clarity and
consistency I refer to him as Moray in all instances. This decision affects primarily part of the section on
Moray in Chapter IV, but little else. Other leaders of the Congregation, notably Argyll and Maitland of
Lethington, rose to power alongside Moray. See Dawson, The Politics of Religion, 112.
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Mary issued a proclamation upholding the religious status quo, that is, protestantism.10
This statement “was tantamount to a recognition of the ecclesiastical revolution” of
1560.11
In sixteenth century Scotland, like most of Europe, effective kingship and power
were based around the person of the monarch.

In Scotland, however, centralized

governmental institutions were less developed than their counterparts in other European
states, including England. Though a parliament existed, a session of parliament required
a summons from the monarch. During the minority or absence of the monarch, the
“powers, privileges and patronage [of the office of king] were a prize to be competed for
by individuals or factions. Each minority thus meant a set-back for the monarchy,” a
condition that by 1561 had existed in Scotland for nearly two decades.12 Mary’s minority
also witnessed the creation of a formal Privy Council, an institution of nobles engaging in
collective decision-making, whose advice she continued to follow after reaching her
majority.13 During periods of effective personal monarchy, however, such as during the
period 1561-1565, “it was to nobles that the Scottish crown still turned for the expertise
and resources.”14 Indeed, the nobility represented the monarch, and their own personal

10

Ian Cowan, “The Roman Connection: Prospects for Counter-Reformation during the Personal Reign of
Mary, Queen of Scots,” The Innes Review v. 38 (1987): 107. This proclamation was issued the Monday
after her first Sunday in Scotland, on which day Mary heard Mass in her chapel at Holyrood. Moray
prevented protesters from disrupting the service; his actions regarding Mary’s personal faith became the
crux of the conflict between him and John Knox. Knox “was convinced that Mary had tricked Lord James
into complying with her deep-laid schemes to restore papacy in Scotland.”
11
Donaldson, All the Queen’s Men, 50.
12
Donaldson, James V to James VII, 5.
13
The parallel English Privy Council had long existed. For the evolution of the Scottish Privy Council and
the emergence of the Scottish parliament. See Donaldson, Scotland: The Shaping of the Nation, 93.
14
Keith M. Brown, Noble Society in Scotland: Wealth, Family and Culture from the Reformation to the
Revolution (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 1. Brown’s is the critical book for the study of
the nobility in mid-sixteenth century Scotland. In addition, Julian Goodare, State and Society in Early
Modern Scotland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) provides valuable information regarding
Scottish society as a whole, including the role of the nobility, as does Jenny Wormald’s Court, Kirk and
Community: Scotland 1470-1625 (London: Edward Arnold, 1981).

5
interests, throughout the realm as they ruled their own holdings and followers.15 The
crucial function nobles performed in local, regional, and more central affairs provides the
justification for focusing on the role of the nobility in the Chaseabout Raid as being the
most revealing means of examination.
In Scotland, as in the rest of Europe, nobles were defined by privileges that made
them distinct from other men.16 Layers of privilege among the nobility itself provided
further “gradations of status.”17 While relative levels of nobility existed, these barriers
were not fixed but rather were fluid: a nobleman’s individual status or house could rise
and fall over several generations of good or bad fortune, or even after a particularly
volatile event.18 Not only did the status of nobility catapult individuals into the elite of
the realm, but the ability to determine the noble status of individuals was the exclusive
privilege of the monarch, and this power to grant nobility remained a powerful tool. In
particular, during this period the holding of land remained “the greatest source of power,
wealth, and prestige” of the nobility.19
The consequence of attaining and maintaining particular levels of nobility
manifested itself in a number of aspects of noble life. To begin with, the marriage of a
nobleman or his children was a decision of singular importance; “it had implications for
the political and economic welfare of the entire family and for its dependents.”20 Though
often a tool to ameliorate a family’s position in a local situation, noble marriages,
particularly at the highest echelons of the nobility, were apt to revolve around the other
nobles of the royal court. Contracts of marriage between nobles were often formalized
15

Goodare, State and Society, 49.
Brown, Noble Society in Scotland, 7.
17
Ibid., 8.
18
Ibid., 15. Brown notes that “men became noble by ennoblement, office, landownership, assumption and
marriage. Others dropped out of nobility by derogation, by contempt of service, as a punishment for
treason, and as a consequence of mésalliance.”
19
Ibid., 47.
20
Brown, Noble Society in Scotland, 113.

16
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between noble children; a contract would not necessarily, however, result in marriage, as
the years between contract and ceremony could drastically alter the situation of one or
both involved parties. Among the nobility, marriage was, above all, a tool for retaining
or gaining power.
Notions of elite marriages were intertwined with Scottish views of kinship and
clan. Indeed, “fulfilling one’s duties and obligations to the kin-group was the means by
which a noble’s honor was maintained and enhanced.”21 While kin technically bonded
two individuals possessing a blood relationship, the definition of kinship and overlapping
loyalties often became blurred by complicating societal instruments.22 Particularly for a
nobleman, duties to kin and obligations wrought by various types of bonds could easily
create conflicting obligations.23 One type of such bond was the bond of manrent, in
which a nobleman pledged protection to a hierarchically subordinate man in return for
service.24 Alternatively, and perhaps more notably, a bond of manrent or of friendship
could be formed between two noblemen of equal rank, creating a formal alliance between
two entities of similar power and status.25 In both cases, such bonds were usually made
for life or in perpetuity between two houses.26
The alliances formed through shared political perspectives, ties of kinship, and
other bonds were a necessary aspect of Scottish society due to another distinctive
21

Dawson, The Politics of Religion, 41. Dawson’s book clearly focuses on the fifth Earl of Argyll, but it
also provides an excellent illustration of the interactions between a nobleman and his kin and clan.
Wormald’s Court, Kirk and Community also provides notable commentary on the roles of kin and clan.
22
The determination of kin, however, relied on a common ancestor in the male line. Women, though they
kept their family names, entered and exited kin groups upon marriage. See Wormald, Court, Kirk and
Community, 30-31.
23
Dawson, The Politics of Religion, 42.
24
For the definitive study of this matter, see Jenny Wormald, Lords and Men in Scotland: Bonds of
Manrent, 1442-1603 (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1985).
25
Donaldson, Scotland: The Shaping of the Nation, 235.
26
Wormald, Court, Kirk and Community, 31. Though generally lesser men would contract a bond of
manrent with only one nobleman, “those who did give more than one bond of manrent included a clause
stating their previous obligation, and on occasion added a promise of neutrality in case of conflict between
their lords.” Nobles, on the other hand, would contract a multitude of bonds.
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tradition: feuding.

Though feuding existed at all levels of society, feuds between

noblemen in particular affected a wide range of people. Feuds stemmed both from
individual incidents and from traditional rivalries. In particular, bloodfeuds among the
nobility enjoyed a certain sense of legitimacy as a means of resolving disputes between
powerful men.27 Like other aspects of noble life, such as religion and marriage, noble
violence was not a private matter; “quarrels over land or honor or status by the men of
power” often wrought great disorder over large tracts of land and across entire clans.28
A last influence in Scotland that should not be overlooked, particularly due to its
specific implications for the Chaseabout Raid, is the doctrine of resistance theory as
postulated by Christopher Goodman.

Goodman, a radical protestant minister, had

assisted Knox in leading the Geneva Congregation and at Knox’s invitation came to
Scotland on the eve of the Reformation; in July 1560 he became the minister in St.
Andrews.29 In 1558, however, Goodman had published a treatise titled How Superior
Powers Ought to be Obeyed of their Subjects, which provided biblical justification for
resisting ungodly rulers.30

Goodman asserted that “obedience to God’s Laws by

disobeying man’s wicked laws is much commendable,” separating divine power from the

27

For more on bloodfeud, see Keith M. Brown, Bloodfeud in Scotland, 1573-1625: Violence, Justice and
Politics in Early Modern Society (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1986) and Jenny Wormald,
“Bloodfeud, Kindred and Government in Early Modern Scotland,” Past and Present 87 (1980): 54-97.
28
Wormald, Court, Kirk and Community, 35.
29
Jane E.A. Dawson, “Trumpeting Resistance: Christopher Goodman and John Knox,” in John Knox and
the British Reformation, ed. Roger A. Mason (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998), 134.
See also Jane E.A. Dawson, “Resistance and Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Thought: The Case of
Christopher Goodman,” in Church, Change and Revolution: Transactions of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch
Church History Colloquium, ed. J. van den Berg and P.G. Hoftijzer (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991). The Geneva
Congregation consisted of a group of mostly exiled English protestants. They had elected John Knox as
their minister in 1555; his frequent absences, however, necessitated additional leadership, which Goodman
provided.
30
At the same time, Knox anonymously published his pamphlet The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the
Monstrous Regiment of Women. Although Knox’s work had a different focus, he too spoke of the potential
ungodliness of a monarch. Though Goodman’s primary thesis discussed the notion of ungodly authority,
he too questioned the legitimacy of female rulers from a religious perspective.
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political power of the ruler.31 From this assumption and evidenced by numerous passages
from Scripture, Goodman reasoned that “it is both lawful and necessary sometimes to
disobey and also to resist ungodly” rulers.32 Though he emphasized that subjects should
surely “avoid all strife and rebellion” when ruled by a godly ruler, the rule of an ungodly
monarch released the subject from his allegiance to that monarch: “the word of God
freeth you from the obedience of a Prince.”33 Goodman thus posited strong rhetoric
favoring rebellion against the anointed monarch several years prior to the Chaseabout
Raid; his time in St. Andrews for five years before the rebellion is significant. During
this period, he became an extremely close associate of the Earl of Moray. Though he did
not explicitly refer to Goodman, Moray surely had great familiarity with the churchman’s
doctrine of resistance.
***
At the time of the Chaseabout Raid in the summer of 1565, while Scotland had
maintained numerous traditional social elements, it had also recently experienced several
social shifts, particularly with respect to the nobility. Mary’s long minority was one of
many that had long plagued the Stewart line; during such times, the nobility had learned
to optimize royal minorities and the opportunities they presented for control over the
crown. More recently, the nobility had acted in conjunction with England to establish
protestantism in the absence of their Catholic queen. Mary had returned to Scotland in
1561 for the first time since childhood to rule her realm; despite maintaining her
Catholicism, she aligned herself politically with her illegitimate half-brother Lord James
Stewart and his fellow Congregationalists.

31

Christopher Goodman, How superior powers ought to be obeyd of their subjects, printed at Geneva, John
Crispin, 1558: 8.
32
Ibid., 84.
33
Ibid., 191- 96.
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In 1565, however, Mary determined to marry a cousin, Henry, Lord Darnley.
Disliked by both her cousin Queen Elizabeth of England and the nobility of Scotland, the
union was particularly hated by some because Darnley was from a prominent Catholic
family with blood claims to both the Scottish and English thrones. Mary’s choice in her
second husband received an “ominous lack of public enthusiasm.”34 Though the match
received limited support from some of Mary’s nobles, others vehemently opposed the
match and defied the queen. Her half-brother, by then Earl of Moray, disobeyed her
summons, quickly spurring him into open rebellion; several nobles joined in his act of
insubordination: the Duke of Châtelherault, the Earls of Argyll, Glencairn, and Rothes,
Lord Boyd, and Kirkcaldy of Grange. The remainder of the significant nobility either
remained loyal to Mary or attempted some level of neutrality in the conflict, electing not
to disobey their queen but sympathizing with Moray. For two months, the rebels crisscrossed Scotland, as did the queen’s forces, but the two sides never actually met in open
battle. When it became clear that the rebels would not receive English aid similar to that
granted in 1560, they voluntarily crossed the English border into exile. This failed revolt
has since been termed the Chaseabout Raid due to its peripatetic nature.
The division of the nobility in this conflict resulted in unexpected factions and
alliances. Because the focus of much of this thesis is on the nobility, some introduction
to the most prominent figures is necessary. Of the utmost importance is James Stewart,
Earl of Moray, Mary’s illegitimate half-brother; he was a protestant and a leader of the
Lords of the Congregation. A close ally of Maitland of Lethington, Mary’s secretary, he
maintained good relations with many English diplomats and nobles in the north of
England. He became one of Mary’s principal advisors when she returned to Scotland and

34

Caroline Bingham, Darnley: A Life of Henry Stuart, Lord Darnley, Consort of Mary Queen of Scots
(London: Phoenix Giant, 1995), 108.
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was responsible for much of her pro-English policy. Moray was also the instigator and
leader of the Chaseabout Raid. Closely aligned with Moray in the rebellion was James
Hamilton, the Duke of Châtelherault. Also a protestant, he was Mary’s heir to the throne.
Older than many of the other important nobles at the time of the Chaseabout Raid, he had
served as Mary’s regent for much of her minority. Châtelherault was the head of the
powerful and extensive Hamilton clan, who participated extensively in the rebellion; he
was also engaged in a significant multigenerational feud with the Earl of Lennox.
Matthew Stewart, Earl of Lennox, remained completely loyal to Mary during the
rebellion; his son Henry, Lord Darnley, became her second husband. Lennox had gone
into exile in England in 1544, where he provided loyal and important service to Henry
VIII. He returned to Scotland in 1564 to reclaim his lands and title.
Several of the nobles who joined Moray in open rebellion against Mary were
staunch protestants. Archibald Campbell, Earl of Argyll, was an ardent protestant whose
extensive lands and power base in the western part of Scotland made him one of the
wealthiest and most important peers. The geographic position of his holdings made him
a significant figure in relations between England, Scotland, and Ireland.

Likewise,

Alexander Cunningham, Earl of Glencairn, maintained a large presence in the southwest
of Scotland; he also favored policies of alliance with England. An early convert to
protestantism was Sir William Kirkcaldy of Grange.

Often an ally of Maitland of

Lethington, he was a notable soldier whose strong military skills were considered an asset
to the rebels. Other active and important protestants included Robert, Lord Boyd, a
leading Ayrshire landowner, and the wealthy Earl of Rothes.
Religion was not a reliable predictor of loyalty, however, as several extremely
significant nobles, both Catholic and protestant, maintained allegiance to the crown. For
instance, Hugh Montgomery, Earl of Eglinton, was a devout Catholic who favored the

11
Darnley marriage. George Gordon, Earl of Huntly, had been imprisoned following his
father’s unsuccessful 1562 rebellion, but he was released and restored to his title at the
time of the Chaseabout Raid. John Erskine, Earl of Mar, was a protestant who favored
alliance with England.

James Douglas, Earl of Morton, was a protestant and the

Chancellor of Scotland.
Several other figures of note, both English and Scottish, appear frequently in the
account of the Chaseabout Raid. These figures represent the religious, political, and
diplomatic structure that existed in the middle of the sixteenth century. In Edinburgh,
John Knox, the protestant minister who was instrumental in bringing the Reformation to
Scotland, preached at St. Giles Church and interacted with many nobles. Two significant
English representatives in Scotland at the time of the rebellion were Thomas Randolph,
who served as ambassador to Scotland for several years, and Nicholas Throckmorton,
another English diplomat. Both men corresponded frequently with Elizabeth I and her
chief minister, William Cecil. These men all played significant roles in negotiations, but
also in terms of preserving historical details of the Chaseabout Raid through their
correspondence.
***
Historical scholarship on the Chaseabout Raid centers almost entirely on Mary
rather than on the numerous lords who rose in rebellion against her. This Mary-centric
account blatantly ignores the complexity of the nobility. The rebellious nobles were all
prominent landholders in Scotland and were deeply involved with the government,
holding various offices, conciliar appointments, and positions in parliament. At the same
time, despite the rapid proliferation of the protestant Reformation in Scotland, in the
instance of this rebellion Catholics and protestants banded together to act in a manner
they thought most beneficial, regardless of the side they chose to support. The emphasis
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in this study on the role of the nobility in this rebellion and a distinct removal of focus
from Mary herself sharply contrasts with extant scholarship on the Chaseabout Raid,
which, in any case, is severely limited.
Current historical scholarship that makes mention of the Chaseabout Raid falls
into three categories: comprehensive histories of Scotland, books on the early modern
era, and focused works regarding mid-sixteenth century Scotland. In the general histories
of Scotland, the Chaseabout Raid receives scant mention in the sections on Mary’s reign.
This oversight is likely due to the fact that the short-lived rebellion failed to enact change.
The New Penguin History of Scotland reduces the Chaseabout Raid to a two-sentence
summary asserting Mary’s triumph over her half-brother, stating that the successful
defeat and exile of the rebels demonstrates that the Chaseabout Raid served to provide
“clear evidence that crown authority remained resilient, even when wielded by a young
woman.”35 Another volume on Scottish history as a whole, Who Are the Scots?, fails to
mention the rebellion entirely. The work briefly mentions that with respect to Mary’s
marriage, Darnley “was unpleasing to the nobility,” but no further mention of any sort of
discontent appears.36 A last general history of Scotland, Scotland: The Story of a Nation,
devotes a full paragraph to a general acknowledgement of the events of the Chaseabout
Raid. The focus of this account, however, is solely on Mary, who is described as having
“promptly raised an army of her own….[and] riding as fearlessly and tirelessly as a man
at the head of her troops.”37
There also exist several slightly more focused volumes than these general
histories that cover a wider span of time than the mid-sixteenth century. One such
35
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volume, Scotland: The Making and Unmaking of the Nation, Early Modern Scotland c.
1500-1707, addresses the Chaseabout Raid, but in less than a paragraph. Though the
account dismisses the rebellion as a “cat-and-mouse game,” it does acknowledge that
“the power of the crown had been undermined” by the incident.38 Another text, Scotland
Re-formed, 1488-1587, devotes two paragraphs to the subject of the Chaseabout Raid, in
which Mary remains the focus: “Mary personally led her troops...Mary was
triumphant.”39 Thus, a survey of modern scholarly histories of Scotland demonstrates a
distinct neglect of the complexity of the Chaseabout Raid. When the incident receives
any mention whatsoever, the focus remains on Mary.
In contrast to the more general histories of Scotland, scholarly volumes that focus
on Mary’s rule or on mid-sixteenth century Scotland do actually provide accounts and
analyses of the Chaseabout Raid, yet these versions unequivocally relegate the position of
the rebellion to one of a distinct unimportance. The lack of insight into the revolt is
communicated in each source in one of three types of oversimplification. First, some
historians portray the incident merely as a prelude to the more outwardly effective and
volatile events of 1566-67. But while these events certainly achieved greater obvious
results, since Mary abdicated in favor of her infant son James VI, the Chaseabout Raid is
more significant than a mere springboard. A second way in which historians have
traditionally examined the Chaseabout Raid is to view it with an excessively Marycentric vision; most accounts are guilty of this generalized portrayal.

While Mary

certainly plays a key role in the events of the Chaseabout Raid, the role of the nobles is
exceedingly complex and cannot be ignored in determining its significance as a singular
38
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event and, perhaps more importantly, as an illustration of greater forces. In that respect,
the third traditional view of the Chaseabout Raid is, if the nobility is discussed at any
length, to divide the nobility into firm factions determined by ideology, but ignoring
numerous other factors and influences.
My theoretical approach to the Chaseabout Raid has been to explore these
nuanced factors and how they interact with one another. To that end, I have used an
extensive number of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources pertinent to
this approach are numerous, but have also become extremely fragmented over time, thus
necessitating a careful examination to construct a full and accurate account of the events
surrounding the Chaseabout Raid. The most valuable source collection is the Calendar of
State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots (CSPS). This printed
volume contains reprints, sections, and summaries of documents pertaining to Scotland as
collected in England. Most documents are letters between the English diplomats in
Scotland and the Elizabethan councilors, though copies of decrees from both Scotland
and England are included as well. From the Scottish perspective, the most critical
continuous source collection is the Registers of the Privy Council of Scotland (RPC).
While these two source collections contain the most continuous records for the
purpose of constructing a narrative of events, many other accounts of the period and
specialized sources allow for a broader picture. Thus, sources such as The Booke of the
Universall Kirk of Scotland, a record of the General Assembly that details religious
development in the early kirk, and Robert Pitcairn’s Ancient Criminal Trials in Scotland,
which contains several accounts of punishments received by men who had conspired with
Moray, permit a better picture of significant developments outside the realm of politics.
While these and other sources were important in collecting information regarding
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individual nobles, that information was augmented by the use of the Scots Peerage and
especially by archival materials.
The majority of manuscript sources consulted for this thesis are currently housed
in the National Archives of Scotland in Edinburgh; documents from the National Library
of Scotland in Edinburgh and the British Library in London were consulted as well.
These manuscripts did not, for the most part, fall into any specific archival categories, but
did include burgh records, court records, estate records, private papers, sasines,
miscellaneous governmental records, marriage documents, and bonds and pledges.
Using these sources, many of which contain only fragments of information
regarding the Chaseabout Raid or the individuals involved in the rebellion, I have sought
to create an accurate and thorough account of the rebellion and to reexamine the events
with an emphasis on the nobility. Chapter I of the thesis seeks to provide a background
to the period and events for the non-specialist, as well as to survey the extant literature.
Chapters II and III contain my account of the Chaseabout Raid. Though Moray did not
formally rebel until 28 July 1565, I have elected to begin my account in September 1564,
when significant events that determined the course of the rebellion began. There are
many instances, moreover, in which I have summarized particular interactions and events
so as to maintain the focus on the nobles rather than on Mary and, in some cases,
Elizabeth. In these instances, I have directed the reader to appropriate scholarship. In
Chapter IV, I continue my emphasis on the nobility by exploring the conflicting
influences and ultimate motivation of each significant nobleman, an examination that
leads to the central conclusion of this thesis. Chapter V takes this conclusion and applies
it to larger themes, including Scottish institutions, identity, and the state. With respect to
the broader study of history, these conclusions discovered through an empiricist approach
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may demonstrate the validity of this method for reexamining other riots, rebellions, and
revolts across history.
There were, in fact, no firm factions determined by ideology; rather, there were
shifting allegiances in the midst of conflict, determined by complex and interrelated
factors, personalities, and motivations. The reason for a noble’s actions, which at this
critical juncture of history might include religion, tradition, land, personal and family
feud, and ideologies of loyalty and allegiance, was also determined in part by the
motivations and actions of other nobles, but the primary motivation for the coalitions
formed during the 1565 Chaseabout Raid was selfish personal ambition. The base desire
for individual gain superseded any proto-nationalistic ideas or purely ideological
commitments.
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CHAPTER II: THE ROAD TO THE CHASEABOUT RAID

The Chaseabout Raid began on 28 July 1565, when Mary formally declared
Henry, Lord Darnley, to be the King of Scots, and ended on 6 October 1565 when the
rebel lords who led the revolt crossed the border into England. The events leading up to
it, however, are as important as the rebellion itself in determining the roles, perspectives,
and motivations of the nobles involved. We must therefore begin a consideration of the
Chaseabout Raid in the fall of 1564, when the Earl of Lennox, a Catholic, returned to
Scotland; his son, Lord Darnley, followed in February 1565. Conventional scholarship of
this period prior to July 1565 focuses almost entirely on the Mary-Darnley relationship
and the English reaction to it. While elements of this discussion are essential for clarity
and an accurate version of events, the more important perspectives are those of the
Scottish nobles. This chapter aims to provide not just a narrative of the events leading to
the Chaseabout Raid, but also an analysis of contemporary observation of the events that
occurred prior to the rebellion.

Examining these circumstances is also essential to

establish a background for a complete analysis of how personal noble relationships and
perspectives shaped the Chaseabout Raid.
Matthew, Earl of Lennox, had been driven into exile from Scotland to England in
1544 following his treasonous support of Henry VIII in Anglo-Scottish conflict.1 With
Elizabeth’s support, he first seriously sought to return to Scotland in 1563 in order to
reclaim his title, position, and lands. On 6 April 1564, Thomas Randolph reported the
first notice of Lennox’s petition in Edinburgh: “since my arrival [in Edinburgh], there
1
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Tower, causing Lennox to resurrect an old promise from Henry VIII to see his restoration in Scotland.
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came and is gone to Scotland a servant of my lord of Lennox, your honor [Cecil] knows
his suit.”2 The Lennox name then disappeared from correspondence for nearly a month,
after which time Randolph remarked in passing that “the Earl of Lennox will obtain
license “to come home and speak [to] the queen,” and that some influential figures in
Edinburgh “suspect she shall at length be persuaded to favor his son [Lord Darnley].”3
Randolph furthermore communicated to Elizabeth that Mary intended to consult some of
her closest advisors—Châtelherault, Moray, and Argyll—on the Lennox matter.
Mary primarily acquiesced to Lennox’s return to Scotland due to the support he
received from Elizabeth. At this point, Mary was attempting to cultivate Elizabeth’s
favor; her closest councilors strongly advocated a friendly relationship with England.4
Thus, at the end of the month of May, she granted that the “lord of Lennox shall come
home and sue his own right.”5 There were, however, some influential figures in Scotland
who did not agree with Mary’s decision. Though he absolved himself of any sympathy
for this perspective, Moray confided to Cecil that “some of [Elizabeth’s] best friends here
[in Scotland] mislike the homecoming of the Earl of Lennox and would have me
persuade my mistress [Mary] to stay him for this year.”6
Clearly seeking to curry favor with Elizabeth and her government, Moray claimed
that he himself was in favor of Lennox’s homecoming, “seeing [as] his passport was
granted at the request of the Queen’s Majesty your sovereign,” Elizabeth. Those nobles
who opposed the Lennox return did so due to potential religious and political
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implications. Moray, however, reasoned that “seeing [as] we have the favor of our
prince,” Mary, and that “our [protestant] foundation is not so weak that we have cause to
fear” Lennox’s return, “the factions his coming might make in matters of religion” were
inconsequential. He also emphasized that “neither he nor I [nor anyone]…can hinder or
alter religion” in accordance with the declaration regarding religion that Mary issued
upon her own return to Scotland in 1561.7 Despite these repeated assurances regarding
the security of Scottish protestantism, the fact that Moray even raised such issues to Cecil
at this early date indicates that Lennox’s imminent return caused religious concern in
Scotland’s elite circles.
Maitland of Lethington provided further support to Moray’s claims in his own
correspondence with Cecil.

He boldly stated that both he and Moray “have rather

furthered than hindered [Lennox’s] coming” to Scotland, particularly after “seeing how
earnestly her majesty [Elizabeth] did recommend onto me my lord of Lennox[’s] cause.”
Maitland, like Moray, emphasized the fact that, in strongly supporting Lennox’s suit, they
were acting on Elizabeth’s own stated preferences.

He declared that not only did

Elizabeth’s support convince Moray and himself of the worthiness of Lennox’s petition,
but her recommendation was also the “chiefest cause of my Sovereign’s inclination that
way.” Mary, like her noble advisors, sought to accommodate Elizabeth. Again, like
Moray, Maitland also attempted to soothe any possible worries regarding the impact of
Lennox’s arrival on the status of protestantism, stating that he saw “no such peril” to
religion because “religion here does not depend upon my lord of Lennox coming, nor do
those of the religion hang upon the sleeves of any one or two that may mislike his
coming.”8

7
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In marked contrast, however, to his previous assurances regarding his comfort
with Lennox’s arrival in Scotland, Moray expressed his vehement opposition to Lennox
in late September 1564. He asserted that “the [E]arl of Lennox[‘s] coming hither was
principally against my will.”9 He failed to give an adequate explanation for this abrupt
change in opinion at the time, yet this position makes greater sense given the events of
1565. In a more ambiguous appraisal of Lennox’s imminent arrival, a letter from Argyll
to Châtelherault dated 19 September states that “the Queen’s Majesty has desired me to
be into Edinburgh,…insisting because the Earl of Lennox is coming…I thought it good to
advise your grace of the same…[but be assured that] I shall do nothing [until] I speak
with your grace for a longer time.”10 This missive, though it does not explicitly reveal
the apprehension both Argyll and Châtelherault felt regarding Lennox’s return, does
indicate that Argyll foresaw the need to act in accord with Châtelherault.
Prior to the parliament at the end of September that formally restored Lennox,
Mary took several steps to ensure a smooth arrival for the earl. On 21 September, she
issued letters of relaxation so that “Matthew sometime [E]arl of Lennox [might] repair
and come within our realm to talk and intercommon with us and to do his other lawful
affairs therein for a certain space” of time.

Mary directly credited Elizabeth with

changing her perspective of Lennox, as she stated that she had issued these letters of safe
conduct “at the desire and supplication of our dearest sister.” She continued to identify
and resolve every possible impediment towards an easy transitional period for Lennox.
Because Lennox had been put to the horn, Scottish law precluded him from appearing in
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the queen’s presence.11 Mary thus “in our name and authority relax[ed] the said Matthew
sometime [E]arl of Lennox from the process of our horn,…[and] restore[d] him to our
peace.”12 In addition, several days later, on 25 September, she formally gave her lawyers
“license to resort and intercommon with Matthew sometime [E]arl of Lennox and to give
him advice and consultation in all and whatsoever his actions, affairs, and business which
he has or shall happen to have.”13 Mary thereby not only extended the relaxation from
the horn so that other individuals in the realm could legally meet with him, but also
sought to provide the services of her personal advocates so that Lennox might more
easily order his affairs in Scotland after a twenty-year absence. In a last gesture of
friendship, Mary issued a precept to the Clerk Register on 27 September so that he might
“extract, draw forth, and deliver the said process of forfeiture to the said earl with
expedition,” further accelerating the process of Lennox’s restoration.14
On 28 September, the Scottish parliament convened at Edinburgh; a number of
issues were discussed at this session, including the Lennox matter. Attendants of this
parliament included the Earls of Argyll, Moray, Morton, Erroll, Glencairn, Atholl,
Caithness and Cassillis, and Lords Erskine, Seton, Fleming, Innermeath, and Ruthven.
The records clearly state that “the Duke and the rest of the nobility was neither desired
nor charged” to appear at parliament. Over the course of the session, it was noted that on
23 September those nobles who comprised the Privy Council were “summoned to her
grace’s presence to receive Lennox” at Holyroodhouse, attesting to the importance of his
return. Upon Lennox’s arrival that day, “Her Grace [had] welcomed him, and every one
11
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of the nobility embraced him.”15 In addition, “in [the] presence of the most part of the
nobility of the realm, [he] conversed with the Queen’s Majesty.”16 The following day
was a Sunday, and the parliamentary record notes that “many rumors [existed] among the
people—the papists bragged [that] the Earl would go to mass with the queen,…[but] that
day the Earl kept his house in quiet,” providing a measure of reassurance that
protestantism would remain safe despite the return of a prominent Catholic nobleman.17
The following day, Mary addressed her council and parliament regarding the
status of the Earl of Lennox. She announced that at the “commendation of our good
sister the Queen of England,” she had assembled the council to consider “the restitution
of the Earl of Lennox our near cousin…His restoration was easily agreed to” by the
nobility present. But Argyll, who believed that “it was good to restore” the earl, added a
notable caveat: “those at contention with Lennox should be put in surety to prevent strife
hereafter.”18 He recognized that future conflict could stem from the Lennox restoration.
Many notable figures continued to stress the degree to which Elizabeth was
responsible for Lennox’s successful return. On 28 September, Mary wrote to Elizabeth
that “it may appear, not only to your self, but to all others in both realms what regard we
have to your recommendation.”19 Lennox also pandered to Elizabeth, writing that he had
been very well treated and vowing that “I am more bound to you than ever.”20 On the
same day, Lennox penned a similar message of gratitude to Cecil.21 Lennox had good
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reason for gratitude: on 16 October, his restoration was “proclaimed at the market cross
[of Edinburgh] by five heralds, [thereby]…annulling the forfeiture led by my lord Duke
against him the xlv [1545] year of God.”22 He was thus “restored to his lands, heritage
and good fame.”23 At this time, the heralds also announced that another parliament
would be held regarding the Lennox matter on 4 December.

The many stages of

reinstating a forfeited individual were, in this instance, condensed into a brief period of
time and were made very public.
In late October, Randolph reported the status of Lennox’s transition back into
Scottish society; he commented that other nobles took note of “the Queen[’s] liking his
behavior.” As to Lennox himself, Randolph discerned that his “cheer is great and his
household many.” In the realm of politics, he remarked that when he last saw Lennox,
“with him [was] the Earl of Atholl, in whom he has singular trust, and [they] are seldom
asunder.” In addition, Lennox was “well friended” of Maitland, perhaps the figure
closest to Mary.24 Randolph further described the favors that Lennox had dispensed to
figures at the center of power: “he gave the Queen a marvelous fair and rich jewel,…to
Lethington a very fair diamond in a ring, to Atholl another…but to Moray nothing.” This
omission is clearly an insult to Moray, widely regarded as Mary’s chief advisor. The
most plausible explanation is that Lennox viewed Moray as possessing a diminished role
at court, or as occupying one in the near future. Randolph believed that these gifts were a
means of securing support in light of “the bruit that my lady [Lennox] and Lord Darnley
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are coming.” Regarding Darnley, Randolph stated a personal “good liking of the young
lord,” as well as revealed that “many desire to have him here.”25
Lennox’s reappearance and restoration had caused the longstanding feud between
the Lennox Stewarts and the Hamiltons to emerge again as an issue of governance due to
the prominence enjoyed by Lennox and Châtelherault.26 As rationalized by Mary, the
“alleged feud, enmity, grudge and displeasure” between them might, now that Lennox
had returned, propagate further negative consequences, as a result of which “her
Highnesses service may be impeded, and the quietness of the country disturbed.”27 Mary
was thus “determined to accord Lennox and the Duke…[and] there [was] much talk to
what end all this favor to Lennox tends.”28 On 28 October, the issue of the feud made an
appearance at the Privy Council session attended by Châtelherault, Argyll, Atholl,
Morton, and Ruthven.

Mary, on the advice of the Privy Council, “presently

command[ed] both the said parties respectively….[to] behave themselves moderately,
quietly, and in peace, as becomes good subjects, and that none of them molest or trouble
[the] other for any offense…under the pain of incurring her Majesty’s utter displeasure
and indignation.”29 After this pronouncement, they “shook hands together.”30
Randolph further reported of Lennox’s continued re-assimilation into Scottish
society, which seemed to proceed successfully. At the end of October 1564, Randolph
wrote that “how much it will profit him I cannot yet conjecture.” In terms of the quarrel
with Châtelherault, Randolph recounted that “the Duke and [Lennox] are thus agreed—
the prince [Mary] commanding both never to quarrel, but [to] live like obedient subjects,
25
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and she herself [would] take part with the one who is provoked by the other—also
commanding them to embrace each other.” The impression Randolph conveyed is one of
a forced reconciliation that demonstrates Lennox’s continuing desire to please Mary; a
genuine bond seems to have been more elusive. Lennox’s eagerness clearly stemmed
from the fact that he had been “restored to his heritage, but must agree with the most of
them that [now] possess his land…Lennox made great demands for the loss by his
banishment.”31 At this point, therefore, Lennox still sought to reclaim more of his lost
property, a venture that could not succeed without Mary’s full support.
Despite Lennox’s eagerness to please Mary, the duke and Lennox “never met but
in the Prince’s sight,” attesting to the continuing quarrel between the two men. For the
whole of Mary’s reign, the duke had effectively, then officially, been the ‘second person
of the realm,’ that is, Mary’s heir apparent.32 Lennox’s return, however, prompted
Châtelherault to believe that the effort “to bring home Lennox is chiefly for his
[Châtelherault’s] overthrow, especially if the Queen [Mary] marr[ies] Lord Darnley.”33
Such an outcome would not only presumably remove the duke from the succession due to
the strong possibility that Mary would bear an heir, a situation that could occur with any
remarriage, but also would place the throne directly into the family of his greatest enemy.
This situation thus explains both the duke’s superficial reconciliation as well as his
refusal to assist with Lennox’s restoration in any way, particularly with respect to land
transference.
In terms of relations between Lennox and various other nobles, reactions to his
restoration seemed mixed. Despite the supposed reconciliation between Châtelherault
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and Lennox, Randolph wrote that Lennox demanded two of his former properties from
the duke, “but got neither.” On the other hand, Randolph noted that “Argyll has freely
rendered what he had of Lennox’s,” a curiously simple renunciation.34 Argyll may have
determined that renouncing this small portion of his extensive lands would demonstrate
to Mary and the other nobles that he welcomed Lennox’s return to Scotland. The earl
might not have been so welcoming, however, if he had given credence to fears expressed
by some fellow protestants, including Châtelherault.
The other matter affecting Lennox’s restoration and the continued absence of his
wife and son from Scotland was the uncertainty regarding the earldom of Angus. His
wife Margaret was the daughter and only legitimate child of the sixth Earl of Angus and
his second wife Margaret Tudor. In 1564, the eighth Earl of Angus, a minor, possessed
the earldom of Angus as well as the lands to which Margaret had some claim.35
Randolph doubted “whether she will be as soon restored to Angus as her husband was to
Lennox.”36 He reported that “it is so committed to me, that but to few I dare write it, that
the earldom of Angus is confirmed by this Queen within late days to the young Earl of
Angus and heirs, from my lady and her heirs for ever.”37 While this decision appears to
be a mark of disfavor towards Lennox, in fact, as Randolph reported, “it was thought
much better to go this way to work, than to have her grace proved illegitimate, as
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earnestly it was gone about.”38

Mary clearly did not want to jeopardize Darnley,

Margaret’s son, being deemed illegitimate as well: his strong claim to the English throne
came from his maternal lineage, and an illegitimate figure could never be seriously
considered as a consort. Despite the fact that some noblemen in Scotland opposed the
unknown Darnley as an individual and as a prospective groom, particularly in light of the
“doubt…of what is his religion,” Mary appeared to be making decisions in the fall of
1564 that allowed for Darnley to remain a potential consort.39
Although these arrangements clearly benefited Darnley’s candidacy, his name had
yet to be discussed in official discourse between England and Scotland. The other matter
that kept Mary and her noble advisers occupied during the months of the Lennox
restoration was the prospect of her remarriage, particularly with respect to England.40
The fall of 1564 marked the first time when Elizabeth emphatically expressed her
preference that she thought “nothing more meet for their two realms than to have [Mary]
married to some of the noble blood of this our realm.”41 Specifically, she had offered her
own favorite, Robert Dudley, recently ennobled as Earl of Leicester. Mary was insulted
by this choice, resulting in “the late unkindness and suspicion arisen between our two
mistresses.”42 If Mary were to follow Elizabeth’s “advice and counsel in her marriage,
[Mary] will thereon proceed to inquire into her right [to the English succession] with all
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favor.”43 Mary had made clear for some time her strong desire to be named Elizabeth’s
heir in the succession; her easy capitulation regarding Lennox attests that this goal
strongly influenced her actions towards England.
As to Mary’s closest advisors, however, Randolph commented that he, Moray,
and Maitland “all agreed that in this, [Mary’s marriage,] the two realms should be joined
in some such band as could not easily be dissolved.” Significantly, Randolph also noted
that over the course of these two conversations, he thought that “something should have
been said touching my lord Darnley, of whom not a word was spoken.” This remark is
the first instance in which Darnley’s name was mentioned with respect to Mary’s
remarriage. While Randolph clearly stated that he, Moray, and Maitland did not discuss
Darnley as a potential alternative candidate, he expressed surprise at this unlikely
omission, stating that “here[, in Edinburgh,] it is through all men’s mouths.”44
At the end of November, Maitland and Moray had traveled to Berwick, just over
the English border, to meet with Randolph and the Earl of Bedford regarding Mary’s
marriage.45

Although nothing conclusive was arranged as a result of this meeting,

Maitland and Moray used the opportunity to emphasize further “how dearly we esteem
the amity of England.”46 They concluded that they had demonstrated their allegiance to
the idea of the amity through their repeated conference with English representatives.
Taking this desire for the amity to heart, as well as Moray’s stated liking for
Dudley, Randolph, based on the Berwick conference as well as on subsequent
conversations with Moray and Maitland, penned a long missive in the middle of
December regarding current thoughts on Mary’s marriage. Both Moray and Maitland
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had, after Berwick, expressed to Randolph their shared belief of “their desire ‘that he
[Dudley] before any other were matched with their Queen,’” as the pair had concluded
that “the English amity is fittest, and no man more acceptable than shall be lord Robert
[Dudley].”47 With respect to the Darnley rumors, however, Randolph broadly stated that
“more was thought of Darnley before his father’s coming than at present, [and] the father
is now here well known, [but] the mother more feared than beloved of any that know
her.” The most significant aspect of Darnley’s candidacy thus was not his character as an
individual but rather his parents and the changes they could potentially effect within
Scottish politics. Despite the lack of support for Darnley as a consort, Randolph related
that he “assuredly” knew that over the last few days, Lennox had mentioned to a Lord of
Session that “his son should marry this Queen.”

Randolph counteracted this bold

pronouncement by assuring Cecil that regarding Mary’s marriage, “‘by that which hath
been spoken of her own mouth, both of [Darnley] and his mother, that [a Darnley
marriage] shall never take effect if other wise she may have her desire.’”48
Regardless of Mary’s reported coolness towards the idea of a Darnley match,
Lennox continued to prosper in his quest for full restoration.

At the beginning of

December, Randolph had reported that a parliamentary session was imminent, but noted
that “no great matter will be done but the restitution of my lord of Lennox.”49 He
reiterated this point in a missive written after the parliament had ended. Mary had come
to the parliament on the third day and given a short oration in which she expressed that,
for “her affection to her subjects and weal of her country, [she]…was moved to restore
my lord of Lennox to his country, the rather also for the request and instant suit of her
good sister of England, whose desire to her was of no small moment.” Mary used this
47
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opportunity to demonstrate visibly to Elizabeth her willingness to acquiesce to her desires
when possible rather than to act with regard for her own subjects; for them, she produced
a barely plausible justification for her actions.

Her named reference to Elizabeth’s

request was further reiterated by Maitland, who “also used the same words as the Queen
did” regarding Elizabeth. Indeed, the Scots went so far as to claim that Lennox could
serve as a link between the queens, that his restoration “may be a mean of continual
amity between the[ir] countries.”50
Despite this seemingly seamless and supported restoration of Lennox in
parliament, other pieces of Randolph’s report suggest that the Lennox restoration
remained a matter of contention for some leading nobles. He observed that for the first
three days of the parliament, “neither the Duke nor Argyll attended, wishing to be absent
at the debate whether Lennox w[as] justly banished or not.”51 While a particularly
sensitive subject for Châtelherault, the absence of Argyll is harder to explain.

In

addition, the less authoritative account, though likely correct in this matter, the Diurnal of
Remarkable Occurrents, states that in addition to Châtelherault and Argyll, neither
Eglinton nor Glencairn attended the parliament. In a clear indication of the most valued
nobles present at the moment of Lennox’s restoration, the Diurnal records that at this
parliament, “James [E]arl of Moray bore the crown, John [E]arl of Atholl the scepter, and
David [E]arl of Crawford the sword.”52
Following the interlude wherein Maitland and Moray remained focused on the
parliament and Lennox’s restoration, the duo once again became preoccupied with the
issue of Mary’s marriage. Though they repeatedly emphasized their desire to preserve
the amity between Scotland and England, their correspondence with Cecil, while
50
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retaining a courteous and diplomatic tone, became more assertive. In a missive of 24
December, the pair strongly railed against the English interference in Mary’s marriage,
which they considered a wholly Scottish matter. They emphasized the fact that Mary
“has ever taken [Elizabeth’s] advice on her marriage,” but that Mary, as an autonomous
sovereign in her own right, “should have free choice” regarding her husband, as Elizabeth
had argued in her own marital situation.53 Indeed, Mary would not agree to a match
“unless she [were to] see probably that her reputation in the world shall not diminish
thereby,” both as an anointed queen in her own right and as dowager queen of the
powerful and prominent France. In discussing Mary’s place in the English succession,
however, Moray and Maitland implied that they would assent to and assist in persuading
Mary to accept such a match if Mary’s “title to the second place next [to Elizabeth were]
declared by parliament…in order and due time.” Their boldest declaration regarding this
point, however, is the assertion that instead of viewing a marriage between Mary and an
Englishman as a means of cementing the “perpetual amity” between the two countries, as
they did, Cecil and the council were on the “hunt for a kingdom, and go about under that
pretence to make an Englishman king of Scotland!,” a situation neither Maitland nor
Moray would favor.54
The weight carried by the joint opinion of Moray and Maitland was clearly in the
ascendant.

The same day, Randolph’s missive to Cecil noted that Mary “has now

committed herself to be advised in her marriage by these two.” From the English
perspective, this stated measure of trust was a positive development, as Moray and
Maitland were “now wholly bent towards England.” Randolph also advised Cecil of the
attitudes of some of Scotland’s other important nobles. Of particular consequence is his
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assertion that there is “no thing [Châtelhreault] misliketh thereof.” He also reported the
whole-hearted support of Argyll and Erskine, stating that “no man approves it better”
than Argyll and that Erskine “wisheth her to marry with an Englishman before any
other.”55 The general concept of an English consort for Mary therefore enjoyed the
approval of several nobles prominent within the Scottish government.
While developments regarding Mary’s marriage remained few throughout January
1565, the division between Lennox and some of the other nobles, particularly
Châtelherault, increased dramatically.

In a deep contrast with the reportedly warm

reception the nobles had granted Lennox and his restoration, a document of 3 February
entitled the “Memorial of the Enemies and Friends of Lennox” portrays an extremely
different and distinct alignment of friend and foe.56 Châtelherault had never favored the
Lennox restoration. At this point, however, a number of his allies had come to share this
perspective, including the Earls of Argyll, Glencairn, Eglinton, Cassillis, Morton, Angus,
Montrose, Rothes and Marischal, the Lords Maxwell, Erskine, Livingston, Fleming,
Yester, Borthwick, and the Hamilton, Campbell, Cunningham, Douglas, and Leslie kin
groups. This substantial faction was also joined by the “remnants of the house of Huntly”
and Moray and Maitland, who disliked Lennox because they “hope[d] to continue their
rule in the realm,” a situation they feared would change if Lennox were to continue to
prosper.

Their firm determination to oppose Lennox’s rise was likely due to the

imminent arrival of Lennox’s son, Lord Darnley, to Scotland, as the list of these enemies
of Lennox ends with an affirmation of how this collective body “hope[d] that Darnley
w[ould] embrace religion,” that is, the protestant religion of Scotland, upon his arrival
from England. In contrast to these figures, the Memorial also provides a list of those
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nobles who supported Lennox and his continued good fortune. His friends included the
Earls of Bothwell, Atholl, and Erroll, Lords Home, Ruthven, and Seton, and the lairds of
Houston, Minto, Manes, and Tulybardin.

The Memorial recognizes that if such

distinctions regarding Lennox continued to exist and flourish, “division shall follow.”57
This issue of Mary’s marriage, however, remained a matter of the utmost
importance, particularly for Moray and Maitland, whose shared favor of the amity
strongly influenced the situation.

Indeed, Randolph reported that Mary “is wholly

advised by these two lords” and that the pair remained “fully bent to do what they can to
satisfy both the Queens.” At this point, furthermore, Randolph had received assurances
from Moray and Maitland that “they will travail to persuade their sovereign to apply her
mind to [Elizabeth] in anything that may be to her honor.”58 In a demonstration of their
joint sway, at the beginning of February Randolph indicated that Mary was willing to
consider Elizabeth’s proposals in order to preserve the amity that existed between them.
His letter to Leicester of 6 February states that “this Queen is now content to give good
ear unto [Elizabeth’s] suit in your behalf, [and] by report she hath heard so much good of
your Lordship that she judge you worthy of any place of honor.”59 This effusive praise of
Leicester does not correspond with her earlier coolness towards him, but Mary’s focus
appears to have once again turned to utilizing her marriage as a means of ensuring a
formalized place in the English succession.
On 9 February 1565, an event occurred that would drastically alter all questions of
Mary’s marriage and the consequent diplomatic negotiations with England: Lord
Darnley, the son and heir of Lennox and his wife Margaret Douglas, arrived in Scotland.
Randolph provided two extremely detailed reports, one to Leicester and the other to
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Cecil, on 19 February regarding Darnley’s arrival and reception in Scotland. He wrote
that Darnley was first made “welcome” in Berwick, and after crossing the border, came
to Edinburgh, where he was immediately visited by “Morton and Glencairn and other
gentlemen.”60 In addition, Darnley “dined at the Lord Seton[’]s…[and] was with my lord
Atholl” as well.61 Darnley and Mary first met on 17 February; Darnley was “welcomed
and honorably used, [and] he lodged in the same house where she was.”62 Randolph
noted that Darnley made an extremely positive initial impression, as “his courteous
dealing with all men deserves great praise and is well spoken of” and “a great number
wish him well.”63 In contrast, however, Randolph also reported that “others doubt him,
and deeplier consider what is fit for the state of their country,” and yet others still
“suspecting his religion, can allow of nothing they see in him.” The careful consideration
these nobles gave to the arrival of this important nobleman’s son reveals that many
nobles recognized the fact that Darnley might be matched with their queen. Some men
had already formed strong opinions, for Randolph reported that some nobles were
persuaded that if Darnley were “match[ed] here [with Mary] in marriage, it shall be the
utter overthrow and subversion of them [i.e., these nobles] and their houses.”64
Towards the end of February and beginning of March 1565, reports indicate that a
close association developed between Moray and Darnley; undoubtedly, Moray realized
the young lord’s growing importance to the crown. Randolph wrote on 27 February that
Darnley went to hear John Knox preach, but emphasized that Darnley “came in the
company of Moray.” In addition, he also recounted that Darnley and Mary shared a
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dance one night, and that Darnley had been “required by Moray” to do so.65 Clearly,
Moray, and not merely Lennox, heavily influenced Darnley’s actions.66 At the beginning
of March, Randolph reported that “at a great dinner with Moray, there was Lennox and
my lord his son” and that after the dinner “we all came to her grace’s presence [and]
amongst them Moray and I had longest to talk” with her. The fact that “Lennox and his
son are well and daily at Court” may be attributed in part to Moray’s facility as a mentor.
Though a seemingly odd pairing, Moray may have become more receptive towards
Darnley since “less talk of anything intended by the Queen to him than at his first new
coming” was circulating.67 Alternatively, however, he may have wished to keep a careful
watch on Darnley.
Despite this lull in the formal discussion of a Mary-Darnley match, Lennox
retained hope for their marriage, yet he kept these desires quiet. Lennox did not actively
campaign on behalf of Darnley in the middle of March. He had no wish to leave
Scotland, however, and wrote to Cecil to request a new license so that he might be
permitted to remain in Scotland for an additional three months. He reasoned that he
could not “proceed so soon as I thought in the assurance of my lands to my son,” which
remained the stated purpose of both his and Darnley’s respective journeys to Scotland.
Lennox emphasized that his “greatest care is not to offend” Elizabeth, but that he viewed
an extended license as a “necessity”; if he did not attain it, his coming to Scotland would
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be “in vain.”68 Thus, Lennox explicitly stated in his correspondence with England that
his sole concern in Scotland with respect to Darnley was the successful assurance of his
lands.
By mid-March, however, Darnley’s name once again rose to prominence in
discussions of Mary’s marriage.69 In a sentiment echoing the earlier “Memorial on the
Enemies of Friends of Lennox,” some dissension had arisen among those nobles who
disliked the special attention Darnley received.

While Argyll profoundly “mislikes

Darnley’s coming home,” he vowed to “abide by that to which he has already given his
consent,” that is, an English match for Mary.70 The fact is that while certain individuals
such as Argyll favored a match with England, they were not enamored of Darnley as the
queen’s prospective husband.

Though Randolph cautioned that his report might be

slightly premature, he warned Cecil on 17 March that “I have to write of the Duke,
Argyll, and many other mischiefs like to grow here—some for religion—some for fear of
overthrowing their houses—some for doubt of her marriage with some papist—and never
found in my life so discontented a people as here.”71 Randolph thus observed that there
existed several factors that influenced the sentiments of various nobles; while he did not
explicitly mention Darnley, he was the only candidate at this point with the ability to
alienate other nobles for all of the reasons Randolph proposed.
Following several weeks of indecisive correspondence regarding Darnley,
Randolph’s missive to Bedford on 7 April expressed a drastic, dramatic shift among the
Scottish nobility. He informed Bedford that on 3 April, Moray had left the court at
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Stirling and that while he was “assured [it] meant nothing,” he had doubts as to the
inconsequence of Moray’s exit, remarking that he “found the court very quiet by reason
of Moray’s departure.” According to Randolph, the rumors regarding Moray stated that
he left “in displeasure, with [Mary’s] disfavor because he has of late been so plain of her”
with respect to her marriage. In the same missive, Randolph reported that since Moray’s
departure, Darnley had fallen sick with a cold and been housed in the castle by Mary. He
noted that among the nobles at court there existed “great expectation [of] what shall come
of this great favor to Darnley.”72
These feelings of dissatisfaction and speculation reached new heights by the
middle of April.

Randolph reported that negative sentiments towards Lennox and

Darnley had “now grown to further ripeness.” This shift in attitude was prompted in
large part by “the Queen’s familiarity with him, [which] breeds no small suspicion that
there is more intended than merely giving him honor for his nobility.”73 This observation
marks the first serious reference of Darnley actually receiving greater favor than was his
due as the heir to an important earldom. In fact, reported Randolph, it seemed to many at
court that Mary “has already such good liking of him that she can be content to forsake
all other offers of all suitors and content herself with her own choice.”74 Though Mary
knew of the antagonism that existed towards Darnley, she believed that selecting him
allowed her to perpetuate the amity.75 In addition, “her Majesty took…the better liking
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of him” with the passage of time, a sentiment bolstered by the fact that “their marriage
would put out of doubt their title to the [English] succession.”76
The favor accorded to Darnley resulted, according to Randolph, in bringing
Scotland “to confusion” in both an aggregate sense in terms of speculation regarding
Darnley’s role in the nobility and in the governance of the realm, and also on an
individual level, as with Châtelherault, who “takes his house [to be] quite overthrown.”77
Since Moray had yet to return to court, Maitland, who “par[took in] the griefs of the
inconveniences and dangers like[ly] to ensue” among the nobility, became a figure of
rising importance; in addition, Maitland’s position with Mary led Randolph to believe
that “he can more easily find how far [Mary and Darnley] have gone.”78 In summation,
Randolph emphasized, a good portion of the nobility, particularly the more ardent
protestants, “cry out that they are undone.”79
Towards the end of April, Elizabeth and her councilors determined that the
Darnley situation warranted additional oversight, particularly after Mary “determined to
marry him,” and therefore sent Sir Nicholas Throckmorton to Edinburgh.80 He received a
very explicit set of instructions as to how he was to proceed in Scotland. The first and
most important command was that Throckmorton should “do all to understand how far
forward the intention of marriage is between the Queen and Lord Darnley—how begun,
how liked, how to be stayed, with all necessary circumstances thereto belonging.” The
unambiguous directives were supplemented with the instruction that he should effect a
change in the matter in one of two ways, as he was ordered that “these two things we
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desire, and to obtain both you shall direct your whole actions.” The two solutions to the
match devised by Elizabeth and Cecil were for Throckmorton to “stay or dissolve” the
Darnley match or, alternatively, to “procure the Queen’s acceptance either of Leicester or
some foreign prince.”81 Thus, Throckmorton’s instructions reveal the adamant English
position that the Darnley match should not come to pass.
A dispatch penned by Randolph at the end of April provided Cecil with a clearer
picture of the developments in Scotland regarding Darnley; according to this report,
Darnley retained as much favor as ever from Mary, but many nobles had become less
pleased by his presence. He wrote that Darnley was nearly recovered from his illness,
remarking that Mary’s “care has been marvelous great and tender over him” throughout
his sickness, and that she tailored her plans to suit his capabilities: for instance, Mary
“stay[ed] her journey to St. Johnstown [Perth] for a few days” for the sake of Darnley’s
recuperation.82

Mary’s change of plans, based on being physically proximate and

emotionally attached to Darnley, demonstrate the seriousness with which she pursued
their relationship.
By the time Throckmorton arrived in Scotland, “the mutual affection of the two
lovers had already take[n] root so deep in their hearts.”83 In addition, Moray, who had
been absent from court, returned on 28 April, and though he had yet to see him in person,
Randolph reported that Moray “is suspected not to favor the Queen’s intent with
Darnley,” which, despite Darnley’s apparent position as a pawn for the amity, had long
been the case. Due to Moray’s personal dislike of the Darnley situation, Randolph
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continued that “there was never [a] man in greater care or more suspicion than [Moray] is
at present.”84
On 1 May 1565, Elizabeth and her advisors came to a definitive conclusion
regarding the issue of the Darnley marriage. The “Determination of the Privy Council”
notes that Elizabeth found Mary’s intention to marry Darnley “very strange, [and] has
communicated the same to her Council.”85 A letter of the same date from the English
Privy Council to Mary also states that they found the marriage unsettling, as Darnley and
his parents were Elizabeth’s “subjects and so much bound to her and the crown of
England as none could be more.”86 Thus, while Elizabeth had previously decreed that
any Englishman would make Mary a suitable husband, she and the English Privy Council
determined that a match with Darnley “would be unmeet, unprofitable and perilous to the
sincere amity between the Queens and their realms.”87 This amity, while important to
Mary on the surface, did not seem to resonate beyond Elizabeth’s control in deciding
whether or not to acknowledge Mary officially as her successor. In contrast, several of
Mary’s councilors, particularly Moray and Maitland, had worked unceasingly to utilize
Mary’s marriage to preserve and strengthen the amity.
Since neither Elizabeth nor her council would approve of a Darnley marriage,
they offered Mary “a free election of any other of the nobility either in this whole realm
or isle…agreeable to both the realms.”88 The English had previously made such a
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statement, and the nobleman Mary chose was Darnley. Thus, by denouncing Mary’s
choice of Darnley, Elizabeth and her councilors not only contradicted their previous
condition for an agreeable marriage, but also produced a document that blatantly
demonstrated belief in their veto power over Mary’s choice of a husband and any other
seemingly wholly Scottish matter. In addition, Elizabeth now revealed that “only with
Leicester [do] we mean to inquire, judge or publish her title.”89 The definitive limitations
this statement placed on Mary being named to the succession directly contradicted the
lure that the English had offered in many months of negotiations.
While the multiple declarations on behalf of Elizabeth and the English Privy
Council clearly demonstrate their collective negative reaction towards the Darnley match,
reported sentiment in Scotland did not, on the whole, favor the match either.

As

Randolph commented at the beginning of May, there existed in Scotland “such
discontent, large talk, and open speech [as] I never heard in any nation.” In addition, he
concluded that he could perceive no feasible solution and that it “must burst out in great
mischief.” He attributed a good amount of the mounting friction regarding the Darnley
marriage to the fact that Mary had made the match “without advice, and other as evil
things they suspect, [particularly] her unprincely behavior.” This rejection of advice
from her nobility marked a fundamental affront to traditional noble privilege. More
drastically, Randolph realized that the nobles and other discontented persons “will shortly
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either have it reformed, or openly signify that what she has taken in hand tends to her
own destruction and overthrow of tranquility of her realm.”90
This discontent, Randolph argued, stemmed from the fact that the idea of the
Darnley marriage caused many of the nobles to “think their nation dishonored, the Queen
shamed, and [the] country undone.”91 Despite this seemingly universal dislike of Lennox
and Darnley, however, some members of the Scottish nobility remained warm towards
the pair.

For instance, the Earls of Cassillis and Lennox signed a formal bond of

friendship on 4 May. This document asserts that there “has been a continual friendship,
familiarity, and inward kindness standing…between the said houses.” The current heads
of the respective houses desired to “renew the said Ancient Amity…reciprocally given
and delivered…[with] equal bands.” An essential element of this formalized friendship
was the reciprocal recognition that “at what time it ever we be required by the said Earl
shall be in readiness as friends, assisters, and partakers to concur with his actions, causes,
and quarrels, whatsoever as said is.”92
Ignoring the lack of unanimity among the nobles on the possible marriage,
Randolph observed that Mary “is now in utter contempt of her people.”93 He attributed
their strong reaction to be in part due to the fact that with her lack of submission to the
English response, she, with the Darnley marriage, has “ever assured that she can never
attain what she so earnestly looked for,” a place in the English succession.94

The

determination with which she had pursued this goal had stimulated similar sentiment
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among some of her nobility, and thus her surrender at this juncture seemed like an act of
weakness.
Mary’s grievous actions had alienated some of her most prominent and important
advisors; Randolph noted that this reaction had, in some cases, become mutual. He
further reported that she had uttered “sore words…against the Duke, [that] she mortally
hates Argyll, and so far suspects Moray.” He further affirmed the existence of mutual
discontent between Mary and these leading figures in providing evidence of “bands and
promises [that] were made between the Duke and Moray, that nothing shall be attempted
against each other, but defended to the uttermost.” In a similar vein, “Glencairn, having
been required by Lennox to do the like, has refused and joined the Duke.” On the other
hand, Randolph reported that Maitland “is suspected to favor Darnley more than he
would seem.”

Despite these individual quarrels and alliances, Randolph repeatedly

emphasized the dire nature of the situation, stating that “suspicions arise on every side,”
resulting in the current state of the realm being that “the country is broken.”95
In addition to a visibly increased dislike of Darnley as a candidate for consort,
Randolph’s report also contains information about the declining social position of
Darnley and Lennox. He blasted Lennox for his extreme behavior, accusing him of
possessing “such pride, excess in vanities, proud looks and spiteful words, and so poor a
purse [as] I [have] never heard of.” Lennox’s finances were in such dire straits, wrote
Randolph, that he had to borrow 500 crowns from Maitland. Despite the difficulty of his
current situation, Lennox and his men were “boldier and saucier with the Queen’s self
and many noble men.” Lennox realized that, at this point, his only opportunity within the
Scottish power structure was to place his son on the throne; thus, he and Darnley both
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displayed so much pride and elicited such “envy,” that “there is almost no
society…amongst them.”96
Despite the problematic lack of support for Lennox and Darnley by many of her
nobles and advisors, Mary pursued the Darnley marriage. She attempted to gain Moray’s
support for the match in early May. Upon his return to the court at Stirling, Mary
commanded him in writing to “promise to allow, grant and consent unto her marriage
with the lord Darnley” if he wished to remain “her most obedient subject” and “avoid her
high displeasure.”97 Although Moray requested time to consider the matter, “that was
denied him” by Mary, and he was forced to present an undesirable answer, as “he would
be loath to consent to the marriage of any such one of whom there was so little hope that
he would be a favorer…of the thing most to be desired,” protestantism. By stating his
disfavor towards “any such one,” Moray skillfully generalized the situation so that,
although he did not personally favor Darnley, his answer was not entirely offensive. But
despite his desire to maintain his place of power at Mary’s side, a “great altercation”
arose between them. “To have like consent of all or most part of the other noblemen,”
Mary sent for “diverse of the greatest…to be at [the court] at Stirling” by 14 May 1565.98
In anticipation of the meeting of the nobility on 14 May, Randolph wrote to Cecil
regarding additional honors Mary intended to bestow at this assembly. He observed that
it “pleases [Mary] to advance him [Darnley] to the highest degrees she can call him to,”
to ennoble him first as Lord of Armannoch and then as Earl of Ross and Duke of
Rothsay, “which are the three chief honors of her patrimony, and never before given to
any but the king’s own sons.” Mary therefore sought to utilize these titles to make
Darnley the equivalent of a king’s son, a rank that would enable them to marry as equals.
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Thus, “to this solemnity are assembled the chief estates of this realm to have their full
consents as well as to the marriage as to these grants, which never yet were given from
the Crown.” Since Mary did not have the power, as dictated by tradition, to bestow these
honors upon Darnley, and since she desired the approval of a majority of her nobility to
do so, an assembly of nobles would allow her to present the two ideas formally and
concurrently. The perceived importance of this assembly was so great that “besides
Argyll, [Randolph] knew not who of the noblemen will be absent.” Reflecting the dual
considerations of this assembly and his instructions, Randolph remarked that the
“earnestness” with which Mary was pursuing the Darnley match at this point indicated
“neither that she can or will be persuaded to take any other in marriage.”99
Throckmorton delivered further details regarding the upcoming assembly in a
missive dated the following day, 12 May. He reported in this message that Mary, “with
the consent of 12 or 13 nobles, minds to create on Sunday [13 May, the next day] the lord
Darnley [E]arl of Ross.” She apparently intended to bestow the elevation with the
permission of a fraction of her nobility and then present it to the full noble assembly the
following day as a completed action. This smaller group of nobles, furthermore, would
“make a band to obey the Queen and him in this their marriage.” Thus, like the fait
accompli she would present regarding Darnley’s title, Mary would also introduce the
subject of her marriage at the full assembly after already having obtained approval from a
group of her nobles, thereby strengthening her case. Throckmorton also noted that Argyll
still “refused to come to this convention, though [he was] sent for.” Argyll was the only
individual identified by both Randolph and Throckmorton as still declining to attend the
assembly. With respect to Moray, Throckmorton reported that in order for him to support
the match, “he will have the Queen leave the mass and quit all popery…[but] she and
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Darnley will no wise agree thereto,” and thus the stalemate between Mary and Moray had
yet to end.100 In addition to presenting him as Earl of Ross, Mary showered additional
honors upon Darnley over the course of the convention, including allowing him to create
14 new knights.101
On 19 May, the Privy Council, consisting of Châtelherault, Argyll, Morton,
Moray, Atholl, Glencairn, Erskine, and Ruthven, met at Stirling to call two meetings of
nobles.102 The first was the calling of a parliament, which Mary and the nobles “thought
expedient” to hold. The assembly was scheduled to “begin at Edinburgh upon the 20th
day of July next to come.”103 The Privy Council believed, however, that in order to
ensure that “all things needful [would] be treated” at the parliament, the Lords of the
Secret Council should “convene in St. Johnstown upon the tenth day of June next to
come.”104
In the wake of this assembly, at which Mary’s actions drastically altered
perceptions regarding the potential for a Darnley marriage, repercussions and reactions
varied among the nobles. As to Elizabeth’s own instructions, Throckmorton wrote that
he was not granted an audience with Mary until the day of Darnley’s creation as Earl of
Ross, at which time he related Elizabeth’s “misliking and disallowance of [Mary’s] hasty
proceeding with the lord Darnley” and that, in her mind, Darnley “and his parents had
failed of their duties by their arrogant and presumptuous attempts” to negotiate the
marriage without Elizabeth’s express permission. Mary remained intent on pleasing
Elizabeth over any of the nobles of her own realm, and thus she
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is so far passed in this matter with Darnley as it is irrevocable and no place
left to dissolve the same by persuasion or reasonable means, otherwise
than by violence, albeit the matter is not yet consummate[d], neither shall
be…these three months, in which time she will use all means to procure
your acceptance, and leave nothing undone to win your favor.105
Though the sentiment expressed remains diplomatic and considerate, Mary’s refusal to
turn away from the marriage demonstrates her true intention to pursue the marriage and
hope for Elizabeth’s eventual capitulation.106
The final part of Throckmorton’s lengthy report on the status of the realm relates
the actions he anticipated would occur in the near future. He enclosed a list of the honors
received by Darnley at the recent assembly as well as the exact oath that Darnley took to
Mary, which Throckmorton believed “not convenient for any [of] your subjects to make
to any foreign prince.” With the dissolution of the convention, Throckmorton noted that
several of the most significant nobles of the realm, including Châtelherault, Moray, and
Glencairn, are “all go[ing] to their houses forthwith for a time.”

In addition,

Throckmorton continued, Mary now turned her attention to bringing Darnley and Lennox
back into the elite circle of nobles, since “she has travailed earnestly to compound [the]
difference betwixt Argyll and Lennox.” While these nobles scattered geographically
following the assembly, Throckmorton cautioned Elizabeth that Mary “intend[ed] to
summon the Estates of her parliament the 20th July next…to put in readiness for
parliament some matters concerning religion and ecclesiastical policy…[and] it is
look[ed] for [there that] they shall show conformity to this marriage.”107 Mary clearly
believed that with time and a little persuasion, she could garner adequate support for her
marriage.
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The continuous narrative provided by Throckmorton indicates that, for most of
the month of May, the majority of the nobility possessed a negative attitude towards
Mary because of the manner in which she approached the Darnley match. Randolph,
whose writing was less prolific during these weeks, penned a missive on 21 May that
further substantiates Throckmorton’s observations.

He wrote of the “pitiful and

lamentable estate of this poor Queen”; this description contrasts with the previous
perception of Mary being deemed “so worthy, so wise, [and] so honorable.”108 Mary, due
to her dealings with Darnley, “hath brought her honor in question, her estate in hazard,
[and] her country to be torn in pieces!”109

Though Randolph had issued a similar

apocalyptic lament in earlier correspondence, that instance occurred prior to the assembly
of the nobility.
Randolph also remained less confident than Throckmorton regarding AngloScottish relations, deeming that “the amity between the countries [is] like[ly] to be
dissolved.” Unlike Throckmorton, Randolph clearly did not believe that any intervention
Elizabeth would exercise at this point would have a positive effect on the situation. In an
interesting observation that Throckmorton did not make, Randolph revealed the status of
Mary and Darnley’s personal relationship, stating that the combination of her love for
him and his overwhelming, “intolerable” pride has made Darnley “almost forgetful of his
duty to her [who] already…has adventured so much for his sake.” Randolph concluded
his formal and final opinion regarding the Darnley match in his determination that “it can
never be either to the honor of God, weal of both realms and my sovereign’s surety that
the Lord Darnley should be approved husband to the Queen of Scotland.”110 The strong

108

Randolph to Leicester (21 May 1565), CSPS II: 166.
Ibid., 167-68.
110
Ibid., 167-68.
109

49
language present throughout his missive, coupled with this dire statement of finality,
demonstrates the firmness with which Randolph felt he must act.
In addition to this alarming rendition of the state of affairs in Scotland, Randolph
wrote another letter to Cecil on the same day, 21 May, regarding the individual
circumstances that existed for particular nobles. To begin with, he stated that Lennox’s
“will is more to see his son thus advanced than he knows how to work it”: despite
Lennox’s years as an agent of both the English and Scottish crowns, in Randolph’s
opinion he remained an individual of mediocre competency, particularly in the face of
adversity, and possessed a distinct lack of enthusiastic peer support.111 Randolph also
reported the presence of Châtelherault at court, commending him for his good nature and
plain dealings despite the fact that “his danger is so great,” a reference to the potential
fate of the house of Hamilton should Darnley, a Lennox Stewart, become consort.
Argyll, he praised, retained “stoutness in defense of religion and his house,” a position
further supported by Glencairn, Boyd, and Ochiltree. He described Moray as being “true,
faithful, honorable, earnest and stout both for defense of God’s glory and safety of his
Sovereign’s honor,” adding that Moray remained concerned about the future of the amity.
Randolph also mentioned other nobles in passing, including the Earls of Atholl and
Morton and Lords Maxwell and Ruthven, but, overall, he concluded that “the most part
are clean against” the marriage, which they perceived, on the whole, as being “against
God’s glory, the weal of their country, and their Sovereign’s honor.”112

While

Randolph’s remarks are biased due to his position, the sentiment he reported, even if it
existed to a lesser extent than he portrayed, becomes strikingly clear in its vehemence.
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Through the end of May and the beginning of June, sentiments towards Darnley
on the whole remained the same, as “the hatred towards him and his house [is]
marvelous[ly] great,” while concurrently “the time now grows more dangerous.”113 The
precise meaning of this last statement remains unclear, as Randolph did not provide a
specific reason for this conclusion. He did caution that with Argyll, who vehemently
disliked Darnley, “if he be not to be made your friend, you will find him a shrewd
enemy.”114 Several days later, Randolph provided some measure of substantiation to his
earlier claim: “there was some hope that time would have wrought another mind in this
Queen, [but] there is no alteration to be seen.”115 Thus, the danger Randolph alluded to
in his last missive is, in actuality, a manifestation of the discontent felt by the nobles who
had believed that Mary would have changed her mind regarding Darnley by this point in
time, the beginning of June. The nobles closest to Mary reflected this disheartened
outlook, as is clear from Randolph’s report that Mary’s “councilors now are those she
liked worst [and] the nearest of her kin [are] the farthest from her heart,” as evidenced in
particular by her rift with Moray, who “liveth where he pleases.”116
Rather than lessening her determination to marry Darnley, Mary instead
continued to attempt to elicit support from her nobles, prompting her to call another
convention of nobles in Perth on 10 June, for which “the end of it is to persuade those
present to allow her marriage with Lord Darnley.”117 Since Mary clearly believed that
settling the matter of religion in the realm would profoundly influence some of the nobles
to alter their attitudes, she resolved at “next parliament, [to] establish a law for
religion,—thinking there is no other cause why they should mislike what husband soever
113
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she take, so that they may have their consciences free.” Despite reports from Randolph
and Throckmorton which indicated wide discontent due to the choice of Darnley, this
missive suggests that there were still some nobles who, for a variety of reasons, continued
to support Mary. Because her choice had caused dissension among her nobility and had
alienated many of her leading councilors, she found it prudent to “count their friends:
Atholl, Caithness, Erroll, Montrose, Fleming, Cassillis, Montgomery, Home, Lindsay,
[and] Ruthven.” These men, asserted Randolph, were “assured of” favoring Mary in the
parliament. Nevertheless, despite this list of five earls and five lords who supported her,
Mary lacked support from several notable and powerful figures, and thus, for instance,
she sought “by all means to reconcile the Duke and Lennox.”118
This convention, however, never occurred; religious dispute prevented it. Despite
the fact that several of the nobles whom Mary counted as ‘friends’ were protestant and
that some of those against her were Catholic, Randolph reported that the convention was
cancelled because “where the Protestants intended to be so many…the Papists mistrusted
them.”119 In addition to not having the opportunity again to address opposing nobles,
Mary, though she was unaware of it, became less secure in her quest to convince them to
support her marriage. Elizabeth wrote to Randolph on 8 June that, as she understood the
situation, the Darnley match elicited opposition from some of the Scottish nobility
because were the marriage to occur, “the cause of religion should be oppressed and the
amity [to] decay.”120 Because Elizabeth found this situation undesirable, she authorized
him to “assure all such as are well minded….that she will concur and assist them
therein.”121 This promise dramatically altered the situation from the perspective of “all”
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the men to whom Elizabeth referred, as it introduced the notion of visible English
intervention. The last time Elizabeth intervened in Scottish affairs beyond the diplomatic
channels, the Reformation Parliament of 1560 forever changed the Scottish landscape.
As a result, the nobles opposing the marriage could now view Mary’s choice of Darnley
as one in which they could, with English help, effect a real and substantial change.
In addition, such a decree bolstered the resolve of some of the nobles who
opposed Mary, as their efforts and opinions were being recognized and validated.
Elizabeth also promised those nobles who opposed the Darnley marriage that, if the
situation should deteriorate such that they should require her assistance, “in the end they
shall find the fruits of their labor and constancy to the honor of God, the comfort of their
sovereign and the felicity of their whole country.”122 She essentially gave these nobles
permission to act boldly in a manner that may not have previously occurred to them or, if
it had, served to encourage strongly their collective determination. While this missive
was addressed to Randolph, its contents clearly were meant to be shared with a certain
group of men.123
Though the remainder of the month of June remained relatively quiet, the
beginning of July witnessed a surge of reported factionalism among the most prominent
members of the Scottish nobility. On 1 July, Randolph received an ambiguous letter
from Moray and Argyll that informed him of a meeting between nobles. Moray wrote
that “my lord of Argyll, my lord Boyd and I have convened this day together to
determine upon some matters of consequence, the which we are willing to communicate
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unto you.”124 Randolph would likely have been able to determine that the trio had met
regarding Darnley but would not have been able to know the contents of their discussion.
In a related incident, on 6 July Randolph reported that “the Earl of Argyll has
gathered his whole forces against the Earl of Atholl and intends to invade [Atholl’s
lands].”125 In addition, a letter to Argyll from his noteworthy cousin Colin Campbell
described Atholl as being their enemy.126 Though this personal conflict had yet to affect
directly either man’s view towards Lennox, the mention of Argyll raising an army figured
significantly, as Randolph also wrote that “we shall soon hear of some attempt by
[Argyll] and others against the Earl of Lennox.” Though Argyll was only one of many
individuals who remained opposed to the Darnley marriage, Randolph further informed
Cecil that “on the 15th instant the protestants assemble again at Glasgow, where will be
the Duke, the earls, and others of that faction.”127

At this point, Randolph clearly

believed that factions were developing along religious lines. Although perhaps true for
this particular meeting, previous missives indicated that, with respect to the Darnley
match, men of both religious persuasions remained on each side of the issue.
The splintering of the nobility had reached a critical juncture. Randolph reported
the following day that “her country [is] broken round about…[as Mary] herself so left of
all her nobility (at least the best) that she knows not which way to turn.”128 This
description indicates a particular surrender on Mary’s part, at least where her nobles were
concerned. Because of the number of nobles who no longer attended her council, such as
Moray and Argyll, and due to the dispatch of several key figures to areas beyond the
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court, “of her whole council there is none left near her but Lord Erskine.”129 Until the
very recent past, Erskine had been a minor figure at council, overshadowed by more
experienced noblemen.
With her intentions regarding marriage finally made clear, Mary now sought to
assure both ardent and moderate protestants of her continued commitment towards
maintaining the changes wrought by the 1560 Reformation Parliament. Her selection of
Darnley, a figure of religious suspicion, as consort raised doubts regarding her
commitment to protestantism as well as engendered the possibility of a Catholic heir to
the throne. This potential for Catholicism to continue with the next generation of the
monarchy, rather than any immediate concerns, was surely the greatest threat to the
longevity of protestantism in Scotland. In addition, her council determined that “diverse
evil given persons,” were spreading “untrue reports to alienate the hearts and love of the
good subjects” in an attempt to incite outrage among protestants. To alleviate such fears
and counter such rumors, Mary and her Privy Council issued an “Assurance of the State
of Religion” on 12 July. The proclamation reminded her subjects that since Mary’s
return to Scotland in August 1561, no subject had “hitherto been molested in the quiet
using of their religion,” so they should realize that they shall not “be inquieted in that
behalf in any time to come.” Her subjects, the proclamation reasoned, should dismiss the
rumors being spread and not be tempted to take any action beyond “behaving themselves
honestly as good subjects.”130
In July, however, the situation changed yet again, this time in a much sharper and
more final sense. Randolph reported that he had previously heard a rumor that “though
then [he thought] false, I now write it with better assurance.” He reported that “on
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Monday last the 9th this Queen was secretly married in her own palace to the Lord
Darnley, [with] not above seven persons present and went that day to their bed to the
Lord Seton’s house.”131 This quick but essential note conveyed the absolute defiance
with which Mary acted in marrying Darnley, both in terms of Randolph’s primary
concern, with respect to England, and in terms of the status of her own nobility. The
reported secrecy with which the marriage ceremony occurred indicates that Mary did not
believe an open state function would result in a positive outcome. Instead, by opting to
present a legal and consummated marriage, she circumvented her nobility, an indication
of Mary’s priorities and her willingness to act without her nobles in their traditional
capacity.
The issue of religion was merely one facet of Darnley’s personality and
circumstances to which some of the Scottish nobles were opposed.

Select nobles

objected to him and his rapid ascendancy so much as to accuse Darnley of behavior that
would alienate those individuals who supported his rise to Mary’s side. Specifically, the
Earl of Moray accused Darnley and his friends of conspiring to kill him. When Mary and
her Privy Council were informed of how Moray and his close ally Argyll attempted to
“persuade all men” that the conspiracy existed, she determined the affront to Darnley’s
character to be “such a matter as her Majesty cannot suffer untried.”132 Accordingly, on
17 July she decided, with the advice of her Privy Council, at that session consisting
merely of Lennox, Chancellor Morton, and Erskine, to order the earls to certify the
details of the “alleged conspiracy, the form and manner of it, and the name of the
reporter.” Demonstrating her priorities, Mary further declared that if they delayed in this
accounting, she would be forced to surmise that the earls had “invented this brute and tale
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of their own heads” with the intent to “raise tumult” and “to bring her Highness and the
said Earl of Ross [Darnley’s elevated title] in hatred of her good subjects.”133 While the
order does not label the earls’ actions as being treasonous, to accuse such influential
figures of inciting hatred of the anointed monarch represents a more serious accusation.
That Mary seemed equally offended by the affront to her and to Darnley accentuates the
heights to which he had climbed in such a short period.
A further indication of his place of intimacy at Mary’s court is evident in a letter
from Randolph to Cecil reporting that Mary “and my lord Darnley walked…until
suppertime, and returned together again, but late that night…this manner of passing to
and fro gave again occasion to many men to muse what might be her meaning.”134
Mary’s determination to marry him at this point also becomes clear in a conversation
Randolph disclosed as having occurred between them, as he “said [to her] that I knew no
better than to send home both the lord of Lennox and lord Darnley, then should my
mistress [Elizabeth] and she be friends and her country at good repose and quietness as it
was before.”135 Randolph clearly believed the Darnley issue to be at the root of the
problems between various members of the nobility.

In addition, Mary’s sensitivity

towards the matter and her desire to cease all discussion regarding her marriage is evident
in Randolph’s observation that “in any thing that is spoken unto her of misliking of her
marriage doth more offend her than any thing that can be said.”136
Whether or not Moray’s accusation that Darnley intended to kill him was
accurate, Mary’s subsequent actions further demonstrate Darnley’s rapid rise.

In

response to Mary’s order of a complete and truthful accounting, Moray declared that he
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was “contented to come to her Majesty” to provide a report of the threat to his life. In a
gesture of fairness, as well as a demonstration of her belief that Moray was not in mortal
danger, Mary and her Privy Council reiterated to him on 19 July that she and the nobles
in her proximity swore that “neither he, or they of his company, shall be molested,
inquieted, or in any sort grieved or troubled in body or goods in their coming and
repairing toward her Majesty.”137 As a further pledge of security, this assurance was
signed by Mary, the Privy Council, and the other nobility present.
In this instance, a collection of ‘extraordinary’ members attended the Privy
Council session, “presently convened and assembled within this burgh of Edinburgh to
do her Highness’s service.”138 That is, in addition to Lennox, Morton, and Erskine, all of
whom are recorded as having attended the previous session in which the Moray issue
originated, a considerable number of lords attended this session as well, including Lords
Hume, Fleming, Livingston, Lindsay, Lovet, Somerville, and Borthwick, various
commendators of abbeys, and Walter Ker of Cessford and Thomas Ker of Pharnyhirst.139
The recording of these names in the Privy Council records indicates that this declaration
was a document to which there were many witnesses, lending it greater authority and
ensuring that its contents were known to a goodly number of the Scottish nobility. While
the presence of many nobles lent the promise an increased authority, Mary was not
actually taking the advice and opinions of all of these men.

Rather, as Randolph

reported, “counsel she taketh of no man but the lord Lennox and his son [Darnley], David
[Rizzio], and the lady Erskine. At this present of her old councilors she hath at the court
only these, the lord Erskine and lord of Lethington.”140 Thus, her circle of intimate
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advisors had declined drastically in size, indicating that only a few nobles remained
actively willing to give her the advice she wished to hear regarding her marriage.
During the same session of the Privy Council, Mary issued a command “with the
advice of her Council” that now required Moray to account for his actions and
accusations in person.141 Although he had already stated his intention to do so, the force
with which Mary issued her new condition indicates the degree to which his accusations
against Darnley both angered and worried her. Had she not been concerned about what
kind of impact they might have on Darnley’s reputation and, by extension, her own
decision to marry and elevate him, she would not have so emphatically charged him
“surely [to] repair toward her Grace for making of his purgation and further declaration
of the truth before” her in the quick space of three days. She furthermore would not have
threatened him, knowing his intention to come to her anyway, that should he fail to
appear, that she would “use such rigor against him in bringing of the said allegiance to
light as her Grace may of the laws of her realm.”142 Mary clearly assumed that Moray’s
accusations possessed detrimental potential regardless of their accuracy. The true issue at
hand was her desire to continue on her course with the crucial support of her nobility.
Based on the records of the 19 July Privy Council session, it is evident that a great
portion of the Scottish nobility had come to Edinburgh “to do her Highness’s service.”143
Not until 20 July, however, was a proclamation issued concerning this extraordinary
meeting of the nobility.

In a clear indication of the importance of the ambiguous

“service” the nobles would render to Mary, the document declared that for the duration of
this convention of nobility, “it is convenient that they lay aside all particular quarrels,
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grudges, and faults …[so that no] tumult may be raised…[nor] her Majesty’s service in
any sort impeded.”144
This order at once acknowledged an awareness of the existence of personal feuds
and recognized that such problems were brought into the sphere of government. Despite
the general order to cease personal feuds, however, Randolph reported only days earlier
of the numerous escalating feuds that showed no signs of subsiding:
Within these six days a discord risen between the lord Yester and the
Homes in an action of the lord of Lethington; the lord Seton looked for,
who hath quarrel against the Douglas; the [E]arl Bothwell, enemy to all
honest men, written for; Edinburgh never so without order; in Fife the
[E]arl of Rothes and lord Lindsay at daily discord; of the [E]arl of Argyll
and Atholl your honor hath heard.145
In addition, the service for which the nobles had gathered merited an explicit order to
forbid regular allowances. The further warning that none of the nobility should “take
upon hand to invade, molest, or pursue others in any way, or to make any provocation or
occasion of displeasure…in their coming, remaining or departing” served as a reminder
to all the nobles present, many of whom had specific grievances with other nobles at that
Privy Council session, that their purpose in meeting was to focus on the business of the
crown rather than becoming consumed by their personal quarrels.146
In a proclamation dated 22 July, the Privy Council formally acknowledged the
various rumors centered around court and, specifically, Darnley, as well as the feared
results of these veiled accusations and whispers. The declaration acknowledged “untrue
reports…that her Majesty has intended to impede, stay, or molest any of [her subjects] in
the using of their religion and conscience freely” had been circulating amongst her
subjects.147
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uncertainty, specifically that Mary intended to retract protestant victories, the focus
immediately became religious policy. Mary and the council could then point to the
numerous declarations of the assurance of the state of religion, including the most recent
such proclamation of 12 July.
Furthermore, in drawing attention to the lack of strength of the “untrue reports,”
the 22 July proclamation also asserted that the stakes in this conflict had risen. Whereas
formerly they were merely “untrue reports” to which subjects should give no credence,
the crown now admitted that despite Mary’s lack of desire to alter the “good and quiet
estate of the common weal,” these rumors had resulted in causing “great grief [to] her
Highness, seeing a great number of her lieges causes to have taken up arms.” Because
these individuals had acted as they did despite her wishes, in order to maintain “due
safety and preservation,” Mary called upon them “in fear of war…[to] come to her
Majesty with all possible haste.”148 These declarations mark the first use of the language
of war, a seemingly hostile and extreme measure given the actual events that had
occurred.
The matter of the Earl of Moray resurfaced on 28 July. Though he was partially
responsible for the “untrue reports” cited in the previous proclamations of the Privy
Council, no specific names were mentioned in those declarations.149 In reality, however,
it is important to remember that Mary and her councilors suspected his actions and
motives since he had left the Privy Council. The Council session of 28 July, however,
records “with what earnest [Moray] desires to speak with her Majesty…for discharging
of him self of such bruits as has been reported to him toward the alleged conspiracy of his
slaughter.”150 In spite of Mary’s threatening order of compeerance issued the previous
148
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week, or perhaps because of her vehement tone, Moray still clearly wanted to convey his
desire to comply with her wishes.151 His eager behavior here contrasts sharply with his
quick turnabout in the following week, the first week of August 1565.
In addition to demonstrating his commitment to Mary’s order of compeerance,
Moray also acknowledged her efforts for his personal safety. At this later date, however,
Mary and her councilors, at this session merely Lennox, Atholl, Morton and Erskine, also
provided the specific parameters that she was willing to concede: notably, Mary extended
the assurance of his safety to “four score other persons with him in company,” recorded
that his safety would be guaranteed in transit “betwixt the date hereof [28 July] and the
last day of July instant,” and stipulated that Moray and his followers should “be at the
same place and room they come from in full liberty at their pleasure and forty eight hours
thereafter.”152 On one hand, these parameters are exacting, as though, from Moray’s
perspective, Mary could not guarantee his safety if he could not operate within these
restrictions; however, it is also possible that Mary instituted these parameters with her
marriage ceremony of 29 July in mind and, knowing his opposition to the match, wished
to restrict his movements and the number of followers she would permit within
Edinburgh. Mary could nearly be certain that Moray would follow these restrictions in
hopes of a fair hearing regarding the supposed conspiracy against him and she could
therefore be assured that he would not bring a large following into the city on the eve or
immediately following her contentious marriage.
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CHAPTER III: THE CHASEABOUT RAID

At the Privy Council meeting of 28 July 1565, Mary and her advisers issued an
order to serve as a public announcement regarding her forthcoming marriage. They also
stipulated that the declaration should be “registered and inserted in the books of our
Council ad perpetuam rei memoriam.”

The announcement first reiterated Mary’s

intention to “complete the band of matrimony…with the right noble and illustrious Prince
Henry, Duke of Albany, etc.” Of greater significance, however, was the declaration that
for the duration of the marriage, Mary “ordain[ed] and consent[ed] that he be named and
styled King of this our kingdom, and that all our letters to be direct[ed] after our said
marriage…[to] us as King and Queen of Scotland conjunctly.”1
The significance and repercussions of this pronouncement cannot be
overemphasized. Although many nobles who disliked Darnley were certainly aware that
he and Lennox were angling for Darnley to be granted an official position and title within
government, they likely did not imagine that he would be placed on an equal footing with
Mary. While this proclamation did not grant him the ‘crown matrimonial,’ the title of
‘king’ demonstrates the lengths to which she was willing to go to please and appease
Darnley and his father.2 Darnley was born an English subject whom Mary artificially
raised to the Scottish peerage, first as the Earl of Ross and then the Duke of Albany,
traditionally Scottish royal titles. When she conferred each of these titles, dissension
arose. Mary must have realized that this proclamation would incite further discord. The
act of raising an individual noble subject to the level of royalty and to share her royal
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authority and power with him made for awkward governance and created problems
among other noble subjects.
Randolph noted the suddenness of this proclamation but also noble participation
in it: “this night very near 9 o’clock, my lord Darnley was proclaimed king of
Scotland…I know not what this haste means.”3 This missive provides an alternative
perspective on the seemingly glorious and potent proclamation issued by the Privy
Council. Randolph’s message indicates that while Darnley was proclaimed king by some
members of the nobility, those that acclaimed his new status were those men who
conveniently happened to be in the queen’s presence at the time, which, given the
extensive reports of Mary’s shrinking circle of councilors, suggests only her most loyal
nobles. In addition, Randolph’s perplexity regarding the rush to proclaim Darnley king
implies that Mary had a particular reason to hurry. Indeed, the pronouncement would
give the title ‘king’ an opportunity to take popular effect, thus potentially influencing
parliament to confer it. The haste in proclaiming Darnley king also reveals Mary’s desire
to legitimize their union in a public display. Mary and Darnley were married on 29 July
at Holyroodhouse at six in the morning “with great magnificence, accompanied with the
whole nobility of this realm.”4
As a further affirmation of Mary’s desire to elevate Darnley with a royal title and
thus make him her equal in rank, an “illustrious Prince,” this proclamation was repeated,
nearly verbatim, on the day following her marriage. By repeating her declaration that she
and Darnley should be viewed “conjunctly” as the monarchs of the realm, Mary clearly
3
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wanted to show her firm commitment to this notion. The repetition of the proclamation
“now since the said marriage is fully solemnized and completed, at the pleasure and will
of God” reveals that Mary felt that the unpopular statement required further emphasis in
order to take hold.5
The marriage heightened the hostile situation that had developed between Mary
and Moray. Moray failed to appear before Mary to account for his accusation against
Darnley, doubtless because of the unsubstantial nature of his evidence.6 Mary clearly
wished to discredit any remaining rumors that had stemmed from Moray’s earlier
accusations; her most efficient method of doing so was to discredit Moray himself.
Accordingly, Mary did not neglect the matter of Moray’s scheduled appearance, which
was “diverse times gently required.” In the Privy Council session of 1 August, she
acknowledged the situation with Moray and the next logical step for her to pursue as a
defied monarch. The session was very well attended, including not only the regular
council of Morton, Atholl, Erroll, Glencairn, Mar, and Ruthven, but also a large section
of the ‘extraordinary’ nobility: Crawford, Cassillis, Hume, Semphill, Somerville, Lovett,
Cathcart, Lindsay, Gray, Glamis, Borthwik, Hay, and Livingston.7
At this critical juncture, the council charged Moray, who had “hitherto
disobediently absented himself,” to “present him self before their Majesties at
Edinburgh…to answer to such things as shall be laid to his charge.” No longer did his
appearance have the stated purpose of making a full and truthful report to sort out a
straightforward legal issue; rather, Moray was being called to account for a number of
matters that had occurred recently. Notably, since Darnley was immediately included in
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the fabric of Mary’s government, Moray was now held solely accountable and was
required to appear before them, not merely Mary. In addition, this decision regarding
how to handle Moray was decided by “the King and Queen’s Majesties, with advice of
the Lords of their Secret Council.” Despite the fact that the throne had belonged to Mary
for more than twenty years, she immediately and seamlessly deferred to Darnley. In a
final indication of the deteriorating situation between Moray and Mary’s council, at this
date the punishment for failing to appear before the monarchs would be to “denounce him
rebel and put him to the horn.”8
The next day, 2 August, “for certain reasonable causes and considerations moving
their Highnesses,” two men viewed as sympathizing with Moray were placed under a
form of house arrest by Mary, Darnley, and their council. The Earl of Rothes and
William Kirkcaldy of Grange, two figures who were not central to court but who
certainly belonged to the Scottish elite, were powerful men sympathetic to Moray. They
were likely, therefore, to have given him aid or shelter during the last few weeks or, if
Moray continued to elude Mary and Darnley, to assist him in the coming days. To
remove these potential allies, the two were charged to “enter their persons in ward within
the Castle of Dunbartane…ay and will they be freed by their Majesties.” In addition, the
instant punishment for their disobedience would be to “denounce them rebels, and put
them to the horn.”9

Whereas Mary had hesitated to threaten Moray with being

denounced as a rebel, this proclamation recognized the escalating situation and the need
to take a firm stance immediately, thus resulting in the initial threat of being stigmatized
as a rebel for non-compliance.
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Randolph reported the actions of the Privy Council to Cecil, reiterating the charge
of non-compeerance levied against Moray as well as providing additional information.
He related that “they sat long in council about the choice of a lieutenant general. Lennox
was chiefly allowed, but not yet resolved on.”10 This appointment reveals that the
council was making decisions regarding military conflict preemptively, as Moray had yet
to disobey the summons to appear. Obviously, Mary and her council anticipated his lack
of response to their command and deemed it prudent to prepare for some sort of conflict.
Two substantial responses to Moray’s impending treasonous behavior were set into
motion by Mary and her councilors. First, on 3 August, Lord Gordon, heir to the
deceased and traitorous Earl of Huntly, was “relaxed from the process of horn” by open
proclamation at Edinburgh.11

In addition, in a more wide-reaching effort, a royal

proclamation of 6 August commanded “all and sundry earls, lords, barons, freeholders,
gentlemen and substantial yeomen to address them with 15 days victuals, to pass and
convoy the king and queen to the parts of Fife.”12
This preparation for military conflict is further evident within the burgh of
Edinburgh. The burgh records indicate that on 4 August, the baillies discussed the
“proclamation already made charging all manner of man to pass forward with the King
and Queen’s Majesties in the pursuit of the [E]arl of Moray and his colleagues.”13 Thus,
they decided that “a universal extent, both of merchant and craftsman, be uplifted and
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gathered for raising and furnishing of 200 men of war.”14 The immediate support for the
royal proclamation reveals a readiness in Edinburgh to follow the commands of the
monarchy.
The action taken against Rothes and Kirkcaldy of Grange on 2 August, an action
limited to two noblemen, foreshadowed a broader Privy Council declaration issued on 7
August. In this proclamation, Moray, for his action of “contemptuously disobey[ing]”
the repeated order to appear before Mary and Darnley, was officially “denounced their
Highnesses rebel upon the sixth day of August instant.” This measure appears drastic for
a charge of contumacy. The proclamation noted that despite Moray having been put to
the horn, he “nevertheless resort[ed] and frequent[ed] the country, received and supplied
as if he were their free liege.”15 In addition, the Earl of Rothes and William Kirkcaldy of
Grange were “denounced our sovereigns’ rebels and put to the horn” by open
proclamation.16
Whereas the previous charge against Rothes and Kirkcaldy of Grange was issued
in a preemptive manner, this proclamation acknowledged that Moray continued to receive
assistance despite his change in status and therefore served to remind the nobility and
others capable of providing aid that Moray had been tainted with the process of horn.
Thus, “none of their Majesties lieges shall pretend ignorance.”

Moray had been

denounced publicly, but this order also stated that, in particular, notification should be
issued personally to the Duke of Châtelherault, the Earl of Argyll, and “all others their
lieges.”17 By singling out Moray’s previous political allies, the Privy Council admitted
its concern that these individuals might be inclined to favor Moray despite his status.
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All were admonished that they should not “receive, supply, or communicate” with
Moray, lest they “be considered and held as plain partakers with him in his disobedience
and rebellion.” Mary and Darnley would assuredly “pursue the contraveners of this their
commandment, as rebels, with all extremity in example of others.”18 The forcefulness of
this declaration reveals the insecurity of the monarchy; Mary and Darnley did not know
whether or not their order would be obeyed. They vowed to treat those who assisted
Moray as rebels, a typical extension of being put to the horn. In addition, however, they
averred the degree to which they would make examples of those who disobeyed. Such an
assertion demonstrates that they considered the possibility of further disobedience to be
quite likely, another revealing indication of the noble view of royal authority and power.
More specifically, Mary and Darnley had come to the realization that Moray’s individual
rebellion might well expand to greater numbers of their nobility; they thus sought to
counter any notions of resistance with a flexing of royal power. As Blackwood wrote,
Moray sought to “cause the breach of this marriage,” an effort that could only be
successful by garnering more support.19
On 7 and 10 August, Randolph informed the English of Moray’s status of having
been formally put to the horn, but he also conjectured that Moray’s state of rebellion
would trigger a course of events for the Scottish nobility that “will be their utter
undoing.”20 Although this statement would, to some degree, prove correct, he neglected
to provide the reasoning that caused him to arrive at this conclusion. In the second letter,
Randolph asserted that “there was very little hope of a reconciliation between the Queen
and Moray. By him also we find that such mislike proceeds from her, Lennox, and
Darnley towards the noblemen of this country, and such hatred and mistrust [is] in their
18
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hearts.”21 This comment reveals for the first time the anger and frustration Mary and
Darnley felt towards the many nobles who opposed their marriage; previously, all
observations regarding this interaction focused on their attempts to persuade the opposing
nobility and on the collective animosity that the group felt towards Darnley.

The

heightened emotions that Randolph introduced here perhaps explain the vehemence with
which “Mary remain[ed] in mind to pursue them to the uttermost.” While Moray was the
first dissident noble to be put to the horn, Randolph elaborated on the plural he used in
this instance by relating that the following day “letters were directed to the Duke and
Argyll on their allegiance not to assist or comfort him or his party.”22
In addition to Moray, Argyll, and Châtelherault, other nobles remained opposed to
the marriage, and Randolph assured Cecil that he had “talked privately with some men of
knowledge and credit, who confirmed that there is no likelihood of any accord between
the Queen and these noble men.” Thus, the anticipated continuing conflict between
Moray and Mary was extended to include all of the nobles who remained adamantly
opposed to her marriage. Randolph also reported that “the Duke, and [E]arls Argyll,
Moray and Rothes, are presently together in Argyll, waiting only to see what she will do,
and which way she will bend her force.”23 The fact that Argyll and Moray were aligned
was no secret. Châtelherault had been previously associated with them as well, but this is
the first time that Rothes was actively associated with the trio. Previously, he had been
singled out for merely sympathizing with Moray and not for acting in conjunction with
him.
Randolph also asserted at this point that “without the Queen’s majesty
[Elizabeth’s] support, they will be clean overthrown” but that “I see their necessity [is] so
21
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great and [I] am so earnestly pressed by Moray and the rest upon [Elizabeth’s] promise
for their relief.”24 Regardless of whether Moray and the other nobles truly recognized the
absolutely essential need for English aid, Randolph clearly believed that they could not
generate enough manpower and supplies for success without it. As Randolph noted,
however, Elizabeth had pledged aid to them, and they were eager to receive it; Moray and
the other nobles acted based on their confidence in Elizabeth’s promise of support.25 For
all participants in Scotland, the recent memory of 1560 allowed them to equate English
aid and support with victory over the Scottish crown.
On the other side of the struggle, Mary’s desire to appease the English more than
her own nobles became more evident in the middle of August, when she replied to
Elizabeth’s letter that questioned and condemned her hasty marriage.26 Mary reiterated
that she “mean[t] nothing but amity,” provided a variety of reasons as to why she married
Darnley, and assured Elizabeth that she did not intend to reintroduce Catholicism to her
realm.27 With respect to the Earl of Moray, Mary replied that she “desires most heartily
[that] her good sister…meddle no further with the private cases concerning him or any
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other subjects of Scotland.”28 Mary, like her rebellious subjects, deemed a comparison
with the English intervention in 1560 to be appropriate.
Regardless of the question of English intervention, by 14 August, enough time
had lapsed without action that Mary, Darnley, and their council felt justified in stating
that the Earl of Rothes and Kirkcaldy of Grange had “contemptuously disobeyed, and
therefore are orderly denounced their Highnesses rebels and put to the horn.” In an
acknowledgement that Moray’s ideas were spreading, and as an effort to prevent their
further dissemination, this declaration further stated that “all places and castles pertaining
to the said persons and being in their possession in any ways” must be delivered into
royal protection or placed under the command of an individual chosen by the monarchs.
In a further progression of the process of being put to the horn, the proclamation also
declared that the “process of forfeiture shall be led against them, according to the tenor of
the Acts of Parliament, laws, and practice of this realm.”29 The decision to initiate the
harshest punishment for treason occurred when the extent of the ‘rebellion’ was the lack
of compliance with two specific royal orders: for Moray to appear before the monarchs,
and for Rothes and Kirkcaldy of Grange to report to Dunbar Castle. The extreme royal
response demonstrates the concern of Mary and her advisors that the situation would
escalate rapidly if they failed to intervene.
Another declaration by the same session of the Privy Council both acknowledged
that Moray continued to convince others of the merits of his defiance and that he had
received support despite his status of having been put to the horn. Mary and Darnley
believed that Moray and his growing number of supporters have “withdrawn them selves
in the parts and countries of Argyll and [the] Highlands…to have such comfort, receive,
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and refuge that their rebellion suddenly shall be unable to be repressed.”

Moray,

although removed from court during the summer months, remained an influential figure
within the Scottish nobility.30

So that Moray and his company might be “cut off

from…all commodities,” they declared by open proclamation that no individuals or
burghs shall “take upon hand to furnish or supply the said rebels…with any kind of
victuals or armor.” The monarchs clearly viewed Moray’s growing support as no longer
being minor but a genuine military threat. In addition, any person who disobeyed this
order and supplied Moray and the others would also be considered rebellious, to be
punished “with all extremity.”31 Moray and his allies, they feared, “thought best…to
draw the common people, [who are] too prompt of nature to rebellion.”32
The following day, the Privy Council once again issued a proclamation that
reiterated Moray’s strength and a wide lack of respect for previous royal orders. The
declaration repeated that despite having been put to the horn, Moray and the others “ride
and go in the realm, where they please, received supplied and entertained as if they were
their Majesties good and true subjects.”

Because they moved so freely, “they are

strengthened in their rebellion, to the great hurt of the common weal.” Their ambiguous
and undefined cause was now depicted as a threat to the whole of society. Thus, Mary
and Darnley once again reminded their subjects not to “receive, supply, or communicate
with the said rebels, their favorers, and assisters,” nor to supply them with specific items
including “meat, drink, munitions or armor,” all of which would be required for a
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successful military campaign.33 Although no declaration of intention had been issued by
Moray or his supporters, Mary and her council expected military conflict to occur.
In a rare communication given his perilous position, Moray wrote a short letter to
Cecil on 18 August regarding the anticipated assistance from England, both in terms of
diplomatic support and, more importantly, monetary and, possibly, military aid. Moray
wrote that he was aware of “your care and diligence to further our suit, whereof for my
part, I render most hearty thanks.” At this point, clearly, Moray expected to receive a
substantial amount of assistance from the English, providing him with the resources
necessary to fight Mary. To demonstrate his genuine need, Moray assured Cecil that “of
our estate, both dangerous and troublesome, you will hear by others.”

Further

emphasizing the good relations that Moray expected would continue, he confidently
ended his note by stating that “we doubt not you shall continue our affectionate friend,
but consider how dangerous is delay to us.”34 As is evident, in addition to utilizing the
language of friendship to soften his ambiguous request for assistance, he also attempted
to warn Cecil of the far-reaching repercussions that could ensue should England not aid
him and his allies in a timely manner.
Over the course of the next week, the situation continued to deteriorate so that
Mary and her councilors determined that military action was the only option that would
halt Moray and his spreading movement. Besides garnering more support from common
men, other nobles had also joined his rebellion, notably the Earl of Glencairn. The
English Earl of Bedford reported that Glencairn had written to him declaring that “though
he were not now with the [E]arl of Moray and the rest, yet was he of their mind, and
would defend the Gospel, and desired me in the mean time to have none evil opinion of
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him.” Thus, after having determined that his beliefs aligned more closely with those of
Moray and his followers rather than Mary, Glencairn elected to join the rebellion.
Despite the perceived success of Moray and the other rebels, Bedford’s plea on their
behalf to Cecil for “money and victuals as…there is almost none left” belied an image of
confidence and growing success.35
Due to Moray’s perceived success, however, Mary and her advisers elaborated on
their previous claim that Moray and his followers were harmful to the common good of
the realm. The “rebels are plainly conspired together, taken on arms, minding not only to
rebel themselves but to persuade and allure them all such true and obedient subjects as
they are able to entice, of purpose openly to resist their Majesties authority.” They thus
determined to “bring them to obedience, or otherwise to pursue them with fire and sword
as rebels and traitors.” To find men to accompany them, they “charge[d] all and sundry
Earls, Lords, Barons, freeholders, landed men [and] gentlemen…well furnished in fear of
war…to convene and meet the King and Queen’s Majesties,” with logistical details
varying by burgh.36 In issuing this call to arms, the monarchs began to utilize language
of justice and authority. This declaration also marks specific actions, as opposed to
previous passive reminders, of how to treat traitors. This statement also reveals the
personal involvement of Mary and Darnley; they did not seek to call men to fight on their
behalf, but rather sought men to fight alongside them.
In addition to issuing the powerfully worded call to arms, Mary and the council
sought to combat the ideas being spread by Moray and his followers. At this juncture,
those ideas centered around religion, as Moray hoped to incite a fear of Catholicism and
channel that fear into tangible support. Evidently, Moray and his followers “caused it to
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be published throughout all Scotland that the Lord Darnley was a papist, as was also his
father and mother, and that the Queen had for no other cause married him than…to
overthrow the state of religion.”37 Thus, Mary and her advisors had reason to fear that
her subjects would take action in the face of religious insecurity. Though Mary had
issued numerous proclamations stating her intent to maintain the religious status quo, her
marriage to a Catholic raised once again the question of religion.
In an attempt both to reassure their subjects that the aforementioned religious
policy would remain and to belittle Moray and his supporters for spreading rumors
regarding religion, the council issued a second statement on 22 August. The declaration
reiterated the position that “none of the said lieges should take upon hand, privately or
openly, to make any alteration or innovation of the estate of religion” so that no one can
act and “can pretend ignorance thereof,” at once repeating the similar earlier promise as
well as extending it to the nobility of the realm.38 Any individual, including Mary and
Darnley, who thus attempted to intervene in the state of religion, “should be used as a
seditious person and raiser of tumult.”39 This proclamation publicly illustrated the idea
that “the Queen never thought it, nor her husband, to trouble…the religion which was
then at her marriage.”40 Further, it accused the rebellious Moray and his associates of
attempting to utilize the issue of religion to create further dissension: that he used “such
untrue reports to alienate the hearts of the good subjects from the obedience of their
Highnesses, their natural and righteous Princes and Sovereigns.”41

The accusation

depicted the rebels as lacking just cause for their disobedience and emphasized the
rightness inherent in obeying Mary and Darnley.
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The last proclamation of 22 August made one more attempt to undermine
Moray’s support base and prevent it from expanding. The Privy Council, in a seemingly
desperate act given the numerous instances in which they already stated similar
restrictions, issued another prohibition against taking up arms. The declaration asserted
that “their rebels are plainly conspired together, taken on arms, minding not only to rebel
themselves, but to allure and persuade to them and their faction all such true and obedient
subjects.” This acknowledgement reveals that the process of being put to the horn had
not negatively impacted Moray’s support base in the way in which the council had
hoped.42 In addition, the statement presupposes that those subjects who had yet to defect
to Moray would remain “true and obedient,” an attempt to proclaim prominently a
prophecy they hoped would prove self-fulfilling. The proclamation also reiterates the
charge that forbade all subjects to in “any ways rise, concur, [or] assist with the said
rebels,” a sentiment that remains unchanged from previous proclamations. The last plea,
however, reflects a change in attitude that reveals the monarchy’s perception that
Moray’s strength had increased: they requested that if any of their subjects “hitherto has
ridden or been in their company, or presently are with [the rebels,] that they leave their
armor, pass home…and utterly leave the said rebels.”43 Whereas previous proclamations
condemned all sympathizers as traitors, this document implies that any individuals
currently acting in concert with Moray and the other nobles would be excused for their
behavior if they defected immediately.
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Given the numerous declarations issued by the Privy Council on 22 August
regarding potential military action and the behavior of rebellious subjects, it is not
surprising that these proclamations were followed on 23 August by a document
addressing the imminent physical conflict. The document began by reiterating the fact
that “James Earl of M[o]ray, Andrew Earl of Rothes, [and] William Kirkcaldy of
Grange…are orderly denounced their Highnesses rebels.” While recent proclamations
discussed and threatened the rebels in a general sense, these individuals had not been
singled out in over a week. This document also marks the first mention of the Earl of
Argyll since the beginning of August. This statement warned him specifically that if he
and his “friends, servants and tenants…ceases not manifestly, maliciously, and willfully
to receive, supply, and communicate with the said rebels…and otherwise to assist and
take plain part with them…[then] they ought to be demanded as manifest rebels and
traitors.”44 Here, Mary gave Argyll, one of the most important and powerful nobles in
the realm, one more specific, targeted chance to cease assisting Moray.
Despite his strength in the Highlands, Argyll’s sympathy towards Moray meant
that Mary could not rely on his power. Mary and Darnley therefore also dictated that
they “constitute their truest cousin and councilor John Earl of Atholl…their lieutenant in
the north parts of this realm, with power to search and seek the said rebels, their assisters
and partakers…and to pursue them with fire and sword.” Atholl, one of Mary’s key
advisors since her initial rift with Moray in May, provided a means of bringing an
individual close to the crown to a position of military power in the Highlands, the
geographic region of Moray’s strongest support to date. The last important part of the 23
August document is the series of provisions made for “whatsoever person or persons that
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happens to be slain, hurt, or dead, or takes sickness in their Highnesses army.”45 The
detailed provisions for the care of heirs and kin and distribution of land in the case of
serious injury or death demonstrate a practical preparation in anticipation of military
conflict. Mary and the council clearly believed that the growing rebellion with Moray
would only be resolved by physical violence. This supposition is further supported by
the exact repetition of much of this pronouncement the following day; rather than
detailing the provisions for the estates of those who might be incapacitated while in
service to the royal army, however, the proclamation of 24 August served as a call to
arms. Men between the ages of 16 and 60 in particular burghs and sheriffdoms were
called to meet in particular locations “well furnished in fear of war” near Lorne, in the
Highlands, where “they shall be commanded, for pursuit of the said rebels and defense of
the true subjects from their invasion.”46
In addition to formal proclamations by the Privy Council that sought to levy large
numbers of men, Mary and Darnley also issued personal notes of summons to particular
nobles. For instance, on 23 August, they had ordered Lord Maxwell to meet them at
Stirling so that they might “freely confer” on issues regarding the rebellious nobles.47
Along the same lines, on 25 August Lord Gordon “was restored by open
proclamation…to his fame, honor and dignity, and to the lordship of Gordon”; his
conveniently timed restoration clearly marked an attempt by Mary to gain his immediate
assistance.48 In addition, Mary and Darnley appealed to particular individuals by writing
of the dishonorable actions of the rebels, arguing that they “have retired them to the in
country, the suffering whereof is na ways to us honorable.” This shift in the rebels’
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location had resulted in the necessity of pursuing them, “where into it is needful that we
be well and substantially accompanied.” The royal pair utilized this changing situation to
urge this particular noble to meet them with “your kin, friends, and household well
furnished in fear of war…[as a sign of] the good affection you bear to us.”49
A further indication of the preparations being coordinated by Mary and her
insistence in using military might to address the rebellious nobles are Randolph’s reports.
On 27 August, he reported that “she is now determined to pursue them, and certain shires
are commanded to attend upon her.” In a valuable tracing of her movements, as well as
those of the rebels, he further wrote that “such as she pursues are now at Ayr, and think
themselves strong enough for this pursuit, and are determined rather to come here or to
Fife than show themselves in the field against their Sovereign. [A] proclamation was
made on Friday [24 August] that any [who are] with them and will leave them shall be
pardoned.”50 Randolph’s missive reveals that while the rebels had thus far remained in
the west, they were considering moving eastward in order to avoid military conflict.
Such a deliberate avoidance of military conflict suggests that they did not feel that such a
skirmish would end in their favor. Thus, they must have concluded that Mary’s resources
greatly surpassed their own, particularly since they had yet to receive aid from the
English.
In addition, Randolph’s words imply that Mary also desired to weaken her enemy
nobles before engaging them militarily, as evidenced by her desire to strip them of
supporters by offering amnesty for desertion. Mary’s reasoning behind this decision may
be explained by Randolph’s acknowledgement that Mary “has borrowed money of
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diverse, and yet has not wherewith to pay so many soldiers as are levied.”51 A smaller
number of enemy troops might mean less men required for Mary’s forces, and therefore
not as much of a monetary outlay by her as presently required.
While Moray and his allies did move eastward from Ayr, they did not travel all
the way to Fife. Rather, as Randolph reported, they came to Edinburgh “this night [31
August] at four of the clock[,] the Duke, Moray, Glencairn, Rothes and Lord Boyd, to the
number of 1,000 persons.”52 In addition, the Diurnal states that these principal rebels
were accompanied by “Andrew [L]ord Ochiltree, the laird of Grange…and diverse other
barons and gentlemen.”53

Randolph, however, did not elaborate further until the

following day, when he “advertised with all speed” a revised figure of 1,200 as the
number of men who had accompanied the rebel lords to Edinburgh. He stated that they
came to Edinburgh because “this place they think [is] strongest for them, and nearest to
their friends.” In addition, “the occasion of their coming hither is that they will not be the
onsetters, but defend themselves while they may, and also is thought the fittest place to
justify their cause.”54
The rebels presumably chose to come to Edinburgh because they felt that their
presence would elicit support from sympathizers in the city.

Edinburgh Castle,

moreover, provided the strongest physical defensive point; taking the fortress would
provide the rebels with the greatest strategic advantage against an opponent that
possessed greater resources than themselves. Still, Randolph wrote that “I do not see
how they can withstand her force, for they are fewer…nor can so soon levy any they
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need.”55 The 1,200 men with which the rebels entered Edinburgh would be strongly
outmatched by Mary’s current and potential fighting force. The rebels, moreover, had
believed that they would find enough support in Edinburgh to gain additional fighting
men and to utilize the strategic advantage of Edinburgh Castle. Instead, however, on 1
September, “the captain of the said castle of Edinburgh, named Alexander Erskine,
brother to John [L]ord Erskine…charg[ed] the whole foresaid lords…to pass and remove
forth of the said burgh of Edinburgh.”56
Without the benefit of the castle or the anticipated support of additional
manpower, Moray and the rebels had little time in which to prepare a defense against
royal forces, as “this night they are surely advertised that she has already left Glasgow
and intends to drive them out of the town or lose the whole…[and] tomorrow or Monday
she is certainly looked for.” The rebels were therefore forced to reevaluate the situation,
and decided that if they were “strong enough, they will meet her two miles out of town,
and there fight or compound to advantage.” A bold move considering the number of
supporters each side could claim, this decision seems more pragmatic with the realization
that “if they [are] not strong enough, they will leave for Leith…and [there] have an open
port for any repairing to them from Fife, Angus, or other parts.”57 As of 1 September,
therefore, a skirmish seemed imminent, but should the rebels have felt as though they
could not withstand the oncoming army, they had devised a means of bolstering their
own forces or perhaps even delaying battle.
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The rebels issued two declarations on 1 September, the same day as arriving in
Edinburgh.58

The first proclamation was directed expressly to Mary.

They

“complain[ed] that they are rigorously pursued from place to place, not for any capital
crime, but only for seeking the maintenance of true religion which they and most part of
the realm profess.”59 This position contradicts earlier indications that they had avoided
physical conflict due to their lesser numbers, but the reasoning seems plausible, if only
due to the fact that weeks of such conduct had yet to result in a substantial outcome for
either side. The rebels were clearly still using the issue of religion as an excuse as to why
they were in arms against their queen. This excuse, however, was weakened by the fact
that only some of the rebels had acted explicitly because of religion and that several
ardent protestants supported Mary.
The proclamation also states that “being now enclosed in this town, [Edinburgh,
we] can flee no further.” For the first time, the rebels’ physical surroundings might force
a battle upon them, an event for which they were inadequately prepared.

Their

declaration therefore asked Mary to “leave off pursuit and suffer their case to be tried by
her council.” This request demonstrates the rebels’ desire to settle the matter without
military conflict, where they would be at a great disadvantage. In a further attempt to
depict Mary as the bloodthirsty figure intent on vengeance, their proclamation declared
that if she would not desist in pursuing them, “they protest [that] their blood is unjustly
and wickedly sought.”60
In their second declaration of 1 September, the rebel lords addressed a wider
audience, the inhabitants of Edinburgh. While they would have certainly attempted wide
58
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dissemination of the proclamation to Mary, the first declaration focused on the strained
relations between Mary and the rebels; the second sought to explain their supposedly
collective motivation for rebellion—religion. They claimed that “we never sought any
thing but [the] maintenance of the true religion professed here.”61 The document does
not explicitly mention the Darnley marriage. By using the shield of religion, the rebels
sought to manipulate a worthy cause to justify their treasonous behavior. In addition, the
maintenance of religion was an issue that could, if they truly believed it was in danger,
appeal to the populace as a whole, and thus encourage the inhabitants of Edinburgh to
join their cause in the face of the impending arrival of Mary’s army.
On the following day, 2 September, the situation evidently became more
ambiguous, as Randolph knew “not what to write with certainty.” He had hoped that
“these lords [would be] able to make their party good against their pursuers,” through the
declarations issued on 1 September. Despite the lack of support from London, Randolph
clearly remained sympathetic to the rebels. He reported, however, that “in this town [of
Edinburgh], they find neither help nor comfort of any persons.” The people of Edinburgh
remained loyal to Mary for a number of reasons: they did not believe the protestant
religion to be in any danger; could not justify treasonous behavior; although sympathetic
to the rebels, did not think it prudent to join them. Regardless of the reason, the rebel
lords did not increase their manpower in the desired manner, a dangerous situation given
that “the Queen follows them so near…that she gives them no time to rest in any place
till their friends may join them.” Thus, Randolph concluded that without immediate
additional support within Edinburgh, “it is thought by the wisest that little good can be
done now without greater support from [Elizabeth].”62 The lack of popular support for
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the rebel lords had reached such a point that English intervention remained the last hope
for pragmatic and timely support.
As the conflict escalated, the Privy Council began issuing frequent and specific
calls for military service to the crown. Thus, on 2 September, when “the King and
Queen’s Majesties depart[ed] this night toward Stirling,” an open proclamation was made
that for those called to participate “at this present raid, that they, and each one of them
meet their Majesties to morn, the third day of September, at Kilsyth, by sun rising.”63
Through such proclamations, it is possible both to trace the movement of the royal couple
and to view the larger orchestrations of military logistics. On 3 September, moreover,
Mary and Darnley recognized that the rebels had been repelled from Edinburgh Castle,
but they “marvel[ed] greatly how their rebels…lately entered and [had] been received
within their town.”64 The royal couple had evidently expected that the rebels would be
prevented from entering the city at all.
The anticipated meeting at Edinburgh, however, did not come to pass. By the
time Mary and her forces had reached Edinburgh, “they were gone, [and so] she
return[ed] to Stirling, and from thence to Glasgow.” Randolph did not speculate or reveal
why the royal forces were to return to Glasgow. As for the rebel lords, he reported that
“the Duke, as I hear with the rest of the lords, yesterday at Hamilton, this night at the
Laird of Drumglanrig’s house, who now takes open part with them, as also the Master of
Maxwell that is come to them, promising assistance with all the power he can make.”65
The rebels decided that without support from Edinburgh, their forces could not match the
might of Mary’s forces and so chose to retreat. Such a decision recognizes the severe
disparity in resources. The remark regarding the two nobles who had recently joined the
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side of the rebels indicates, however, that some individuals did in fact oppose the
marriage strongly enough to oppose Mary even after the disparity in resources had
become evident.
On 3 September, the Privy Council issued an extremely formal declaration of the
perceived intentions of the rebels.

Whereas previously proclamations had declared

certain individuals, or even the more generalized ‘rebels,’ to be put to the horn, this
declaration formally charged them as rebels and examined their motivation in rebelling
against the authority of the crown. It was addressed broadly to all the subjects of the
realm in the form of a “greeting.” Unlike other proclamations, this missive lacks an
accusative tone; it assumes that all subjects will remain loyal to the crown.

It

acknowledges the fact that there existed in the realm a certain “uproar lately raised up
against us by certain our rebels and their assisters,” who, “to soil the eyes of the simple
people, has given them to understand that the quarrel they had in hand was only religion,
thinking what that cloak to cover their other ungodly designs.”66 The declaration thus
attempted to discredit the rebels’ ideology by claiming that they were using an
unsubstantiated threat to religion to disguise their true motivation for rebellion.
But Mary and Darnley, by “the goodness of God, [have] by the utterance of their
own mouths and writings…discover[ed] the poison that before lay hid in their hearts,”
thereby allowing them to reveal the rebels’ true intentions to “ignorant persons” who
would otherwise be “seduced” by their propaganda. The rebels, individuals “upon whom
we had bestowed so many benefits,…[have] put themselves in arms against us so
unnaturally” because of “insatiable ambition” that would not be satisfied until the “whole
realm [is] led, used, and disposed at their pleasure,” an attitude that became evident when
the rebels made a “plain profession that the establishing of religion will not content
66
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them.”67 They thus depicted the rebels as being unreasonable in their demands and
unjustified in their accusations.68
They suggested that the rebels would like to compose their own government in
which they “give us a council chosen after their fantasy” and “they would be Kings
themselves…to [give] to themselves the whole use and administration of the Kingdom.”
This extended dialogue portrays the rebels as greedy, opportunistic individuals who were
both mistaken about and were exploiting the issue of religion. These claims, however,
were not substantiated by any missive or proclamation by the rebels themselves; they
were merely the musings and assumptions of understandably disgruntled monarchs and
council.

The strong language, however, is understandable, as this lengthy missive

provided extended reasoning as to why still-loyal subjects should continue to support
their “natural…good and loving Princes.”69
Despite this and earlier proclamations, the rebels appeared to be gaining support,
even though the disparity in resources had become apparent. Randolph reported that
“many of her forces fall daily from her,…weary of the matter.”

This ambiguous

statement, however, does not make clear whether or not such men actively joined the
opposing side or whether they merely became passive observers in the matter. Randolph
described one of these men who joined with the rebels, Maxwell’s heir: “he purposes to
convey them to Dumfries, either there to defend them against all her power, or put them
in safety in their friends’ hands at Carlisle.” This suggestion is intriguing both because it
proposed bringing the rebels back to the western part of Scotland, a clear indication of
where they enjoyed the most support, and because it came from Maxwell, a young man
67
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who had only recently declared his support for the rebels. Regardless, “if they go with
their whole force to Dumfries, without doubt they look for a support of men from
Berwick to Carlisle, which may be easily convoyed without danger.”70 In addition,
Randolph further campaigned on their behalf to Elizabeth.71
Despite issuing such specific military orders, the Privy Council continued to
circulate broader calls to arms as well. A charge on 5 September justified all of the
military preparations because Mary and Darnley now possessed “perfect knowledge of
the manifest defection and rebellion of diverse their subjects.”72 An additional danger
stemmed from the report that the rebels were attempting to “draw in strangers and others
to participate with them in their attempts.” The last time these strangers, the English, had
intervened in Scottish affairs, the Lords of the Congregation had successfully brought the
Reformation to Scotland. Thus, due to the fear of eventual English support as well as
confirmed reports of treasonous behavior, the Council issued another general call to arms
through an open proclamation, ordering subjects to “prepare them selves and put them in
readiness, with xx days provision.”73 The instruction to arrive with such great quantities
of supplies indicated that the monarchs and the council were unsure as to the course of
action they would ultimately take.
The same day, 5 September, a group of nobles signed a bond of allegiance to
Mary and Darnley at Glasgow. They promised that “we and every one of us shall truly
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and faithfully serve the King and Queen’s Majesties, and the right noble and mighty Lord
Matthew Earl of Lennox…their Highnesses lieutenant, in and whatsoever thing he shall
command.” This pledge of support in anticipation of military action provided confused
subjects with yet another reason to maintain their allegiance to the crown and fight on
behalf of the monarchy. The list of lords who signed this pledge includes the Earls of
Cassillis and Eglinton, Lords Semphill, Ross, Somerville, Cathcart, and Sanchair, and
representatives from a number of important clans, including the Campbells, Kennedys,
Hamiltons, and Cunninghams.

In an additional demonstration of their collective

determination to serve most fully their monarchs, the nobles pledged to “lay all quarrels,
grudges, and deadly feuds standing amongst any of us apart during the time of this their
Majesties service.”74 In addition to this pledge, Mary and Darnley issued a proclamation
reasserting their own promise to make specific and generous provisions for any
individual, “if he be Earl, Lord, Baron, freeholder, vassal, subvassal, feuer, or heritor
whatsoever,” who should be injured or killed in military service to the monarchs.75
On 6 September, the council issued a proclamation regarding Darnley’s father, the
Earl of Lennox. The document restated the names of the leaders of the rebels and again
asserted that individuals who assisted this disobedient group would be considered traitors.
This pronouncement, however, stated that Mary and Darnley possessed “most assured
confidence in the ready goodwill, and diligence of their dearest father and right truest
counselor” and therefore appointed Lennox their Lieutenant-General over a western part
of the realm, notably sherrifdoms and stewartries surrounding Glasgow.76

He thus

possessed “full power” in the region and was commanded to pursue the rebels. To ensure
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that his expedition possessed every advantage, the same proclamation ordered that “all
and sundry inhabitants of the bounds above written” should ride with Lennox as his
deputies; if any of those individuals should “participate with the said rebels, or refuse to
assist and obey” him, then Lennox, as Lieutenant, should “hold and pursue them as the
rebels themselves.”77
These conditions provided Lennox with the means to command a force in the
geographical area that, to this point, had been most supportive of the rebels. Further, the
explicit nature of the instructions reveals that without such sharp words from the
monarchy, Lennox would be unable to muster a large enough force to complete his duty.
While not a typically worded call to arms, this missive afforded the same result. The
final part of the declaration provided Lennox with an even greater degree of power than
his new title and role suggested; Mary and Darnley essentially gave him the right to act in
any manner he wished without fear of repercussion. This prerogative is evident from the
allowance:
…the said rebels, their assisters or partakers, or others being in company
with them, shall happen to be hurt, slain, or mutilate, or their corns and
goods to be spoiled and destroyed, or their houses burnt and cast down,
the same shall be no crime to the said lieutenant nor the faithful subjects
being with him in company, or they nor none of them shall be called nor
accused therefore, criminally nor civilly, by any manner of way in time
coming; exonerating and discharging them of all actions, criminal or civil,
that may be moved or intended against them.78
Thus, Mary and the council ceded great power to Lennox, endowing him with the
authority to act however he saw fit towards the rebels or anyone suspected of consorting
with them.79
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Lennox quickly took advantage of the new power the position enabled him to
wield.80

He noted the treasonous activities of Argyll that fell within his area of

jurisdiction: “the [E]arl of Argyll being of the same self conspiracy with the said [E]arl of
Glencairn,” clearly linking the two nobles together in treasonous activity.81 Lennox
pursued this matter three days later; he issued a warrant to the sheriffs under his
command that ordered them to disarm until further notice the tenants of the conspiratorial
nobles.82
As evidenced by a ‘Band of Fife’ signed on 12 September at St. Andrews, Lennox
was one of several lieutenants Mary and Darnley appointed in anticipation of military
action. In a Privy Council session, a number of “barons and gentlemen” agreed to “truly
serve the King and Queen’s Majesties…and whom their Majesties has constitute[d] and
appointed their Lieutenant” in the east part of the realm, particularly in the region of
Fife.83 They also swore their oath to follow the Lieutenant in his pursuit of the rebels as
an extension of their “allegiance to their Highnesses.” They further stated that, in a
manner similar to an earlier declaration of royal service, they would temporarily “lay
apart all actions of deadly feud or other grudge or controversy standing betwixt [any of]
us.” This band reveals the existence of a portion of the lower nobility eager to retain their
royal allegiance without bringing other ideology into their declaration of loyalty.
Notably, however, the group of signatories did not include any man who possessed the
rank of earl or lord, and extremely few lairds as well; the men are primarily barons or
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locally important landowners, but they are not figures of importance beyond their
immediate respective regions.84
A letter of 8 September from the rebels, specifically Châelherault, Moray, and
Glencairn, to Randolph, demonstrates the continued communication between the rebel
lords and the English diplomats, a relationship that Mary would rather have seen ended.
The rebels acknowledged the receipt of Randolph’s previous letter, taking great care to
give Randolph their “hearty thanks for your great care and solicitude for us.” Randolph
clearly remained biased in favor of the rebels.85 They utilized this opportunity to inform
Randolph that they continued to engage in rebellious behavior because of a few but vital
points of contention with Mary: the security of “the religion we profess [and the]
abolishing of the contrary, [Catholicism,] and surety of our lives and heritages.” These
facets of their existence had been, according to the rebels, permanently disrupted by the
Darnley marriage. In addition, the goal of their rebellion was to preserve the tradition
that “this country be governed by advice and counsel of the nobility of the same,
according to its ancient custom and laws, and not by strangers.”86 Thus, their ultimate
quest was to ensure that no significant changes in Scottish governance or religion
occurred, particularly with respect to developments that would affect the nobility.
Within Scotland, the nobles continually realigned themselves, and physical
movement occurred on both sides. Though a lesser number of nobles entered into open
rebellion against Mary than were actually opposed to her marriage, some men switched
sides during the course of the rebellion itself. For instance, on 9 September, Randolph
reported that “Morton has now also left her, and promised to take open part with the
others.” Such shifts in allegiance and alliances had yielded a situation in which “all men
84
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mislike this strange kind of government, but know not which way to remedy it.” In terms
of physical movement around Scotland, Randolph also accounted for Mary’s anger
towards the rebels due to the support they had received in certain locations. He recounted
that “the Queen this day left Stirling for St. Andrews…[and] from St. Andrews she will
to Dundee, and so to St. Johnstown, with which towns she is greatly offended for the
support they had in readiness to send to the lords.”87 Though the rebels had more
recently been active in the western part of Scotland, several towns in Fife had provided
support in the previous weeks.
At this point, therefore, rather than actually pursuing the rebels themselves, Mary
altered her tactics and attempted to demolish their bastions of support. By attacking
sympathizers and supporters in Fife, she could cause the rebels to lose one of their two
main areas of support, leaving them able to count on only the western region of the
country. Coupled with the lack of anticipated support from England, the loss of Fife
would wield a crippling blow to the rebels’ ability to accrue resources. Dwindling
support led the rebels to reach out to nobles who had not yet actively participated on
either side. For instance, on 12 September, a letter signed by Châtelherault, Moray,
Glencairn, and Rothes probed for support from the laird of Glenurquhy. They explained
that they had retreated to the west country “to repair our forces.” In attempting to
regroup from the unexpected lack of support, they wrote that they “assure our selves you
tender the cause so you will [be] so good as to find yourself in readiness to join with us
and the rest of our brethren.”88
On 10 September, the rebel lords sent two missives to London, one addressed to
Cecil and the other directly to Elizabeth. In their letter to Cecil, the lords expressed their
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desire for his support, claiming that they “crave his favor as heretofore in their suits to
her majesty” Elizabeth.89 This message of supplication, like the other of the same date
directed to Elizabeth, was signed by Châtelherault, Moray, Glencairn, Rothes, Ochiltree,
Maxwell, and Drumlanrig. Argyll had returned to his own lands to raise more forces and
so was not present to sign these letters. The letter to Elizabeth began by emphasizing the
unfairness of the situation, as they claimed that Mary “has so suddenly and with such fury
pursued us that the sober forces we had prepared for defense of our lives were cut off
from us, and cannot as yet join us.”90 Thus, the rebels here chose to emphasize that they
had managed to elicit support within Scotland but accentuated the issue of logistics as
having prevented their success.
The rebels clearly did not want Elizabeth to believe that their position was the
minority one among the Scottish populace and thus did not deserve her support. They
explained that due to the inability of their allies to join them, they had been “forced to
retire to this town near to your majesty’s borders, trusting God shall move your
highness’s heart to aid us in this just cause of defense of our religion, lives and
heritages.”91 The rebel lords thus now claimed that they were approaching Elizabeth
because their other venues of support had fallen by the wayside. The more accurate
statement would be that they had always desired Elizabeth’s substantial support and now
were desperate for it. Nevertheless, they did not present the situation as such in hopes of
making their position seem stronger.92

Overall, this letter serves to reveal the

precariousness of their situation.
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In addition, they employed previous tactics of flattery and emphasized the common religious bond they
shared with her, invoking God in their bid for her support.
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As Moray and the rebels sought to obtain much-needed assistance from Elizabeth,
Mary and her allies were not unaware of such machinations and remained ever-vigilant in
maintaining and strengthening their own resources. Mary and Darnley sought to enlist
the assistance of noblemen who had yet to actively aid either side of the conflict. This
tactic is evidenced by a letter of 14 September from Mary and Darnley to the laird of
Rowallan, which informed him of the present situation for the purpose of gaining his
assistance: “our rebels rid[e] in armor to and fro about the country,” and that the rebels
have sought to escalate the conflict by being of a “mind to draw in strangers to the realm,
which to us is insufferable.”93
While the entrance of the English into the conflict would undoubtedly have
severely hurt Mary, the outcome of such an intervention might ultimately also be
unpleasant for her nobility as being contrary to their desire to escape foreign influence
and rule. Thus, Mary and Darnley came to the point of their missive, which first praised
the laird of Rowallan as being one of “our faithful subjects, of which number we
specially esteem you,” and then requesting that he meet them at Stirling on the last day of
September “with the whole force you may make with twenty days victuals.”94 A similar
letter of the same day to the laird of Abircarny requests that he “accompany his whole
force” to Stirling in order to confirm “the same good opinion which we ever” had of
him.95 They moreover justified their need for his assistance by claiming that the rebels
sought “to pervert the whole state of our common weal, which to us is insufferable and
we trust [that] none of our faithful subjects…will be contented of their unnatural
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defection.”96 These two missives indicate both that Mary and Darnley believed they
would need increased numbers should the English act, and also that they still anticipated
military confrontation occurring at the end of September or beginning of October.
In addition to these firm requests, Mary and Darnley also issued specific
commands to particular individuals. On 15 September, a missive from the royal couple
acknowledged that Argyll and members of his clan had “invaded the lands, heritages, and
possessions pertaining to our truest cousin David Lord Drummond.” The monarchs
maintained that Argyll and his followers had acted in such a manner that by their “cruel
and unnatural defenses that they have shown and declared themselves plain enemies to
this our common weal and so aught to be pursued as traitors.” This independent action of
Argyll served, from Mary’s perspective, to splinter the rebel forces. While he had
already been declared a rebel because of his association with Moray and the other rebel
lords, Argyll was now also considered to be a traitor for the militant actions he conducted
for personal reasons, though more broadly related to the rebellion. In the wake of this
attack, Mary and Darnley commanded the victims to retaliate and pursue Argyll and his
followers: they “have given, granted, and committed full power special…to search, seek,
and pursue all and sundry persons suspected of the said cruel and heinous crimes
wherever they may be apprehended.” Mary and Darnley further gave them permission to
act however they wished, as they declared that should anyone or any goods be “slain or
mutilated” in the course of their retaliation, they would not be held responsible.97
That Mary and Darnley continued to find support and resources while aid from
England did not arrive caused great concern among the rebels. They therefore wrote to
Robert Melville, a Scottish diplomat, in hopes of utilizing his diplomatic skill to finally
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obtain English assistance.98

This letter was signed by the leaders of the rebellion:

Châtelherault, Moray, Glencairn, and Rothes. The rebels pragmatically realized that
“now our Sovereign is preparing all her forces against the first of next month…and if we
have not some aid to meet her forces,…our friends will forsake us to our undoing and
wreck…our cause.”99 This desperate plea indicates that the rebels were, in fact, aware of
Mary’s activities and were thus anxious in the face of Mary’s increasing forces.
In addition, the rebels had also realized that without an infusion of aid from
England, their only potential source of further assistance, men who were wavering in
their support for the rebels might see the hopelessness of the situation and desert. In
order to be successful against the growing forces Mary had summoned for the beginning
of October, the rebels asked that Elizabeth’s “aid be hastened to Scotland by the fourth of
next month, or sooner if possible.” If such material assistance would not be forthcoming,
now a real possibility that the rebels had not previously considered as a likely outcome,
they requested that Melville “haste us word with diligence, for it they will not [send aid],
we must provide some other means for ourselves.”100 Their options if English aid were
not to materialize, however, were not clearly articulated at this point.
On 16 September, the Privy Council issued a new charge to the leaders of the
rebellion. The listed leaders, Châtelherault, Argyll, Glencairn, Boyd, and Ochiltree, were
summoned to “present them selves before the King and Queen’s Majesties at St.
Andrews, or where it shall happen them to be for the time, upon the sixth day next after
they and each one of them respectively is charged thereto.” This gesture reveals a desire
to reconcile with the rebels, or at least to listen to them “answer to such things as shall be
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laid to their charge.”101 Despite the numerous calls to arms issued by the Privy Council,
this offer may have been attempted as a means of trying once more to avoid expensive
military conflict. If the rebels were to capitulate to the orders of Mary and Darnley after
over a month of disobedience, the monarchy would appear powerful.
By the later part of September, however, there still existed “little hope of accord.”
In contrast with earlier reports that merely stated that an easy reconciliation was unlikely,
Randolph’s account of 19-20 September stated that Mary was now, with a “full resolute
mind,…determined to deal with them in all extremity.” Randolph assessed the situation
of the rebels as being so dire that “if God send them not speedy support…they are not
able to withstand her force.”102 The increased focus on the deliverance of English aid by
all parties demonstrates the extent to which the rebel lords had failed to garner the
support they thought they could raise. It also attests to the fact that they had come to
view the situation as a repetition of 1560.
The use of England by the rebel lords as an agent against their queen also
demonstrates the lack of confidence they possessed in the resources of their own realm.
Randolph thus echoed their repeated request for aid, stating that the rebel lords wished
that God would “move her majesty’s heart to have consideration of them.” In further
evidence of the impending need for resources on the part of the rebels, Randolph
confirmed that a royal proclamation for additional men had been issued, stating that “all
men should be ready the last of this instant at Stirling with 20 days’ provision.” Though
Mary and her forces had most recently been active in St. Andrews, Dundee, and Perth,
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Randolph and others believed that the new troops would be utilized to “besiege Hamilton
Castle and other places thereabout.”103
On 21 September, a new charge of rebellion was issued by the Privy Council. In
this instance, however, rather than declaring certain noble individuals to be in a state of
rebellion, a larger number of lesser-ranking men were charged with treasonous activity.
While this list included a number of non-memorable names, it also included eight
different Campbell men. The charge was not surprising given that the Campbell Earl of
Argyll and the area of Argyll were exceedingly hospitable towards the rebels. As with
previous charges of other individuals, they were charged to “compeer before their
Majesties and Lords of their Secret Council” within six days or else would be put to the
horn.104
In a band recorded in Edinburgh on 21 September, various “barons and
gentlemen” signed a bond to remain loyal to the king and queen, but also specified
particular conditions they would follow in accordance with that loyalty. In a general
gesture of respect for the decisions made by Mary and Darnley, they vowed to serve
“whatsoever person or persons whom their Highnesses give their power and commission
unto, and commands us to obey.” Specifically, however, the purpose of this bond was
revealed by the assertion that they will obey the command “in special [of] James Earl
Bothwell.” Of additional note is the fact that they vowed to support and obey him
equally in “pursuit of their Majesties rebels or defense of England in case it shall happen
to invade.”105 Two days later, a band of the same terms was signed by other men at
Teviotdale.106
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On 21 September, a more personalized version of the plight of the rebels appears
in the records by way of a letter from Moray to the Earl of Bedford. Bedford and Moray
had a longstanding friendly association.107 Though the rebels’ desperate situation had
been conveyed in formal correspondence throughout September, Moray frankly informed
Bedford of the great need for English assistance to the rebellion. Moray first recognized
that Bedford sympathized with his cause, assuming that “I am in my heart persuaded
[that] your lordship favors our cause.” He wrote that previously, when he had requested
a small amount of aid, “our sovereign had neither such forces of paid men, nor entered on
sharp handling of our friends, and [thus] we had a reasonable power in the field.”108 This
assessment of the situation as it had existed in August and early September demonstrates
that Moray had carefully considered logistic and military strategy and had not charged
into rebellion without responsibly considering the consequences.
Moray continued, however, that Mary had now “doubled her force, our friends are
taken and warded [in] their houses and seized in many parts, [and so] this has so
discouraged the multitude of our favorers…that they cannot join us unless they see us
able to match the adverse party in the field.” He thus attributed their ever-increasing lack
of success and lack of additional followers to the tremendous growth the royal forces had
experienced over the same period of time. By effectively removing many potential allies
from the rebels’ grasp, Mary and her advisors had also strongly discouraged any other
wavering subjects from joining the rebels. This strategy had resulted in the rebel lords
being “compelled to crave greater force now than before” from England.109 Thus, Moray
provided a logical justification for his many and urgent pleas for assistance.

By

appealing to Bedford, a man with whom he had a longstanding personal relationship and
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who lived in close geographical proximity, Moray hoped that he might dispatch resources
that would reach the rebel forces in time to make a difference.
In a more formal letter to Bedford dated the following day, 22 September, Moray,
Châtelherault, Glencairn, and Rothes asked for more specific resources. Again reiterating
the fact that Mary had summoned men to enhance her forces, they also confirmed that
“on 2nd October [she] purposes to besiege the castle of Hamilton,” thus far a sympathetic
fortress. In light of this imminent attack, the lords requested that Bedford, “if possible,
send hither 3,000 men of war with expedition, [and] better than 10,000 in a month
hereafter.”110 Because Mary’s increased forces intended to make an offensive attack, the
rebels realized that they needed a substantial fighting force of their own to repel the siege.
If they could not prevent the taking of Hamilton Castle, the rebellion could easily
crumble. With these 3,000 Englishmen, however, the rebels estimated requiring an even
more substantial force in the following weeks, a testament to the confidence they had in
the merit and strength of the men the English could provide. They did realize, however,
that should aid fail to come from England, they would need to drastically alter their plan
in order, collectively, to survive the attack and, on an individual level, “to save their
lives.”111 In addition, a lack of immediate aid would mean that their capability of
possible action would be hindered beyond repair.

This letter indicates a further

deterioration of the rebels’ position and once again accentuates the ever-increasing need
for English assistance if they hoped to continue their rebellion.
The same day, 22 September, Randolph provided Cecil with yet another
introspective missive that provided detailed commentary on the deteriorating situation
within Scotland. In this instance, he explored the issues that had arisen due to the fact
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that Mary had become estranged from her most important advisors. He deliberated on
the question of Scotland’s future should the rebellion continue far into the future or, if it
should end, a Scotland without these critical figures. Thus, he stated that “how she, with
this kind of government, her suspicion of her people, and debate with the chief of her
nobility, can stand and prosper, passes my wit.”112 A quarrel of this magnitude between
monarch and nobles affected a wide range of people and issues, not the least of which
stemmed from the fact that the nobles performed many critical administrative duties.
One of the most striking developments is the falling away of the nobles who had
previously played crucial roles in government. As time passed and the rebellion had not
been resolved, Mary was forced to turn to lesser nobles to provide the services the
rebellious lords no longer rendered. For instance, a letter of 22 September from Mary
and Darnley to the Baron of Kilranak lamented the “defection of the Earl of Moray [that
is] so unnaturally against us,” but continued that due to Moray’s status “it is not
convenient that any his houses be retained by him or any in his name.”113 The queen and
king therefore informed the baron that they “commit[ed] the keeping of our castle of
Inverness to you having so good proof of your faithful service.”114 That Mary and
Darnley elicited his help to hold such a significant fortress demonstrates their increased
reliance on the less experienced and lower-ranking nobles of the realm. In addition,
Randolph lamented Mary’s “continued evil mind to the Duke, and suspicion that Moray
sought but his own advancement when [in fact] he did her [his] best service,” for if she
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should continue to possess such negative attitudes towards each man, he asked, “what can
be their lives hereafter?.”115
The close association of the futures of Moray and Châtelherault and his steadfast
loyalty to the amity provides a clear indication of Randolph’s possible feelings towards
the two, and, by extension, the other rebellious lords, after the rebellion would end. If
they were no longer welcome in Scotland, their presence could possibly benefit England.
Randolph further emphasized that “these noblemen now pursued are the best and wisest,
the greatest friends and well willers my Sovereign has.” In contrast, Randolph reported
the lack of value Darnley’s presence provided to the royal side, stating that he had
“showeth himself all together unworthy of that which she hath called him unto,” the state
of kingship.116 Thus, Randolph fully explicated his belief that Mary had acted without
the best interests of her realm in mind. He also introduced the notion of Moray and
Châtelherault as valued royal advisors who had ceaselessly worked for goals that were
complementary to those of England.
In addition to soliciting support through direct proclamations and letters, Mary
and Darnley continually sought to discredit the rebels as using religion as a pretense for
revolt. A proclamation of 30 September asserted that
“in this uproar lately raised up against us by certain our rebels and their
assisters[,] the authors whereof to defile the eyes of the Simple people has
given them to understand that the quarrel they had in hand was only
religious…from under the pretence of that plausible argument…ignorant
persons easily [were] seduced…and trapped in a dangerous snare.”117
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The emphatic accusation that the rebels sought to persuade the masses to their side
through deception had some merit, but religion was not the only reason the rebel lords
had acted. While this point remains valid, the proclamation insinuated that the rebels
succeeded in utilizing deception to successfully win the masses.118 As evidenced by the
lack of support the rebels garnered, they did not succeed in bringing significant numbers
to their faction.

In addition, the proclamation intimated that the rebel lords had

previously been treated well, but that “their insatiable ambition could not be satisfied
with heaping riches upon riches and honor upon honor” and that they had “the
unreasonable desire to govern.”119
On 30 September, Elizabeth finally replied to the numerous requests for aid sent
through various channels. She was “very much grieved that the estate of the lords of
Scotland should be in so hard terms as is reported.” Elizabeth recounted the diplomatic
tactics by which she had “attempted all good means to the Queen of Scots to reduce her
to accord with them in all their reasonable causes.” With respect to providing actual
support to the rebels, however, Elizabeth remained deliberately vague, ambiguously
stating her intention to “enter into treaty with her by persons of good authority and credit
and therewith….[assemble] upon her frontiers a convenient force to be used and
employed in such sort as upon that treaty shall be seen necessary.”120 Thus, Elizabeth
committed herself to maintaining some sort of military force along the border should she
enter into some sort of treaty with Mary, but she remained ambiguous as to the time
frame or specific function of this force. From the haziness of this plan, however, the
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rebels could finally determine that Elizabeth did not intend to send any military force to
them in time for the impending conflict.
This ambiguous and only slightly sympathetic message from Elizabeth contrasts
with a missive, also addressed to the lords, written the following day, 1 October. In this
letter, Elizabeth attempted to demonstrate her appreciation for their plight, claiming that
“nothing has happened to her, since coming to her crown, more grievous than to learn
[of] their dangerous estate.” This seemingly sympathetic stance, however, was tempered
by her unwillingness to act aggressively on the rebels’ behalf: Elizabeth insisted that she
“cannot in that manner give them the aid they require, without open war, which she
means not to do without a just ground and cause given to her by” Mary. Elizabeth would
“send an embassy to the frontier, and therewith an army to be used as she shall see
occasion.” But this mere movement of men without their engaging Mary’s forces in
battle would not benefit the rebels.

In an attempt to further alleviate resentment,

Elizabeth did promise “to receive [the rebels] into her protection and save their persons
and lives from ruin…to show herself as a merciful and Christian prince, to defend
innocent noble subjects from tyranny and cruelty.”121 Although this pledge of asylum
may have been comforting, it would obviously have been an unnecessary pledge had
Elizabeth provided them with battlefield or monetary aid.
The resolve of Mary and her advisors strengthened in the absence of an English
army. On 4 October, Randolph reported that “whatever can be invented to overthrow
these noblemen pursued, shall be done if it lie in the Queen’s power.” Clearly, Mary was
becoming more and more assured of victory and had thus begun to contemplate the
rebels’ future after the rebellion was quelled. Mary, however, still retained very few
noble advisors. Randolph reported that “only Atholl of her council [is] now present”;
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despite the rebels’ desolate outlook, even “my lord Chancellor [Morton] has forsaken her
and joins the others, ready with his forces when so ever called.” While he had yet
outwardly to support the rebels, Maitland had also left her. Thus, the nobility of the
realm had become extremely disjointed: “God is so offended with this nation that I know
not what may do it good.”122
Randolph wrote on 4 October to Cecil that “all things are uncertain” within the
realm; nevertheless, he recounted several important developments. Although Mary had
successfully levied troops to fight in October, she remained short of money.
Accordingly, she had “besiege[d] their houses and take[n] all they have”; with this and a
loan of 1,000 pounds sterling, to be paid on 10 October, she could now take “herself
again to the field and pursue them.” Joining her in this endeavor was Lord Gordon, who
brought “a great force…from the north” to avenge his Catholic father against “Moray,
which is [naturally] approved by the Queen’s self.”123

On 8 October, Gordon was

“restored to all lands and annual rents…[held by] his father…and made [E]arl of
Huntly.”124 Thus, Mary’s forces seemed to be as strong as ever. The rebels altered their
plan in the wake of Elizabeth’s letter. At the moment, “Argyll [lay] in wait to find them
ready when he joins them. Morton has promised as much” as well.125 Randolph thus
remained aware of an effort on the part of the rebels to recover strength after the denial of
English aid, an effort made possible by Mary’s delay in receiving funds. While still
clearly the stronger of the two forces, Mary appeared vulnerable at this moment.
A letter from Bedford to Leicester depicted a more dramatic situation in which
Mary had already emerged as the triumphant force. Regarding the financial blow to the
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rebels, Bedford wrote that “the [E]arl of Moray above all the rest [of the rebels] seemeth
best to continue a good opinion of us.” That Moray continued to feel this way towards
the English despite the fact that they had not provided the promised assistance indicates
either his true resolve towards the amity, or, more likely, his continuing hope for English
support in the wake of the rebellion. As Bedford related, the rebels “think they have gone
too far, and trusted us too much.”126
At this point, however, the rebels “see now none other way but by their flight to
provide for themselves; whether, or where, are diverse opinions amongst them.” The
rebels had realized the futility of pursuing their cause within Scotland: without the
anticipated support from either the local population or the English, their cause could not
increase further. While diverse opinions existed among the rebel lords about where to
flee, a logical choice existed to the south. Though England had neglected to provide
material aid during the course of the rebellion itself, the common values between the
rebels and the English made England a natural haven. As Bedford related, “the [E]arl of
Moray sticketh only to our country, and meaneth shortly to come to me, whom I will
receive and aid all that I can.” Bedford’s promise indicates that Moray’s relationships
with English nobles had not been undermined by his rebellious status. Refuge was vital,
as reinforced by Bedford’s report that Mary “will hear of no peace, but will have either
the duke or the Earl of Moray’s head.”127
Accordingly, Moray and the other rebels crossed the border from Scotland into
England, where they received a warm reception from Bedford. Mary had successfully
“chased them here and there, till at length they were compelled to flee in England for
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refuge.”128 She understood that Elizabeth, despite not providing military assistance, had
remained sympathetic to the rebels: in her realm “all traitors are welcome, cherished and
received with honor and credit.”129 They fled to “her [Elizabeth] that had promised by
her ambassadors to wear her crown in their defense.”130 In fact, while many of the lords
remained on English Border estates, reportedly “some of them passed to the court of
England to induce support against our said sovereigns.”131 While this statement is for the
most part untrue, the uncertainty of having the rebel lords in England, in proximity to
Elizabeth, represented a threat that Mary and her advisers had no means of combating.
Randolph’s missive of 8 October indicates that Mary and her advisers did not yet
realize that the rebels had crossed the border into England, but it does reveal the action
they intended to pursue. He wrote that “this day the Queen sets forward to Dumfries with
all her force,” though he acknowledged that part of her forces “will do her little service
when there, [as] she now knows not whom to trust, [as she is] so much misliked in her
doings.”132 Although Mary may have amassed a much more substantial army, her lack of
certainty regarding their loyalty would have provided a huge impediment to their being
an effective fighting force. The potential impact of this uncertainty, however, was muted
by the sheer size of her army, as she still vastly outnumbered the forces of the rebels.
In terms of her elite advisors, “her chief trust” remained in Atholl, Bothwell, and
Gordon, whom she had restored to the earldom of Huntly on 6 October.

In a

demonstration of his gratitude, or perhaps as a condition of his restoration, he brought the
“whole force of the north” to her. The rebels, as Randolph contrasted, possessed many
friends and allies, but they were “too far off to help them.” This complaint had been true
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for several weeks, and so the true extent of friends willing actively to assist the rebels is
uncertain.

Regardless, Randolph deemed them to be too far away from the actual

fighting force to make a difference in the conflict at this point in time; he predicted that
“on Thursday or Friday, [11 or 12 October] the issue will be known, if it be God’s will
they meet.”133
On 10 October, a large and important Privy Council session took place for the
purpose of delineating a precise battle plan. The numerous attendees included Mary and
Darnley, the Earls of Lennox, Huntly, Bothwell, Atholl, Crawford and Cassillis, and
Lords Ruthven, Fleming, Gray, Creichton, and Lindsay. These individuals represented
the nobles who, for various reasons, remained loyal to the king and queen throughout the
events of the Chaseabout Raid. That being said, despite, or perhaps because of, the fact
that the royal army and the rebel forces had been marching around Scotland for weeks
without ever meeting in battle, a plan was designed so that the “whole army[,] presently
in readiness” might pursue the rebels most effectively.134
Through the divisions created and leaders assigned, it is possible to determine
which individuals were in the greatest royal favor and influence at this crucial moment.
Not surprisingly, Lennox was to lead the vanguard, accompanied by the Earls of Cassillis
and Eglinton and Lords Semphill, Ross, Cathcart, and Sanquhair. In addition, Huntly,
Atholl and Crawford were jointly to lead the rearguard with Lords Ruthven, Glamis,
Forbes, Drummond, and Invermeath, as well by the heir of the Earl Marischal. Finally,
the battle as a whole was to be commanded by “the King’s Majesty’s self,” with the
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assistance of the Earls of Morton, Bothwell, and Mar and the Lords Ogilvy, Fleming,
Livingston, Somerville, Borthuik, Yester, Lindsay, and Home.135
More important than the actual dispersal of the various nobles were the men
chosen to lead these divisions; while many of the choices were not surprising, some,
however, were slightly puzzling. That Darnley was to lead the overall battle does contain
a certain logic, as it placed him for the first time in an authoritative position wholly
separate from Mary; his lack of battle experience was countered by the other division
leaders. By the same token, it is not surprising that Lennox would be accorded the honor
of leading half the army. This honor further established Lennox as being preeminent: he
would merely be assisted by two men of equal rank, Cassillis and Eglinton, whereas the
other earls who were to lead divisions conjointly would be assisted only by lords. The
more surprising decision was the triumvirate leadership of Huntly, Atholl, and Crawford.
While Huntly and Atholl both had reasons to feel indebted to Mary, the same cannot be
said of Crawford. Although he remained faithful to the crown, no special reason for his
loyalty existed. Despite this careful planning for a military hierarchy during conflict, no
battle ever occurred. The battle-plan document is dated 10 October, and four days earlier
Moray and the other noble rebel leaders had crossed the border into England. It must be
assumed that Mary, Darnley, and the council had yet to receive word of this escape.
On 14 October, a letter from Moray to Leicester reveals the status of the rebel
lords once they had escaped to England. Moray had “comforted the rest of the nobility
here” in Carlisle, as instructed by Robert Melville.

Despite being pleased to have

received asylum in England, Moray wrote that “there is little good occasion given me,” as
regardless, “a great part of my friends are ruined, and I and the rest of the nobility here
put to this extremity…which we are brought to by following [Elizabeth] and her
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Council’s advice.”136 Moray clearly felt that he had been led astray by Elizabeth and her
wavering support.
He therefore requested that Leicester use his influence to persuade Elizabeth to
“make an end of these troubles” by whatever means necessary, hopefully by “expediting
the support.”137 A 17 October letter from Châtelherault to Cecil indicates that Moray
himself elected to journey to London to speak to Elizabeth on behalf of the cause.138 As
for the other lords, they meant “to remain (if [Elizabeth] licensed them) till their mistress
[Mary] should by some good means be pacified.”139 Moray “could obtain nothing but
disdain and scorn” in his first official meeting; subsequently, however, Elizabeth
expressed a more friendly attitude.140
The Privy Council records do not reveal Mary’s knowledge of the escape into
England until 22 October, when Mary and Darnley were “surely informed that their
rebels, with their assisters, have now withdrawn themselves in England.” Despite the fact
that the rebels had not received English aid, they were still able to receive sanctuary in
England, which galled the Scots monarchs. More distressing to them, however, was the
fact that from the rebels’ position just over the border, they were “daily and continually at
their pleasure, resort[ing] and repair[ing themselves] within this realm as [if] they were
their Highnesses free lieges.”141

This successful travel demonstrates that they still

maintained enough support for what was now clearly a failed rebellion that they could
continue to travel within Scotland without being turned in by subjects who only appeared
to remain loyal to the crown.
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While this lack of respect for and obedience to royal authority remained troubling,
the more immediate concern for Mary and Darnley was that the rebels were now using
England as a safe base of operations and were therefore entering Scotland for the purpose
of “persuading and seducing the good subjects to the like rebellion and defection.” To
prevent them from succeeding in this endeavor, the king and queen charged the Wardens
of the East, Middle and West Marches to “appoint watches in every high passage, and
other places needful,…and diligently search and give attendance what persons pass in
England, or come there toward this realm.” If they were to encounter any of the known
rebels or other suspicious persons, they were commanded that those persons should “be
stayed, taken, apprehended, and brought to their Majesties.”142 The border between
Scotland and England was defined but not guarded or monitored, and so the reality of
geography, lack of technology, staffing, and communication made the task impossible.
The tenacity with which Mary and Darnley continued to pursue the rebels, however,
reveals that they did not believe that the crisis had ended.
The English ambassadors to Scotland now received new instructions regarding
how they might engender peace in the northern realm. The English Privy Council
instructed them to “endeavor to restore the amity” and to accentuate the faults of Mary
herself in dealing with the English, as Elizabeth had “complain[ed] of the strange conduct
of the Queen of Scots regarding her marriage…[and] her treatment of” Randolph. In
addition, the instructions continued, the ambassadors to Scotland were to “obtain
[Mary’s] confirmation of the Treaty of 3 July 1560, [as well as] to do what they can to
procure the restitution of the lords, particularly the Earl of Moray.”143
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obviously still sympathized with their cause and sought to provide the best terms for them
after the rebellion without monetary cost to her own realm.
Randolph continued to report developments about the nobles who had not
rebelled and remained in Scotland. In the wake of the rebels crossing the border into
England, the “most part of her soldiers [have been] cassed.” The status of the individual
nobles closest to Mary varied. To begin with, Morton was forgiven by Mary since he did
not actually join the rebel forces, though he did desert her momentarily; she went to
Dalkeith to “enrich my lord of Morton, who is well pleased with her being there.” In
addition, Lennox now remained in Glasgow “to keep that country in obedience, but takes
I hear what he likes from all men,” further contributing to his unpopularity. Atholl,
Randolph recounted, had returned to his home, where he was joined by Bothwell. In an
offer that henceforth separated him from the remainder of the rebel lords, Châtelherault
was offered “if he gives over his right to the crown, to be restored to his possessions,” but
had yet to respond to this proposition.144
In contrast to this softening attitude towards Châtelherault were the criminal trials
of individuals accused of associating with the rebels. Several individuals were at once
“accused of art and part of the treasonable and unlawful supply, assistance, and
intercommoning” with the rebels, “putting of themselves in arms, as raised Men of War
against our sovereigns and their authority.” The rebels, with whom the accused had
consorted, were named specifically: Châtelherault, Moray, Glencairn, Rothes, Ochiltree,
and Kirkcaldy of Grange. All were denounced for “willful and manifest contempt and
disobedience in non-compeering…to answer to such things as should be laid to their
charge.” The accused men in this case were sentenced, according to Pitcairn, to be
“headed and quartered,” but then “the execution [was] delayed at the King and Queen’s
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Grace commandment, [and] they were in the meantime ordered to be strictly warded in
the Castle of Edinburgh.”145 Both the initial harshness of the sentence and the subsequent
postponement of the punishment demonstrated the authority of the monarchy.
In addition to criminal trials in the wake of the rebellion, Mary, Darnley, and
Lennox sought to punish rebel sympathizers but reward individuals who had remained
loyal to the crown through the redistribution of lands and goods. An instance of such a
transfer occurred on 12 November with the Letters of Gift from Lennox to Sir John
Stewart. Stewart, a “right truest cousin” of Mary and Darnley, was granted “the escheat
of all goods movable and immovable…which pertain to Master Andrew Hay,” who had
been “put to your Highnesses horn after his treasonable assisting and partaking with
James [E]arl of Moray and his accomplices your Highnesses rebels.”146
Individuals who had remained in Scotland but had sympathized with the rebels
still remained targets of Mary’s wrath. On the other hand, a desire for fairness existed:
Ochiltree had sided with Moray and the rebels, yet Mary and Darnley “have dispensed
[his heir]…and his brother and sisters their father’s escheat.”147 The reasoning behind
this dispensation, which does not correspond with many other instances of entire families
being punished, may lie with the depleted numbers of actively loyal and supportive
nobles. Endearing the Ochiltree heir and his siblings to Mary would encourage loyalty.
While most of the noble leaders, including Moray, Rothes, and Glencairn, had
crossed the border into England, there was a notable exception. The powerful Earl of
Argyll merely retreated to his fortified Highland estate. The Privy Council issued a
proclamation on 29 October for Argyll to appear before Mary and Darnley; his power in
Argyll, however, meant that “the said charge [cannot] be duly executed, because there is
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not sure passage to the said Earl’s presence and dwelling places.” The fact that the
Argyll lands were so well protected that communication with the earl was uncertain
attests both to the government’s lack of power and the strength of Argyll itself. Indeed,
the council was forced to issue an open proclamation rather than personally charging
Argyll. Most curiously, however, this declaration also orders that Robert Lord Boyd
compeer before Mary and Darnley, and in his case, “nor yet is the dwelling place of the
said Lord certain.”148 Argyll and Boyd were not connected in any particular way, other
than the fact that they had both sided with Moray in the recent conflict.
Argyll had opted to remain in Scotland and retreat to his own lands so that he
might continue to fight for the protestant cause. A zealous supporter of the Reformation,
he genuinely believed that the changed circumstances in governance wrought by the
Darnley marriage represented a threat to Scottish protestantism and the kirk. Thus, long
after the other rebels had fled to England, he continued to maintain his forces. After
Argyll himself failed to appear, he and “his kin, friends, partakers, and tenants,
inhabitants of Argyll, Lorne and Braidalbane” were strongly reprimanded as “rebellious
and wicked persons” on 3 November. While they were not expressly put to the horn,
Argyll and his supporters were accused of “having shirked of all due obedience, and
without all fear of God and of their Majesties as there were na law nor authority above
their heads.” Specifically, Argyll and his men had supposedly made incursions beyond
Argyll, particularly into the Lowlands, where they reived and committed other crimes for
the sake of their cause. The proclamation therefore ordered that Argyll and his men were
not to be supplied with “victuals or armor.”149 These raids can be viewed as the last
attempts made by the rebellious factions of the Chaseabout Raid; while not explicitly part
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of the overall scheme Moray had concocted, Argyll’s attempt to continue to fight for
religion provides a sense of closure in terms of actual aggressive action.
The other rebel nobles found sanctuary in England. Although Moray officially
received an extremely cool reception in London from Elizabeth herself, Mary realized
that Elizabeth did sympathize with their actions. She was obviously angry towards
Elizabeth for harboring her rebellious subjects, further exacerbating the rift that had
occurred between the two queens when Mary had defied Elizabeth by marrying Darnley.
On 5 November, Mary received from Elizabeth an offer aimed at reconciliation, wherein
Elizabeth expressed a desire to resolve “all things tending to the welfare and tranquility
of both the realms.” She implied that “the Kings Highness, her Graces husband, may in
time coming be recognized”; this recognition was essential for Mary’s claim to the
English succession.150
Elizabeth, however, was not a notably generous individual; her diplomatic and
favorable leanings towards Mary directly preceded a request that safe conduct into
Scotland should be granted to “some personages of good trust and quality.”151 Those
‘personages’ were, in fact, the rebel lords who wished to return to the power and lands
they had left behind in Scotland. As failed rebels in exile, they could not hope to
accomplish anything of note. If they returned to Scotland, however, they might be in a
position to negotiate with Mary to return to their positions of power and influence. This
effort might be particularly successful with Elizabeth’s backing, as Mary still wished to
be officially named as Elizabeth’s heir.
Mary, however, did not grant any such guarantees of safe conduct. Not only did
she refuse the lords safe conduct, but also, according to Randolph’s report of 8
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November, Mary vehemently placed the blame for the rebellion squarely on Moray. In
hearing how well Moray was ultimately received by Elizabeth, Mary asked what “could
be in him why he should be beloved or favored.”152 She claimed that she would “rather
lose half her realm than have him in the state he was in this country.” Randolph
concluded that “the whole burden is laid on Moray,” but he sympathized with Moray to a
greater degree than with the other rebel lords: “would to God the rest that were
participant of this action had had the self same regard to the honor of God and amity of
both the countries that he had.”153 The same day, Randolph wrote to Cecil that the
opinion of the whole of the nobility regarding Moray varied, that some believed he
should remain abroad, while others believed that he should “seek with the rest to come
home, and will be received.”154 Maitland, who “enter[ed] again in credit,” Randolph
reported, “is of this mind.”155
Regarding the nobility as a whole, the situations of both the rebellious and the
loyal nobles had shifted with the passage of time. Remaining within Mary’s close circle
of advisors in the wake of the rebellion were the restored Earls of Huntly and Bothwell,
both of whom were appointed to the Privy Council.156 As for the rebel lords in England,
many in Scotland “lament[ed] that the noble men now in England receive so little
comfort.”157 Many assumed, as the common rumor suggested, that they would either be
“chased back or forced to seek another land.”158 The specific fates of some of the rebel
lords became differentiated at this point as well. Châtelherault, Randolph reported,
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accepted the earlier offer, and Randolph thought that “it shall not be hard to have his
pardon granted.”159 On the other hand, Randolph remained unsure as to whether Moray
and Kirkcaldy of Grange would be permitted to return to Scotland, stating that they
“stand in worse terms—yet I believe they shall have liberty to live out of the country,”
indicating Mary’s inability to prosecute them from afar.160 In addition, Randolph claimed
that “Argyll may make his peace when he will with better conditions than any of the
rest.”161 This conclusion was likely due to the significant power base Argyll maintained
in the west and his important dealings with Ireland.
Several weeks later, however, at a meeting of the Privy Council attended by
Morton, Huntly, Atholl, and Crawford, Mary and the council issued a declaration
regarding the leaders of the recent rebellion. Mary and Darnley “libeled summons of
treason against Archibald Earl of Argyll, James Earl of Moray, Alexander Earl of
Glencairn, Andrew Earl of Rothes, Andrew Lord Ochiltree, Robert Lord Boyd, and
diverse others,” ordering them to appear at the next session of parliament where they
were to be charged with having “incurred the crime of lèse-majesty,” and, for this crime,
to have “forfeited life, lands, and goods.” The proclamation did acknowledge that the
majority of those being charged were, at the time, “outwith the realm, and having na
certain dwelling places.” Because the declaration accounted for the rebels’ self-imposed
exile, the monarchs reasoned that since the charge was being declared by open
proclamation, it remained “sufficient in all respects as if the same summons were
executed upon them personally.”162

159

This determination by Mary and the council

Randolph to Cecil (12 November 1565), CSPS II: 237.
Ibid., 237.
161
Ibid., 237.
162
Declaration anent the execution of the summons of treason (1 December 1565), RPC I: 409.
160

118
demonstrates that they wished to be protected against any claims the rebels might concoct
and that they were adamant that the rebels be punished at the next parliament.
At the beginning of December, Randolph submitted another report to Cecil in
which he remarked upon the individual situations of some of the most important nobles in
the realm. Mary had requested that Elizabeth grant Châtelherault safe conduct “through
her realm to parts beyond the sea,” so Randolph had surmised that “the Duke is like to
speed well enough in his suit to be restored.”163 As a matter of course, “it is fully
determined that the Duke shall enjoy his own and license for 5 years to live where he
will.”164 In addition “all his friends, kinsmen and their tenants [are] to be deleted out of
forfeiture, and [so] gave him and them a remission for all crimes committed.”165 As he
stated, the statuses of Argyll, Morton, and Maitland were not changed from the time of
his last such report.
Lennox had not changed his behavior either, but his activities had become more
notable, as he “is complained of to the Council for many extortions in the country where
he is lieutenant.”166

In addition, the relationship between Mary and Lennox had

deteriorated severely, as Randolph saw “no great likelihood of long accord between
[Mary] and Lennox, of whom she has already wished he had not set foot in Scotland.”167
As for Atholl, “he is now in court and at friendship with Argyll and would that Moray
were now in Scotland with his friends; many even in court lament his absence.” In
contrast to this multitude of nobles who missed his presence and his counsel, Randolph
reported that Mary “continues in one mind to Moray, never to do him good.”168 Mary
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had yet to waver in her resolve to place complete blame on Moray despite the fact that
many of the nobles she had managed to retain believed that she and the realm would
benefit from his presence.
Moray, like most of the other rebel lords, was scheduled to be forfeited of his
titles and estates at the March parliament. In an attempt to prevent this forfeiture from
occurring, he appealed to Elizabeth for assistance, claiming that he had “long travailed
for my sovereign’s favor, yet I have profited so little.” In actuality, Moray had profited
immensely, gaining great influence until her marriage, and an earldom until his rebellion;
the risk of forfeiture, however, threatened these gains permanently. He then reminded
Elizabeth that “I and the rest are under summons of forfeiture” and that he had learned in
the month since the summons that “favor is not to be looked for to me, unless by your
majesty’s means.”169 Elizabeth saw that having Moray and the others put under forfeiture
might mean that they would never again be part of Mary’s government, a development
that could have negative consequences for the amity and for Elizabeth’s ability to
maintain a careful watch over Mary’s government.
The passage of time did induce greater tranquility regarding the matter,
particularly following the most important success of the Darnley marriage: Mary’s
pregnancy. By the end of January, Mary’s anger towards the rebels had, to a degree,
subsided; Randolph reported that “towards my lord of Moray I find that some part of her
extremity is assuaged, [and] she neither useth so grievous words as she hath done, nor so
impatient to hear him spoken of as she was.”170 This lessening in the intensity of Mary’s
animosity towards Moray may also indicate her growing need for the counsel he had
given the queen as her principal advisor.

169
170

Moray to Elizabeth (31 December 1565), CSPS II: 249.
Letter from Thomas Randolph to Sir William Cecil (24 January 1566), Selections: 151.

120
A communication of 8 February shows the attitudes of the nobles who had
remained loyal to the crown towards the rebel lords. Bedford reported that a meeting of
the lords had been called in anticipation of the parliament of the following month in order
to “determine and conclude beforehand upon such and so many articles as shall there [to
the parliament] be brought into question,” “most of them being hereunto appointed
[being] utter enemies to the cause” of the rebels. They naturally determined that the rebel
lords should “be excluded from all pardon and their goods and lands confiscated,
and…that the [E]arl of Moray’s lands be given away.”171 While Mary’s attitude towards
the rebels seemed to have softened somewhat, the collective attitude of the loyal lords
had clearly not experienced any such change. In addition, they stood to benefit greatly if
the rebels’ lands were to be redistributed.
Not until much closer to the date of the parliament at which the forfeitures were to
occur is there another reference to the rebel lords. In a report of 25 February, Randolph
wrote that Mary “wills this parliament to hold, and that the lords to be forfeited,”
indicating that despite Mary’s estrangement from Darnley, the catalyst for the rebellion,
she remained steadfast that the rebel lords should be punished.172 In contrast, Randolph
reported, some of her nobility “contend to the contrary to stay [the parliament] either by
fair or foul means.”173 This discontent among those of her nobility who had remained
loyal throughout the rebellion indicates a growing dissatisfaction with the idea of
punishing the rebel lords, as the process of forfeiture would prevent them from reentering
the political sphere. While some individuals may have been glad to curb the power or
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resources of other particular nobles, on the whole Mary’s rule had deteriorated without
the benefit of her full council. In addition, such a sweeping action could establish a
disadvantageous precedent for royal-noble relations.
Randolph provided evidence of the potentially nefarious means by which some
individuals may have sought to halt the parliament, and therefore the process of
forfeiture, from occurring. He related that he was “told secretly…that Lennox and Argyll
shall within 3 days talk together, and it shall be offered to Argyll that if he and Moray
will concur with this King to give him the crown matrimonial, then he will take their
parts, bring them home…and establish religion as it was at this Queen’s home
coming.”174 The concession of the crown matrimonial would directly counter the rebels’
primary stated reason for rebellion, the Darnley marriage; however, Darnley’s
concessions to them would provide them with the assurance that several of their goals
would materialize and would also result in no loss of lands or honor. If not forfeited,
then the rebel lords would also be able to regain their respective places in Scottish society
and, most importantly, in the ruling Scottish nobility.
On 6 March, Bedford and Randolph had gained greater insight as to the result of
this meeting between Lennox and Argyll and the ensuing plot between Darnley and some
of the Scottish nobility. Darnley “thinketh to advance himself unto that which by other
means he cannot attain unto,” the possession of the crown matrimonial, with the
assistance of “some noble men in Scotland.”

The English diplomats enclosed two

relevant documents with their missive, the bond by the nobles to Darnley and the articles
of promise by Darnley.

The lords who bound themselves to Darnley included the

rebellious Argyll, Moray, Glencairn, Rothes, Boyd, and Ochiltree as well as, in Scotland,
Morton, Ruthven, and Maitland. These nobles made seven distinct promises to Darnley,
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including, most importantly, that they would “support him in all his lawful and just
actions,…maintain his just title to the crown failing the succession [child] of their
sovereign lady,…[and] maintain the religion established by the Queen after her arrival.”
In exchange for these overwhelming measures of support, Darnley agreed to five separate
promises, including that he would “obtain their remission, stop their forfeiture, restore
their lands, support them in the exercise of the reformed religion, and maintain them as a
good master should.”175 In addition to making these promises, some of which would
require the passage of time to take effect, Darnley formally granted remission to the
nobles for “whatsoever all actions, quarrels, and crimes whatsoever, and gives them free
license to repair” to him.176 Darnley additionally stipulated that “none of [his subjects]
take upon hand to molest or trouble any of the said persons in their bodies or goods,” thus
allowing the previously tainted lords to travel to Edinburgh and elsewhere in Scotland
without fear.177
The Scottish nobility and Darnley thus circumvented Mary completely in their
quest to restore order to the realm and to devise a solution that would in some way satisfy
each of the parties involved. On 7 March, the uninformed Mary entered Edinburgh with
several of her nobles to “elect and chief the lords of articles” for the imminent parliament.
Of note, “the king’s majesty passed not” through the tollbooth with her, but of the honors,
“George [E]arl of Huntly bore the crown, James [E]arl of Bothwell the scepter, and
David [E]arl of Crawford the sword of honor.” The shift in the earls providing Mary
with the greatest amount of support contrasts with similar lists of honors prior to the
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rebellion. In addition, the temporal lords of articles for parliament were the Earls of
Huntly, Bothwell, Morton, Marischal, Crawford, Atholl, and Lennox.178
On 9 March came the culmination of the plot between Darnley and the nobles, the
murder of Mary’s private secretary David Rizzio. The murder was “conspired by the
king, the [E]arl of Lennox his father, the [E]arl of Morton, my lord Ruthven, and my lord
Lindsay, with their assisters.”179 In addition, Melville claimed that “the Earl of Lennox
knew of the said enterprise…and so had the Earls of Atholl, Bothwell, and Huntly.”180
Apparently, Darnley had been in communication with Moray and “the whole nobility
who was at then banished in England…to cause [them]…to be in readiness.”181 Thus,
Moray and the other nobles who had participated in the rebellion anticipated utilizing the
incidence of Rizzio’s murder as a means of reentering Scottish politics and society.
Following his murder, on 10 March, “Moray and the other lords entered Scotland and
went that night to Edinburgh.”182 Once there, Moray was “well received by the king”
and, regarding the process of forfeiture of the rebel lords, “of parliament there is no more
talk.”183
In the wake of the murder of Rizzio, Mary became so focused on exacting
revenge on the lords who had most closely plotted with Darnley and who actually
executed the murder that she became “content to remit to the former lords with whom she
was so grievously offended, all they had done.”184 At this point, she became more
strongly opposed to those at the center of the Rizzio plot, namely Morton, Ruthven, and
Lindsay. The fact that Moray and the rebel lords had yet to enter Scotland at the time of
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the murder removed them from the geographical proximity necessary to implicate them
as key figures in that plot.
While Mary’s attention was otherwise occupied the next day, 10 March, a
proclamation was issued in Darnley’s name ordering that “all and sundry the earls, lords,
barons, and bishops, that [had]…come to Edinburgh to the Parliament, [should] depart of
the same within three hours, under the pain of treason.”185 Darnley thus did deliver his
part of the bargain, as dissolving parliament effectively halted the forfeiture proceedings
that had been scheduled.

A further indication of the unlikely partnership between

Darnley and the formerly rebellious nobles was the fact that that evening, Moray, Rothes,
Grange, Home, and Boyd came “to the said palace of Holyroodhouse…at the king’s
command.”186 In the following weeks, while Mary continued to pursue those who had
assassinated Rizzio, as they had fled to different parts of the realm, “Moray, Argyll,
Glencairn and Rothes and the other barons and gentlemen banished before have obtained
favor and pardon” by the beginning of April.187 Thus, the turn of events to an even
greater affront to Mary afforded the expedient pardon of the rebel lords.

185

A Diurnal of Remarkable Occurrents, 91.
Ibid., 91.
187
Robert Melville to Elizabeth (1 April 1566), CSPS II: 272.
186

125
CHAPTER IV: PERSONALITIES AND MOTIVATIONS

The actual events of the Chaseabout Raid only reveal part of the reason why this
failed rebellion retains significance; the motivations of the various nobles themselves are
extremely revealing. As Jane Dawson eloquently and unequivocally states, “in an age of
personal monarchy and small, tightly-knit elites, personal rule lay at the heart of political
power.”1 While the ultimate reason why a particular noble chose to side with Mary or
with the rebels differs from person to person, factors that influenced that decision
included ties of kinship and clan, bonds of friendship and manrent, religious perspectives,
traditional networks of alliance, political power, and land. No clear factor differentiates
the two groups of nobles. By examining the factors most relevant for each prominent
noble involved, we can ascertain which factor proved to be the most important for him.
The lack of coherence of factors on either side of the conflict demonstrates that, indeed,
the only unifying factor among the Scottish nobility was the lack of consensus. The
motivation that emerges across the nobility is selfish, personal ambition. The conflict
was thus not fundamentally ideological or based on the greater religious conflict of the
age, but reflects more traditional rifts in a clan-based society.
Many of the missives compiled in the Calendar of State Papers of Scotland refer
to the construction of alliances. While some contemporary analysis of the situation is
highly sophisticated, the nobility as an entity is often referred to as having a singular
motivation.

Often the situation, and noble response to it, is over-generalized.

For

instance, Randolph referred to the attitudes of the Duke of Châtelherault and Argyll
specifically in a particular letter, but he then proceeded to generalize their attitudes,
commenting that he had “never found in my life so discontent a people as here,” wherein
1
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the ‘here’ referred to all of Edinburgh, not these two noblemen.2 In addition, particular
reports attribute a specific viewpoint to the entire nobility, an attitude that simply could
not have existed due to the lack of any common opinion regarding the complicated
situation that unfolded in 1565. For instance, Randolph reported at one point that “I can
write of no men’s minds in particular, but generally I may say that the most part are clean
against it, and yet so void of hope, comfort or support, that they know not where to turn
themselves, and so for these wants, shall be forced to yield to that which is against God’s
glory, the weal of their country, and their Sovereign’s honor.”3
On the other hand, there are examples of contemporary analyses and reports
which recognize that many factors contributed to the ultimate alignment of the nobility.
For instance, the “Memorial of the Enemies and Friends of Lennox” attempts to surmise
how the enemies of Lennox might be converted into friends: “these may be w[o]n partly
in hope that Darnley will embrace religion, which I doubt will never be—partly by
preference of spiritual lands, partly by money, and partly put in fear by the authority, and
in respect of other insolent pretences.”4 This breakdown of factors that may influence
this particular decision reveals an acknowledgement that different men may approach the
situation with different goals in mind. For instance, at times individual stories seem to
point towards the issue of religion as determining one’s allegiance, but this type of
analysis dangerously oversimplifies the situation. Thus, “in Mary’s party we search in
vain for a nucleus of committed Catholics. She certainly had Catholic supporters in
numbers, though they did not act as a party.”5 Equally important to consider, therefore, is
the relative importance of each of a number of factors for each individual to discover
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which factor proved to be the most critical. In addition, though religion might appear to
have been the critical factor simply because of the label of protestant or Catholic, this is
not true for the vast majority of the nobles. Indeed, the rebels’ statement of purpose as
expressed to Randolph in September 1565 claimed that
The heads we seek are known to you, and few and short; the one,
establishing the religion we profess, abolishing of the contrary, and surety
of our lives and heritages—the other that this country be governed by
advice and counsel of the nobility of the same, according to its ancient
custom and laws, and not by strangers. This is the whole that we sought
as our Declaration testifies.6
Clearly, particular factors affected individual nobles in different ways, and while multiple
issues may have influenced a person, one element superseded the others in importance
and thus became the determining issue in his decision as to which side to join. A separate
evaluation of each significant noble is thus necessary for understanding the complexity of
factors affecting each man, and, further, will show the ways in which the nobility
remained greatly fragmented.
Moray, due to his absolute centrality to the Chaseabout Raid, will be the first
individual examined. We then shift to the Duke of Châtelherault as the next most critical
individual, as he provided great legitimacy and leadership to the rebels. Because of the
personal interplay between the two houses, Châtelherault is juxtaposed with the Earl of
Lennox. From there, we move back to the rebellious nobles and evaluate the Earl of
Argyll, Lord Boyd, and the Earl of Glencairn.
Moving to those nobles that remained loyal to Mary during the Chaseabout Raid,
we examine the Earl of Atholl and Lord Ruthven, both of whom supported the Darnley
marriage because of alliance.

Shifting to the nobles who ultimately decided their

respective positions based on political factors and loyalties, we evaluate William
6
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Maitland of Lethington, the Earl of Eglinton, and Earl Marischal. Of equal importance
are the Earls of Mar, Huntly, and Morton, all of whom received specific rewards that
prompted them to forego other loyalties and remain loyal to Mary. Of slightly lesser
importance are the Earl of Bothwell, Lord Fleming, the Earl of Cassillis, Lord Lindsay,
Sir William Kirkcaldy of Grange, and the Earls of Rothes and Caithness, each of whom
mirrors the sentiments of one of the more central nobles—loyalty to the crown, personal
reward, and personal feud. Several additional nobles who also played a lesser part in
rebellion and for whom adequate sources do not exist are briefly mentioned as well.
***

James Stewart, Earl of Moray (1531/32-70)
Though influenced by the issues of religion and Anglo-Scottish relations, Lord
James Stewart, after 1562 Earl of Moray, rebelled against Mary due to his desire to
maintain the power and status he had accumulated during the first four years of her
personal reign, a situation he viewed as being threatened by her marriage to Darnley. He
was the illegitimate son of James V and Margaret Erskine, the daughter of the fifth Lord
Erskine; he was one of a number of base-born half-siblings of Mary, herself the only
lawful child of James V.7 Despite his illegitimacy, his father made him a generous
provision. Throughout the 1550s, as well as later in the 1560s, Moray proved himself to
be an adept politician and a skilled military tactician. He briefly met his half-sister Mary
on a trip to France in the 1550s, but otherwise remained in Scotland where he was active
in politics and remained on good terms with Mary’s regent, her mother, Mary of Guise.
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His involvement in politics prior to Mary’s return to Scotland provided him with
governmental experience that helped legitimize his place at Mary’s side. In addition to
purely political activities, he also gained valuable leadership experience and a reputation
because of his involvement with the Lords of the Congregation.

His first notable

encounter with protestantism occurred in 1555 when he attended a talk given by John
Knox; he was among the lords who urged Knox to return to Scotland the following year.8
Despite this early foray and other indications of reformist sympathies, he did not
demonstrate a strong commitment to protestantism; his name is conspicuously absent
from the First Band of 1557.9 As was common in this period, politics and religion
intersected for Moray.

Increased French dominance over Scottish affairs persuaded

Moray to distance himself from Mary of Guise and to declare publicly his allegiance to
protestantism. On 1 June 1559, Moray openly joined the Lords of the Congregation and
“thenceforward he shared the congregation’s fluctuating fortunes.”10 His “conversion” to
protestantism, however, was “largely political, and within two years he would be
quarreling with Knox almost as often as [Mary] did.”11 Moray thus did not possess the
absolute religious conviction of several of his contemporaries, such as Argyll or
Glencairn, but he did publicly commit himself to the reformed cause.
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Through his acute political abilities, however, Moray quickly established himself
as one of the leaders of the Congregation; he thus worked for the establishment of
protestantism but retained a political focus, rather than an ideological drive, towards
realizing the Congregation’s goals. While his abilities were crucial for the success of the
Congregation as a whole, his enemies were quick to claim that he sought the power and,
ultimately, the throne, for himself, a charge that he denied through both actions and
words. For instance, Moray demonstrated his commitment to protestant victory through
his great willingness in acknowledging the significance of the Hamilton clan to the
protestant cause and in advancing the respective positions of Châtelherault and Arran.
With his leading position in government secured following the success of the
Congregation and the queen firmly ensconced at the French court, it seemed as though he
would “remain firmly in control of the Scottish government…for the rest of [Mary’s]
reign.”12 With Mary’s husband Francis having ascended the French throne, governing
nobles in Scotland and in France assumed that Mary would remain on the continent for
the rest of her life. Scotland would therefore have a reigning, yet absent, queen, a
situation that would allow for capable and appropriate leaders, such as the competent
half-brother of the queen, to assume great power.

The death of Francis, however,

dramatically altered the situation in Scotland.
Following the death of Francis II, Moray emerged as Mary’s chief advisor,
catapulting him to a new position of power that far exceeded his experiences with the
Congregation; Mary’s return marked the beginning of his rapid ascendancy at her side.
In another demonstration of his political acumen, he convinced Mary to follow his
moderate plan for her return to Scotland rather than the more militant and dramatic
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options offered by other nobles. She agreed not to attempt to alter the state of religion
and to accept Moray and Maitland as her primary advisors, as Mary “desired to confer
with Moray and Lethington, that no other man might be made of counsel.”13 The extent
to which these two men are singled out time and again throughout reports represents one
of the most notable constants in the tumultuous period of 1561-1565.
With his new status at Mary’s side, Moray was able to pursue policies that he
personally favored, further contributing to his newfound sense of power and special
status among the nobility. The cornerstone of Moray’s general policy was his adamant
support for and maintenance of the amity with England; he was “wholly bent towards
England.”14

He maintained good relations with the many Englishmen he had

encountered through his work at the English-Scottish border, particularly the Earls of
Bedford and Leicester, and also had a good relationship with Randolph and other English
diplomats. Indeed, Randolph praised Moray as being “true, plain, and faithful.”15 In
December 1564, when tensions began to escalate, Randolph enthusiastically praised
Moray, as he wrote to Cecil that “well as your honour have ever thought of Moray, I
doubt not you shall increase it.”16
In addition, Moray and Maitland closely aligned themselves in government with
other nobles from the Congregation, demonstrating that Moray had yet to relinquish
completely the close alliances he had formed in the period 1557-1560. For instance, they
often allied with Argyll; their close working relationship is evident from the many
instances in which Mary would “take short advice with such as Moray, Argyll, and
13
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Lethington.”17 In addition, though Châtelherault was not as involved in daily governance
as he was in the preceding decades, Moray closely associated with the duke and Argyll
not only religiously but also politically. Kirkcaldy of Grange noted that “my lord of
Argyll and my lord of Moray ha[ve] concluded that the duke shall suffer no wrong by any
particular party,” indicating the emergence of an alliance.18 This more formal coalition
of mid-September 1564 likely stemmed from the imminent return of Lennox.19
Moray quickly gained Mary’s absolute confidence, which further solidified his
position at her side and resulted in his accumulation of further honors.

Randolph

observed that “my lord of Moray is presently very great and may do what he will.”20 In
addition, other nobles observed the queen’s reliance on Moray, as he took “the burden of
this Queen’s affairs, for when any comes to present a supplication, she bids them to go to
her brother of Moray.”21 He was rewarded with the earldom of Moray on 30 January
1562.

Though the title was kept secret for a time, his ennoblement was publicly

announced on 7 February 1562 in anticipation of his marriage the following day to Agnes
Keith, daughter of the fourth Earl Marischal. The marriage provided Moray with an
expanded base of support, as the Earl Marischal was a conservative protestant.
In addition to bringing him closer to subscribers of another political philosophy,
the match also provided him with the potential for further material support, an essential
element of success that he lacked. It is important to remember that, unlike the many
earldoms passed down from generation to generation intact with associated lands and
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tenants, the earldom of Moray was created by the crown from a group of lands whose
administration had changed many times over the years. In addition, unlike earls whose
lands were farmed and inhabited by members of their clans, Moray had no such
associations of kinship to provide him with a power base. This situation contrasts starkly
with, for instance, the situation of the Earl of Argyll; his lands were indisputably his and
had been inhabited by fellow Campbells for generations. The marriage thus augmented
his already powerful position by providing him with an intact kin network, an important
element of noble life, as well as further establishing him as a member of the hereditary
nobility.
Moray’s success at Mary’s side continued throughout the year, further solidifying
for him the need to remain physically close and politically complementary to his halfsister. A moment of particular triumph occurred for him when “on 27 October 1562 he
had a commission to proceed against…the Earl of Huntly, and the following day he
completely defeated him at Corrichie.”22 In leading Mary’s forces, Moray once again
augmented his military reputation as well as collected material gains from the earl’s
downfall. Moray also received a number of substantial appointments from Mary in
gratitude for his service to the crown. Two years after Corrichie, in September 1564,
Moray received from Mary a “commission of lieutenandry” and was later chosen to be
her “lieutenant general” in recognition of his services.23 Indeed, Moray’s power and
property grew to such an extent that not long after Darnley arrived in Scotland, he
consulted a map and determined that “Moray’s estates were far too extensive for his
needs,” revealing the vast resources Moray had accumulated in a short time.24 Though
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Moray continued to serve Mary loyally, his continued insistence on religious compromise
in allowing her to hear mass alienated some of his more radical protestant allies.
The early months of 1565 reveal Moray’s shift to an active and outspoken
vehemence against Lennox and his restoration, undoubtedly a reaction to this growing
threat to his overt power. In February, a list of enemies of Lennox confirms Moray’s
dislike of the restored earl as well as exposes his fear of the consequences of the
restoration, as the document states that Moray “misliked Lennox other times, [and] only
now hope[s] to continue [his] rule in the realm.”25 This characterization of Moray is not
flattering, but it does reveal that at least some court observers believed that Moray felt
threatened by Lennox. This sentiment may have developed in the wake of Darnley’s
arrival in Scotland and his immediate connection with Mary. Indeed, Randolph observed
that with Lennox’s growing influence, Moray had become “the sorrowfullest man that
may be.”26 While a restored nobleman with whom Moray had no personal quarrel was
not a threat, a powerful potential father-in-law of the queen served to bring a measure of
insecurity to Moray’s heretofore unchallenged authority and his place at Mary’s side.27
By the spring of 1565, Moray found other aspects of Lennox’s growing influence
to be detrimental to his position, which by this point had emerged as Moray’s most
essential possession or ideology and, increasingly, in need of real protection. In terms of
religion, Lennox’s beliefs were uncertain, and so Moray demonstrated concern for the
state of religion. Randolph reported that he left the court in early April: “he is gone in
displeasure, with her grace’s disfavor, because he has of late been so plain with her
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idolatry and small regard for redress of things to be reformed in this country.”28 In
addition, Moray remained adamantly opposed to his old enemy, the Earl of Bothwell,
who was an ally of Lennox. When Mary recalled Bothwell to Scotland in the spring of
1565, Moray intended to come to Edinburgh “with all his friends of the best in Scotland
to keep the day of law against Bothwell.”29 This response demonstrates that Moray
remained confident enough in his position to disagree markedly with Mary’s decision.
Mary’s choice to recall Bothwell in spite of her knowledge that it would anger Moray,
however, demonstrates that Moray did not have complete control over the queen’s
political actions.
Lennox’s further ascendancy throughout the spring resulted in some of Moray’s
power being marginalized; for the first time since 1561 substantial disagreement occurred
between Moray and the queen, an event that demonstrated to Moray the degree of
fragility his power had reached. This discord can be directly attributed to Mary’s new
interest in Darnley, Moray’s personal dislike of such a match, and Lennox’s increased
prominence as Darnley’s father.

Though Moray had expressed some level of

dissatisfaction with the escalating situation, his departure from the court represented a
more forceful protest. Randolph more explicitly reported at the end of April 1565 that
Moray “is suspected not to favor the Queen’s intent with Darnley, [and that at
court]…there was never [a] man in greater care or more suspicion than he is at present.”30
Moray’s increasingly defiant actions caused Mary to become alienated from him;
throughout the spring of 1565, therefore, Moray’s power declined significantly. He
realized that continuing in this vein would quickly lead to his complete marginalization in
favor of other nobles. Indeed, the prospect of the Darnley marriage actually occurring
28
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caused great turmoil in politics and at court, and “within the space of a few weeks, the
triumvirate’s policies had been rejected and the political influence of Argyll and Moray
had collapsed.”31 This loss of influence in policy was complemented by the concurrent
loss of Mary’s friendship; not only did Mary disagree with Moray and his policies, but
she shifted to an active personal dislike of him. When Moray arrived at court in early
May accompanied by five to six thousand men, Randolph reported that Mary “hath
showed herself now of late to mislike of my lord of Moray.”32
In addition, Randolph also reported that Mary “so far suspects Moray that…she
said she saw that he would set the crown upon his own head.”33 Indeed, “his appeals for
English assistance suggest that he may have hoped to replicate the conditions of 1560, to
bring English arms and money to overthrow a Catholic ruler.”34 Mary’s fear was not
entirely unwarranted, as “Cecil had discerned kinglike qualities” in Moray.35

The

prospect of a marriage between Mary and a noble who was not an ally of his, moreover,
meant that “his well-constructed position of domination [would be] underminded,”
providing Moray, from Mary’s perspective, with further incentive to act against her.36
Moray, however, was not isolated in this state of alienation. By the end of April,
Randolph observed that some alliances had emerged, for he reported that “the Queen sent
for the most of her nobility (except Moray, Argyll, and that faction).” Though he did not
elaborate as to the nobles that comprised this vague ‘faction,’ Randolph utilized the word
to differentiate Moray, Argyll, and their allies from the rest of the nobility. It seems
likely that Châtelherault was a member of this faction due to his intense dislike of
Lennox and his earlier bond with these men. Moray had also again formally strengthened
31
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his relationship with Châtelherault; Randolph reported an agreement between the two
nobles: “bands and promises were made between the duke and Moray, that nothing shall
be attempted against each other, but defended to the uttermost.”37 Thus, the pairing of
Moray and Châtelherault was reinforced yet again. An earlier alliance of Moray’s,
however, lessened during this same period. Though he had heretofore been a close
political ally of Moray, Maitland cannot be thought of as being a part of this faction, as
he had been increasingly conducting the queen’s business.
Mary’s dislike of Moray’s policies became more pronounced, and the continual
decline of his power in the face of the Lennox-Darnley rise caused him more fully to
develop additional alliances outside the court circle. Her disfavor towards Moray and
Argyll led the two to “at no time be in Court together, that if need be, one may relieve or
support the other.”38 Towards the end of May, after Moray had returned to court briefly,
Throckmorton reported that “the Duke, Argyll, Moray, and Glencairn all go to their
houses forthwith for a time.”39 This mass exodus indicates a growing agreement of
action among a certain group of nobles.
Moray also cited additional religious reasons for his objections to Darnley; these
criticisms, however, arose substantially after it had become clear that the Lennox-Darnley
faction was encroaching upon his dominant political position, demonstrating that religion
was not Moray’s priority. When Mary wished him to announce his support for the match
in the middle of May in anticipation of Darnley being created Earl of Ross, Moray made
his condition that he would “have the Queen leave the mass and quit all popery, or he will
never agree[, but] she and Darnley will no wise agree thereto.”40
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Moray’s increasing reliance on the language of religion to support his actions
became evident by the end of May, when Randolph reported that Moray was “true,
faithful, honorable, earnest, and stout both for defense of God’s glory, and safety of his
Sovereign’s honor that now lies in balance[,] fearful her doings may break the amity.”41
While Moray maintained that religion played a prominent role in his decision to rebel and
Mary believed that Moray’s motives did not stem completely from religion, a Moray
supporter, Melville, noted that “it is hard to persuade the protestants that some part of his
grief is not for religion,” attesting to Moray’s capabilities.42 His propaganda had depicted
Mary’s marriage as being dangerous to the protestant religion in Scotland, but “Mary’s
appeasement of protestant opinion did much to disarm his arguments.”43 At this point in
the early summer of 1565 and later during the actual rebellion, Moray would have limited
success in convincing a wide body of support that protestantism was actually in danger.
At the end of July, Moray demonstrated his clear contempt for Mary’s judgment
and her marriage by ignoring the royal summons and then consciously instigating the
rebellion against, ostensibly, her marriage. This sequence of action also marks a more
radical attempt to manipulate the situation of her marriage in such a way as to regain the
status and power he formerly enjoyed at her side. His birth had prevented him from
inheriting the kingdom, but acknowledgement of royal bastards, the service opportunities
presented to him, and Moray’s significant abilities permitted him to rise to the highest
echelon of Scottish society. His leadership of the Congregation was extraordinary and
served to establish Moray as a political leader. Although he clearly did convert to
protestantism, his conversion lacked the absolute religious conviction of some of his
contemporaries, such as Argyll and Arran. The notion of Moray’s conversion as being an
41
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act equally embedded in religion and politics stands firm. Though the ultimate success of
the Congregation was not assured when he joined, Moray, through his acute political
savvy, recognized the opportunity offered by the Congregation. He accurately predicted
the political benefits to be gained by aligning himself with, and especially by leading, the
protestant party.
When Mary returned in 1561, Moray was extremely well-poised to reinvent his
position among the Scottish nobility, an enormously successful endeavor that had the
potential to unravel completely upon Mary’s marriage. Moray transitioned the skills of
effective leadership he had established and honed in the Congregation to Mary’s return,
when he compromised with her regarding personal religious issues in exchange for
authority.

Mary’s court was thus dominated by Moray and his friends from the

Reformation, including Argyll and Morton. These nobles, plus Maitland, served to create
a court at which Moray could maintain his power and derive support for his protestant,
and especially his pro-English, policies.

His ennoblement and marriage served to

formally assure him of his place in noble court society.
In the years following the Reformation, and especially since Mary’s return,
Moray amassed great material benefits and power. This position did not seem threatened
when the forfeited Lennox returned to Scotland in September 1564; Moray still remained
actively involved in negotiations for the Leicester match. When those negotiations began
to crumble and Darnley arrived in Scotland, however, Moray’s position was threatened.
It is this threat that prompted the series of events that culminated in Moray’s rebellion.
Though the notion of rebellion in Scotland was relatively novel, Moray possessed
knowledge of Goodman’s doctrine of resistance to assist him in making the psychological
leap to revolt. Although he utilized the perceived threat to religion as a means of rallying
support, and he was likely genuinely concerned about the fate of protestantism, the
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overarching factor that caused him to launch a rebellion against his half-sister was his
desire to maintain the power, authority, and position he had created in the early years of
her personal rule.

James Hamilton, second Earl of Arran and Duke of Châtelherault (1519-75)
Though a number of factors, including religion, England, and alliances, did
influence his political actions, the duke ultimately rebelled against Mary during the
Chaseabout Raid in an attempt to protect his dynastic interests against the Earl of
Lennox. Châtelherault was the eldest son of the first Earl of Arran; his grandfather, the
first Lord Hamilton, had married Mary Stewart, a sister of James III. This marriage
formed the basis of Châtelherault’s position in the Scottish succession. His critical
dynastic position was at the heart of the hostile Hamilton-Lennox feud, which in turn
spurred his decision to join the Earl of Moray in rebelling against Mary in the Chaseabout
Raid in protest of her marriage to the Lennox heir, Lord Darnley. While he had hitherto
held the position of Mary’s heir, the marriage ensured that royal power would be passed
into the hands of his traditional enemy clan.
Châtelherault did not always enjoy stability in this position; his claim to the
throne was tenuous during the early 1540s. Opponents to the house of Hamilton argued
that his father’s divorce from his first wife was invalid; these charges were dropped in
1543. He married Margaret, eldest daughter of the third Earl of Morton. The couple had
nine children.

Though their five sons did not make notable marriages, their four

daughters each married into prominent families, providing Châtelherault with a network
of alliances among the nobility. His four daughters married the fourth Lord Fleming,
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Lord Gordon, the fifth Earl of Huntly, and the third Earl of Eglinton.44 In addition, the
Hamiltons as a whole “were one of the most powerful and extensive aristocratic kindreds
within Scotland.”45
In addition to the critical dynastic issues influencing Châtelherault, religion
played an important role in the duke’s actions during the middle of the sixteenth century.
He was a very early convert to protestantism; Châtelherault had, as early as 1539, been
“suspected of a leaning to the reformed religion.”46 In 1543, he publicly announced his
conversion to protestantism, long before Knox had preached in Scotland. His religious
conversion resulted from his close ties with England and members of the English
nobility. He explicitly supported contracting an English marriage for Mary. Specifically,
he endorsed the proposed marriage between Mary and Edward, heir to the English
throne.47 His illegal reformed leanings were posited as a means of disbarring him from
the group of men designated by James V to serve as joint governors of the realm for the
infant Mary; the appointed group consisted of Cardinal Beaton and the Earls of Argyll
and Huntly.48 Châtelherault was nominated, however, to be sole governor of the realm
and tutor to Mary on the grounds that, after the infant queen, he was the nearest heir to
the throne.49
Châtelherault rose in prominence in the 1540s and 1550s: he was formally
declared by parliament on 15 March 1543 to be the “second person of the realm and
nearest to succeed to the crown of the same failing of our sovereign lady and the bairns
44

The Scots Peerage, i., 368-70.
Jane Dawson, The Politics of Religion, 14.
46
The Scots Peerage, iv., 366.
47
Edward, later Edward VI (r. 1547-53) was the son of Henry VIII and his third wife, Jane Seymour.
Henry had created a national church independent of Rome over a decade earlier. While Henry’s church
contained many features of Catholicism, Edward’s reign would witness a dramatic shift towards protestant
theology and liturgy.
48
Ibid. It is important to note that the earls are the fourth Earl of Argyll and the fourth Earl of Huntly, the
respective fathers of the earls who figured in the Chaseabout Raid.
49
‘Tutor’ is a Scottish legal term referring to the guardian of a minor.
45

142
lawful of her body and none others. And by reason thereof tutor lawful of the Queen’s
grace and governor of the realm.” In this position, “all the lieges of the realm [must]
answer and obey…the said earl [later duke] as tutor lawful to her grace and governor
foresaid in all things.”50 As governor of the realm and heir to the throne, then possessed
by an infant, Châtelherault reasonably conjectured that he might become king. Prior to
Mary’s birth, when he was the heir presumptive, he engaged in several transcripts of
obligation, wherein he entered into an agreement with another party, usually a lesser
noble. According to these agreements, the lesser noble would be awarded particular
lands or some other reward when “it shall happen us or our heirs to obtain the crown of
Scotland and to be crowned king thereof.”51 Such bonds suggest that Châtelherault did
covet the throne, yet realized that he might require support should circumstances emerge
in which the Stewart line ended and he ascended the throne.
His roles as both tutor and governor allotted him power far beyond that of an
ordinary nobleman, contributing to his increasing prominence among the Scottish
nobility. During his regency, Châtelherault controlled the great and privy seals, the
power to call parliament, the direction of the Privy Council, the instruction of
ambassadors, the capability to make treaties, the ability to issue pardons and
appointments, and control of the crown’s military resources.52 Châtelherault’s position
resulted in numerous bonds of manrent between himself and other noblemen, a seemingly
peculiar situation as ordinarily bonds of manrent were made between two parties of
unequal rank, such as a nobleman and a commoner, whereas two noblemen wishing to
express a connection would more likely commit themselves to a bond of friendship.
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Regardless, many of Scotland’s leading noblemen formally committed themselves to
Châtelherault through bonds of manrent for the duration of his regency. Châtelherault
moreover attempted to temper his power as compared to other noblemen through the
distribution of generous gifts and rewards. Thus, the duke enjoyed great power with his
unique position among the nobility for more than a decade of Mary’s minority.
In addition to granting rewards, he was enticed as well, reinforcing the importance
of retaining his role as governor. The governor received, for himself and his heirs, the
duchy of Châtelherault from the King of France on 8 February 1549. According to
Bishop Leslie, the “territory was granted at the prompting of [Mary of Guise] as an
inducement to resign in her favor the Regency of Scotland, which she greatly desired.”53
Mary of Guise returned to Scotland from France in 1552 and immediately sought to
supplant Châtelherault as Regent. By early 1554, Châtelherault agreed that the queen
was of age and therefore no longer needed a governor, and he relinquished the regency to
Mary of Guise “on the best possible terms for himself.”54 He formally resigned the office
of regent on 10 April 1554 and retired to private life. He was induced back into the
public sphere at the time of the Reformation. Châtelherault’s name appears first on the
list of signatures on the second Reformation Covenant of 27 April 1560, and he was
present at the Reformation Parliament of 1560.55 Although he appears to have been
committed to the Congregation, he was reported to have been willing to change sides
when the Congregation stumbled in 1559; English intervention, however, resulted in his
continued loyalty, and he signed the treaty of Berwick as “James [D]uke of Châtelherault,
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Earl of Arran, Lord Hamilton, second person of the realm of Scotland, and apparent
[heir] to the crown.”56
Of further importance to the duke was the longstanding dynastic feud between the
Hamiltons and Lennox Stewarts, which had manifested itself in this generation; “the
hatred between the two nobles was implacable.”57 Its active nature was short-lived,
however, when Lennox went into exile in 1544; indeed, while Châtelherault was
governor, “the forfeiture [was] led by my lord Duke against [Lennox].”58 When Lennox
returned to Scotland in 1564, however, the feud flared again.

Mary was publicly

“determined to accord Lennox and the Duke.”59 They were reconciled, and “thus agreed,
[with] the prince commanding both never to quarrel.”60 In this moment of reconciliation,
however, “Lennox made great demands for the loss by his banishment, [and] the Duke
defended himself” and his actions.61 When Lennox was restored by the December 1564
parliament, Randolph reported that for the “first three days neither the Duke nor Argyll
attended, wishing to be absent at the debate whether Lennox w[as] justly banished or
not.”62 The reconciliation that Mary had effected thus seems superficial.
Randolph’s revelation that “they never meet but in the Prince’s sight”
demonstrates the continuance of the feud between Châtelherault and Lennox and its
influence on their political actions.63

Due to the hereditary and genealogical

circumstances surrounding the relationship between the duke and Lennox, Randolph
further reported that not long after Lennox’s return “the Duke is now in no small doubt of
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himself, and thinks this drawghte to bring home Lennox is chiefly for his overthrow,
especially if the Queen marr[ies] Lord Darnley.”64 The duke viewed the appointments
and rewards Mary gave Lennox as being his “utter undoing.”65 Though his attendance at
court and council had become irregular, he “remained alert on behalf of his family,”
emphasizing his commitment to the Hamilton clan.66 Furthermore, once the idea of a
Darnley marriage began circulating, Châtelherault, who claimed great “love for [his]
sovereign, whom he never failed,…[required] protection from further hurts—as if this
match [with Darnley] goes on, he may be in danger to lose both land and life to him and
his forever.”67 When a formalized list of the enemies of Lennox was drawn up in
February 1565, the first entry read “all the protestants of the realm in general, and in
special, the Duke Châtelherault with all the Hamiltons.”68
Since the period prior to his regency, Châtelherault had advocated a pro-English
policy, another important element of his political conduct. Throughout the marriage
negotiations conducted by Moray and Maitland in England, the duke “beg[an] to smell
where about we go, and nothing misliketh thereof.”69

In early 1565, Châtelherault

continued his petition for the release of his eldest son Arran, who had been kept in
custody for some time. Randolph reported in mid-January 1565 that the duke “renew[ed]
his suit for my lord of Arran’s delivery, [but] I know not his hope of success.”70 His heir,
styled the third Earl of Arran following Châtelherault’s ducal appointment, was a close
ally of Moray throughout the Reformation. An ardent protestant, he had been heavily
involved in religious policy, but he was plagued with some sort of mental illness. His
64
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psychological problems were widely known among the nobility; though he appeared to
recover after a breakdown in the early 1560s, by the end of 1563 “it [was] feared that
Arran [would] return to his old madness.”71 Arran had been held in custody for several
years, and Châtelherault’s petitions for his release were frustratingly unsuccessful.72
Clearly, Châtelherault believed that the ascendancy of the Lennox Stewarts could
have no other outcome than to generate the downfall of the Hamiltons, the most critical
and feared development. By the spring of 1565, when rumors swirled around court as to
the status of the relationship between Mary and Darnley, Randolph reported that
Châtelherault believed “his house quite overthrown, and with heavy heart beholds the
sight of them that he fears shall be his confusion. He trusted much in the Queen’s favor,
[but] now he sees his undoing.”73 While the duke had formerly possessed Mary’s favor,
he believed her perspective and preferences had shifted markedly.

His serious

differences with Mary caused her, by the beginning of May, to utter “many grievous and
sore words…against the Duke.” The growing dissension between the duke and Mary
caused Châtelherault to “live at home” and refrain from attending court and council.74
Châtelherault’s absence also indicates a growing similarity between his actions
and those of Moray, a relationship formally evidenced by the “bands and promises”
accorded between them.75

Indeed, after he and Moray appeared briefly at court,

Throckmorton reported that towards the end of May, “the Duke, Argyll, Moray, and
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Glencairn all go to their houses forthwith for a time.”76 One of the factors that served to
link these men was their varying levels of commitment to protestantism. Randolph
revealed that Châtelherault was beginning to allow the issue of religion to influence his
perspective of the Lennox situation, as he further believed that there existed “no hope
now of the sure establishment of Christ’s true religion.”77 Despite these actions that
indicate an increasing distance between Châtelherault and Mary’s court, a missive from
the beginning of June indicates that Mary still sought “by all means to reconcile the Duke
and Lennox.”78 This attempt demonstrates that the duke still remained a significant
individual despite his alienation, a designation likely stemming from the fact that until
Mary bore a child, Châtelherault was her heir. Regardless of Mary’s desires, however,
the rise of the Lennox Stewarts was a development that Châtelherault and his Hamilton
following could not sanction.
When Châtelherault rebelled in 1565, he was “defending [his] dynastic position
against the hereditary Lennox foes.”79

The Hamilton-Lennox Stewart feud clearly

remained the most important issue for Châtelherault, as the Darnley marriage nearly
guaranteed that power would be transferred to and remain in the hands of his enemies.
The strong Hamilton clan, “a large and united family group close to the center of
government,” rallied behind their leader in this matter.80

The strength of this clan

network is evidenced by the fact that 37 Hamilton lairds and 120 Hamiltons of lower rank
participated in the rebellion.
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Matthew Stewart, fourth Earl of Lennox (1516-71)
Lennox, as father of Mary’s second husband, Lord Darnley, clearly remained
loyal to the monarchy for the duration of the Chaseabout Raid and, not surprisingly,
served as the foremost proponent of the match. He was the eldest surviving son of the
third earl and his wife Elizabeth, daughter of the first Earl of Atholl; he succeeded to the
earldom as a minor on 4 September 1526.81

He was contracted in 1520 to marry

Christine Montgomery, eldest daughter of the Master of Eglinton.82 The proposed match
was clearly intended to unite the two families, as the provision was made that a marriage
would occur as long as “the said John Earl of Lennox has a son being heir to him and the
said John master of Eglinton have a lawful daughter.”83 This marriage, however, did not
come to pass.
The Lennoxes were one of the most prominent noble families in Scotland, having
the next strongest claim to the throne after the Hamiltons, their longtime enemies.
Though the Hamilton-Lennox feud superseded all other relations between Lennox and
other members of the nobility, in addition to Châtelherault one of the “leading enemies”
of Lennox was the Earl of Morton.84 In the first years of Mary’s reign, Lennox refused to
recognize Châtelherault as governor; Lennox became a valued agent of Henry VIII in
Scotland and promised to promote the Mary-Edward marriage, convert to protestantism,
and promote other pro-English policies.
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Scotland, Lennox was to be made governor.”85 After Lennox went to England in 1544,
Châtelherault, then governor of the realm, declared him “guilty of treason in 1545 and his
estates forfeited” for his involvement in the intrigues of the first few years of Mary’s
reign.86

While in England, Lennox “was received of King Harry [Henry VIII] in

protection,” and was rewarded for his service to Henry VIII by his marriage to Margaret
Douglas, the only child of the sixth Earl of Angus and his second wife, Margaret Tudor.87
In a move that provided him with an unprecedented opportunity to reestablish his
presence and forge a new position of importance for himself, Lennox returned to
Scotland in September 1564 from twenty years of exile. Mary decided to “relax the said
Matthew sometime Earl of Lennox from the process of our horn.”88 He was received
well, as parliamentary records indicated that “Her Grace welcomed him, and every one of
the nobility embraced him.”89 In December 1564, Lennox was more formally restored to
his title and lands at a session of parliament convened specifically for that purpose. In
late 1564, royal letters were issued that charged tenants on specific traditional Lennox
lands that they were to obey the reinstated earl.90 The Lennox restoration, however,
would be obtained only at the expense of the Hamilton clan.91 As late as March 1565, a
month after Darnley had arrived in Scotland, Lennox maintained that his sole purpose in
coming to Scotland was to attain the “assurance of my lands to my sons, [else my]
coming were in vain.”92 Once Mary began to favor Darnley openly, however, it became

85

Marcus Merriman, ‘Stewart, Matthew,’ ODNB.
The Scots Peerage, v., 353.
87
Knox, i., 59. Margaret Tudor was the widow of James IV of Scotland. She was also the daughter of
Henry VII, King of England, and Elizabeth of York. Lady Margaret Douglas was thus considered to be a
claimant to the English throne; it is through this connection that Darnley claimed the throne as well, which
was an important part of his appeal to Mary.
88
NLS MS3137, 21 September 1564.
89
The Scottish Parliament (28 September 1564), CSPS II: 77.
90
NAS GD220/6/1989/2, 1564.
91
Simon Adams, 131.
92
Lennox to Cecil (10 March 1565), CSPS II: 134.

86

150
evident to both the Scots and English that Lennox’s purpose had, at some point, shifted
focus from his own restoration to Lennox’s “will to see his son thus advanced” as Mary’s
consort.93 For this obvious reason, he actively defended Mary and Darnley during the
Chaseabout Raid.

Archibald Campbell, fifth Earl of Argyll (1538-73)
Argyll, one of the foremost peers of the realm, was a devout protestant who
ultimately viewed Mary’s marriage to Darnley as enabling the rise of Catholicism in
Scotland. He thus viewed his part in the Chaseabout Raid as a defensive action against a
true threat to protestantism within the realm. Argyll was the eldest son of the fourth earl
and his first wife, Helen Hamilton, daughter of the first Earl of Arran.94 In 1554, Argyll
married Jane Stewart, an illegitimate daughter of James V; thus, as Mary’s brother-inlaw, he became part of the intimate family group of blood relatives Mary gathered around
her when she returned to Scotland in 1561.95

In addition, he was a nephew of

Châtelherault through his mother, and he remained close to his maternal kin, the
Hamiltons, “whom he treated as far more than political allies.”96 The extensive lands of
Argyll, which dominated the west Highlands and islands, made the Earl of Argyll a
leading noble, third in order of precedence after the Duke of Châtelherault and the Earl of
Huntly.

The extensive clan structure and comprehensive network of Campbell

dependents of which Argyll was the head, combined with the resources of the earldom,
resulted in Argyll being able to command extremely large forces. Despite the geographic
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disunity of the Campbell clan, the “[E]arls of Argyll were always recognized as head of
kin by their cadet branches.”97 As demonstrated by the fifth earl and his successors, “a
strong magnate backed by a united kin group reinforced by other adherents was a
powerful force.”98
The earldom of Argyll had been relatively strong and stable for several
generations, and thus Argyll had inherited an extremely favorable situation in terms of
economics and power. In addition to the power and wealth afforded by the resources of
the earldom, Argyll held the hereditary offices of justice-general of Scotland and master
of the royal household. These offices served to bolster his already extensive resources
and authority. His proximity to Ireland, moreover, meant that he served as an envoy
between Ireland, Scotland, and England, leading the earl to favor pro-English policies.
He inherited these pro-English tendencies in part from his father, who had been among
noble signatories of a pledge to Henry VIII supporting a marriage between Edward VI
and Mary.99
Argyll was an early, genuine, and ardent convert to protestantism, a commitment
that influenced his political actions tremendously. Due to the influence of his father, who
ensured that protestant convictions “were rooted firmly in his [son’s] upbringing,” Argyll
was instrumental in founding the protestant kirk in the Highlands.100

He played a

concrete role in “establishing a Protestant ministry throughout his extensive
territories.”101 Argyll emerged as a noble leader of ecclesiastical reform after hearing a
sermon by Knox at which he “heard and so approved [Knox’s] doctrine;” in 1557, he was
the youngest nobleman to sign the First Band of the Lords of the Congregation, the first
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open declaration of support for protestantism in Scotland.102 Along with Moray, Argyll
became one of the two most important leaders of the Lords of the Congregation. The
Reformation also allowed him to be closely aligned with his Hamilton cousin, the third
Earl of Arran, a “firm friend” since their youth.103 He drew on his extensive power base
to provide the majority of the forces for the Congregation. In addition, his promise to
assist England with respect to Ireland was an important condition of the Treaty of
Berwick, providing further indication of the crucial geographic position his lands
occupied.104 The English assistance provided through the treaty was the essential factor
that contributed to the success of the Congregation. Argyll, along with Moray and
Maitland, led the Reformation Parliament of 1560, establishing the new protestant kirk
and passing laws against Catholic worship.
These many actions of behalf of the Congregation demonstrate how Argyll,
arguably the most dedicated protestant among the Scottish nobility, had become even
more adamant regarding protestantism following the death of the fourth earl in 1558.
Indeed, his “father’s dying command [was for Argyll] to establish protestantism within
Scotland, at whatever cost to himself or his lineage.” In addition, Argyll’s absolute
conversion is evident from the manner in which he allowed religion to influence his
political actions; “though prepared to ally and remain on good personal terms with
Roman Catholic nobles, [he] only placed his complete trust in fellow Protestants.”105
Argyll fared well when Mary returned to Scotland; his personal affection for
Mary and the power held by his Congregation allies formed a welcoming atmosphere,
thus persuading him of the feasibility of a protestant realm ruled by a Catholic queen. He
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became a Privy Councilor and Mary quickly “formed a deep affection for her brother-inlaw.”106

Despite their religious differences, Mary and Argyll, as governmental

collaborators and relatives by marriage, maintained a friendly relationship. In 1563,
Mary “purpose[d] to take progress into Argyll.”107 He remained her most influential
adviser other than Moray and Maitland; the three ensured the prominence of protestant
and pro-English policies. Of this ruling triumvirate, Argyll contributed the political
powerbase, as neither Moray nor Maitland possessed a large network of dependents.108
Argyll further assisted Mary in defeating the brief rebellion by the fourth Earl of Huntly
in October 1562; the Gordon Earls of Huntly were “traditional regional rivals [of the
Campbells], competing for influence in the northern parts of the Highlands.”109 The
elimination of Huntly thus benefited Argyll in numerous ways; he was able loyally to
serve his sovereign while eliminating a traditional rival landowner and the most
prominent Catholic peer.
Argyll first became alienated from Mary, however, with the return of Lennox; this
development marks a significant shift in the previously harmonious relationship between
the protestant nobleman and his Catholic queen. Both significant branches of Argyll’s
family, the Campbells and the Hamiltons, had benefited materially from Lennox’s exile.
When Lennox was formally restored at the December 1564 parliament, Argyll, along
with the duke, did not attend the first few days of the session, as he “wish[ed] to be
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absent at the debate whether Lennox w[as] justly banished or not.”110 While Argyll
favored a pro-English policy, as with respect to the English marriage negotiations “Argyll
is made full privy to it, but no man approves it better,” he clearly did not favor the
Lennox Stewarts.111 After the Hamiltons, the Campbells had benefited the most from
Lennox’s long exile in England, as Lennox’s absence had allowed Argyll to expand his
authority into the Lennox as well as to “take over former Lennox clients…through bonds
of manrent.”112 Indeed, when the enemies of Lennox were listed in February 1565, the
second entry read “the Earl of Argyll, sister son to the Duke, [and] all the Campbells.”113
Argyll’s dissatisfaction with the Lennox situation was obviously exacerbated by
Darnley’s arrival in Scotland and the ensuing marriage rumors. Randolph reported in
mid-March 1565 that Argyll “plainly says to me he mislikes Darnley’s coming home—
for he says the affections of women are uncertain. He will abide by that to which he has
already given consent, and if he finds anything intended otherwise, he and his will
provide as best they can for themselves.”114
In addition to Argyll disliking Lennox and his ascendancy, over the course of the
spring he became further alienated from Mary and the nobles who remained at the center
of her court. In contrast to earlier evaluations of the close relationship between Mary and
Argyll, by the beginning of May, Mary “mortally hate[d] Argyll.”115 Concurrent with his
alienation from Mary, Argyll became progressively more associated with Moray, and
their actions at court increasingly complemented each other. Indeed, towards the end of
May Throckmorton reported that “the Duke, Argyll, Moray, and Glencairn all go to their
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houses forthwith for a time.”116 This coordinated action demonstrates the extent to which
the four nobles felt that they needed to address the changes wrought by Lennox’s
restoration. The simultaneous, voluntary removal of these nobles from court, men who
had been critical figures in Mary’s government for the last several years, marks an
attempt to demonstrate to other nobles the severity of the situation.
This alienation at court and absolute dismay at the possibility of a Darnley match
stemmed from Argyll’s religious concerns. Randolph’s reports indicate that there existed
widespread knowledge of Argyll’s objections to Darnley based on religion: “Argyll
deserves more praise for his stoutness in defense of religion and safety of his house than
any man I have heard speak in this action.”117

Argyll remained committed to the

reformed religion. When Mary and Darnley refused to renounce Catholic ceremony as
requested by Moray in exchange for his support, “Argyll refused to come to this
convention [at which Darnley would be ennobled], though sent for by the Queen. He
passed by the Court and would not see her.”118 This slight by Argyll, particularly in light
of his earlier friendship with the queen, demonstrates the seriousness of protest he
believed was necessary in order to prevent religious catastrophe. Randolph also reported
that Boyd, a longtime ally of Argyll, and Glencairn were in agreement with Argyll
regarding the threat to protestantism.
Though Argyll was certainly a member of Moray’s rebellious coalition, within the
larger context of the rebellion he did separate physically from the other rebels to pursue
his personal feud with Atholl. Atholl, a Catholic, possessed lands adjacent to those of
Argyll; he was also the most steadfast supporter of Lennox. At the beginning of July
1565, Randolph reported that “the Earl of Argyll has gathered his whole forces against
116
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the Earl of Atholl, and intends to invade and lay waste his country.”119 The potential
conflict was considered to be one of immense importance due to the men involved, and it
therefore could have repercussions throughout the nobility.
From Mary’s perspective, Atholl had thus far proved to be Lennox’s closest ally,
and his ability to devote time and support to the Darnley marriage was of critical
importance. In order “to persuade them not to meet, and leave gathering their forces,”
Mary sent Lord Ruthven and Maitland to Atholl, resulting in a situation wherein “that of
her whole council there is none left near her but Lord Erskine [later Earl of Mar].”120
This gesture would have also benefited Moray, as the Argyll-Atholl conflict could
likewise distract Argyll and consume a good portion of the best resources he could
otherwise commit to any wider conflict.121
While Argyll manipulated his extant state of rebellion as an excuse to act upon his
feud with Atholl, by that point he had already defied the queen on the basis of the
religious implications of her marriage. Argyll sincerely believed that Mary would utilize
her marriage to “undermine the entire ecclesiastical settlement.”122

He justified his

involvement in the 1565 rebellion as being a defense against a real threat to
protestantism, as he believed that “to preserve true religion” was a fundamental aspect of
“the welfare of the kingdom and the people.”123 The threat to the commonweal of the
realm temporarily, according to a common rationale, superseded his duty to the
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monarchy. Argyll viewed the Darnley marriage as being a severe danger to protestantism
in Scotland and so joined Moray in rebellion.124

Robert, fifth Lord Boyd (1517-90)
A zealous protestant, Boyd perceived the potential threat to the reformed religion
posed by the Darnley marriage as reason enough to join the rebellion. Indeed, he was one
of a few nobles for whom multiple strong influences did not exist. Boyd succeeded his
father, the fourth Lord Boyd, in late 1557 or early 1558.125 The Boyd lands were located
in Ayrshire, southwestern Scotland, a region with a reputation for religious disturbances.
Like several other leading nobles in the area, particularly the Earl of Glencairn and Lord
Ochiltree, Boyd played a prominent role in the Scottish Reformation, joining the Lords of
the Congregation at Easter 1559. Boyd was one of the noblemen who signed the letter of
appeal to Elizabeth, and he was appointed in February 1560 as one of the negotiators for
the Treaty of Berwick. He also advocated the Elizabeth-Arran marriage and subscribed
to the first Book of Discipline. He was an active proponent of protestantism and sought
to squash any remaining vestiges of Catholicism, as evidenced by his mounting a party
against the Catholic Earl of Eglinton.126 Several years later, however, he and the third
Earl of Eglinton ended the Boyd-Montgomery feud, which had been in existence since
1484: “on 25 August 1563…[they] entered into a mutual bond of defense.”127
A genuine Protestant, he was troubled by Mary’s proposed marriage to Darnley,
as Darnley was raised a Catholic.

Indeed, when the Darnley marriage emerged,

Randolph indicated that Boyd “concur[red] with Argyll” regarding the religious threat
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this match posed to the realm.128 The possibility that Mary and Darnley would marry and
attempt to reverse the changes wrought by the Reformation, or would produce a Catholic
heir who would pose a threat to protestantism in the future, were Boyd’s foremost
concerns. He thus joined Moray’s rebellion in protest of the marriage for the threat to
protestantism, which he viewed as being a genuine threat.129

Alexander Cunningham, fourth Earl of Glencairn (d. 1575)
Though he was uncertain as to whether his commitment to protestantism would be
best exercised by joining Moray, Glencairn ultimately decided that supporting Moray
would be an effective religious action. Glencairn was the eldest son of the third earl and
his wife Katherine, daughter of the third Lord Borthwick.

He first married Jane

Hamilton, daughter of the first Earl of Arran; they divorced in 1545, and he subsequently
married a fellow Cunningham.130 From the 1540s, Glencairn favored a pro-English
policy; he had spent some time in England as a hostage, and upon release received an
English pension with the understanding that he would further Henry VIII’s dynastic plans
in Scotland.131 Though he did not sign the bond himself, he supported his father’s pledge
to Henry VIII to uphold a marriage between Edward VI and Mary.132 In addition, his
father signed a bond of manrent to Châtelherault during the latter’s governorship; unlike
many such bonds between various noblemen and the governor, this bond, signed 19
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August 1546, was stated as being valid for life.133 Even prior to his time in protestant
England, Glencairn and several of his family members became committed to the doctrinal
and institutional reform of the church.

Like Lord Boyd, his lands were located in

southwestern Scotland, an area known for religious dissidence.

This geographical

position resulted in an ongoing feud with the Montgomery Earls of Eglinton and
triggered occasional conflict with the Earls of Argyll.134 At the same time, however, due
in part to territorial proximity as well as an affinity for the English alliance, the Earls of
Glencairn remained allies of the Earls of Lennox.
The fourth earl succeeded to the earldom in 1548 and despite English invasions of
Scotland remained committed to friendly relations between the two realms, and, perhaps
even more importantly, religious reform. Glencairn became a prominent member of the
Lords of the Congregation. He had invited Knox to speak at his home several times,
including an instance where Knox “ministered the Lord’s Table, whereof besides himself
were partakers, his Lady, two of his sons, and certain of his friends” and also was one of
the nobles who formally urged Knox to return to Scotland.135 He signed the First Band in
December 1557, a bond that aligned him closely with the Earls of Argyll and Morton as
well as the future Earl of Mar. In addition, he signed the letter sent to Cecil in July 1559
that explained the Congregation’s position with respect to Mary of Guise and that
formally asked for English support. Through the rest of 1559 and the spring of 1560
Glencairn was extremely active in the Congregation’s activities against Mary of Guise
and in contributing to the formation of an English alliance. He was also among the
133

Wormald, Lords and Men in Scotland, 309. Many other bonds were made to Châtelherault (Arran) as
governor but were stipulated as lasting only as long as he remained governor. Examples cited in
Wormald’s appendices include bonds from the fifth Lord Maxwell, the fourth Lord Boyd, the third Earl of
Bothwell, the seventh Earl of Errol, and the sixth Earl of Angus.
134
At times, attempts were made between the Earls of Argyll and Glencairn to get along. For instance, a
contract between the fourth Earl of Argyll and the third Earl of Glencairn dated 16 September 1545 binds
each earl to support the other in future conflicts. NAS GD31/1/57.
135
Knox, i., 121. Also Knox, i., 132.

160
Scottish leaders who met the English army that entered Scotland following the Treaty of
Berwick, at whose signing he was present. In addition, Glencairn sat in the Reformation
Parliament of August 1560. Besides being one of the foremost noble participants in
officially altering the religion in Scotland and in creating the Book of Discipline,
Glencairn implemented local change, actively assisting in “dismantl[ing] the apparatus of
Catholic worship”136 in western Scotland. He remained personally committed to the
spread of protestantism in the west of Scotland, as the minutes of the General Assembly
meeting of 31 December 1563 note that “Glencairn was requested…to visit the hospital
of Glasgow, and consider how the revenues…may be taken for support of the poor…and
report the same to…the Assembly.”137
Like many of the instrumental members of the Congregation, Glencairn became a
prominent member of the reshaped government that formed in 1561. Though not in
Moray’s immediate circle of power, Glencairn was appointed to the Privy Council upon
Mary’s return to Scotland.

Although he remained within close proximity to Mary,

Glencairn remained uncertain as to her true intentions regarding religion and thus signed
the Band of Ayr on 4 September 1562 that aimed to defend the reformed religion from all
perceived enemies.
When Lennox appeared as a rising power, Glencairn did not support him;
although Lennox appeared to conform to basic protestant worship, his religious
allegiance remained uncertain, and his absent wife certainly practiced Catholicism.138 A
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list of the enemies of Lennox from February 1565 includes “the Earl of Glencairn, whose
eldest son and heir is sister son to the Duke Châtelherault and all the Cunninghams.”139
Though the reformed religion was of the utmost importance to Glencairn, this document
demonstrates how that religious ideology complemented his ties of kinship; though
divorced for two decades, marriage and birth provided inextricable links between
Glencairn and the powerful Hamiltons.140

Glencairn remained opposed to Lennox

throughout the spring; by the beginning of May, he was “required by Lennox to [sign
bands and promises with him, and] has refused and joined the Duke” instead.141
This initial alignment with Châtelherault became stronger by the end of May,
marking Glencairn’s willingness to risk his political position in favor of other factors.
Throckmorton reported that “the Duke, Argyll, Moray, and Glencairn all go to their
houses forthwith for a time.”142 Glencairn’s commitment to protestantism and to acting
against any threat to its progress is evidenced by the fact that he “concur[red] with
Argyll” regarding the threat that the Darnley match posed to Protestantism.143 Glencairn
clearly regarded his association with Moray and his commitment to protestantism as two
separate entities, for in the middle of August Bedford reported that “the Earl of Glencairn
sent a gentleman…to declare that, though he were not now with the Earl of Moray and
the rest, yet was he of their mind, and would defend the Gospel.”144 Glencairn’s delay in
joining the rebels demonstrates that he was in agreement with some of the ideological
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views for which the rebels claimed to be fighting, but that he did not view his ardent
support for protestantism as automatically translating into support for Moray.
Unlike other rebellious nobles for whom religion played a role of varying
importance, Glencairn can be viewed as relying exclusively on his commitment to
protestantism. In Glencairn, there was an “evident willingness to put [his] faith above
self interest, the traditional ties of kin and marriage, or traditional enmities of feuds.”145
Though Glencairn opposed the marriage because Elizabeth disapproved of the match and
it would therefore risk the amity, more important for Glencairn was the fact that Mary
was marrying a Catholic. Thus, no matter how uncommitted Darnley was to the Catholic
faith, any heirs they produced would be raised within the confines of Mary’s Catholicism.
Glencairn therefore participated in the Chaseabout Raid on the side of the rebels, for he
viewed armed resistance as a means of forcing Mary to ratify the protestant religious
settlement and cease her private mass. If this settlement were to come to pass, Mary,
Darnley, and their heirs would be forced to convert to protestantism and the realm would
be safe from a Catholic threat.

John Stewart, fourth Earl of Atholl (d.1579)
Atholl, as a close friend and political ally of Lennox, supported the Darnley
marriage and remained loyal to Mary during the Chaseabout Raid. Atholl was the only
son of John Stewart, third Earl of Atholl. He married twice, first to Elizabeth Gordon,
daughter of the fourth Earl of Huntly, and then to Margaret Fleming, daughter of the third
Lord Fleming.146
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historically determined his political actions; he remained a strong supporter of Mary of
Guise in both 1554 and 1559-60.

Along with the Lords Borthwick and Somerville,

Atholl “strongly opposed the Reformation in the Parliament of 1560.”147
When Mary returned to Scotland in 1561, Atholl was made a member of her Privy
Council, a position that should have contented the earl with respect to his position within
politics. The Privy Council was comprised of both protestants and known Catholics.
Although he remained opposed to the Reformation, Atholl proved willing to work with
nobles who had participated in the Congregation. This flexibility contrasts starkly with
the inflexibility of his fellow Catholic earl, Huntly. Despite his first marriage to Huntly’s
daughter, “in October 1562, he, with the Earls of Moray and Morton, defeated the Earl of
Huntly at Corrichie.”148 Although he acted against a fellow Catholic in this instance,
Atholl’s actions were determined by his loyalty to Mary.
Atholl, however, turned to a new alliance. Once Lennox arrived in 1564, the two
nobles became closely aligned; Randolph observed that Atholl was a figure “in whom
[Lennox] ha[d] singular trust, and [they] are seldom asunder.”149 The close relationship
shared by the two men is further evidenced by Randolph’s report that Lennox remarked
upon the possibility of a Darnley marriage as early as December 1564 with “Atholl only
present.”150 Clearly the closest ally Lennox possessed, Atholl’s name was included on a
list in February 1565 of Lennox’s friends.151 When other nobles fell away from their
early commitment to support Lennox that they had maintained since the emergence of the
issue of his restoration, Atholl remained steadfast. In late April, Randolph reported that
“the Court is very small—none but Atholl, the father and the son,” further indicating
147
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Atholl’s strong alignment with Lennox.152 Indeed, Atholl was commonly viewed as
Lennox’s strongest and closest supporter; a bond between two insignificant figures
demonstrates the widespread view of them as a cohesive unit, as the bond states that the
parties “make in their names with the Queen and with Lord Darnley, the Earl of Lennox
and Earl of Atholl in all points.”153 This bond demonstrates that even in a situation that
did not directly affect either Lennox or Atholl, Atholl’s name was invoked and paired
with that of Lennox, illustrating their political closeness.
A multi-generational feud stemming from geographic proximity and, more
immediately, religious dissidence, existed between Atholl and Argyll. At the beginning
of July 1565, Argyll resuscitated the ongoing feud when he returned to his home and
mounted a substantial force to combat Atholl. On 9 July, a letter from a close cousin
warned Argyll that Atholl remained an enemy to the earl and his clan, and that Mary had
forbidden both Argyll and Atholl from “convocating the[ir] lieges.”154 Both “Argyll and
Atholl gathered their forces,” but Mary sent mediators to prevent an outright conflict.155
Notably, the men sent to Atholl were Ruthven and Maitland, whose views regarding the
Darnley marriage mirrored those of Argyll. This enmity between Atholl and Argyll
remained an extant factor for each, but their conflict became a side feud that did not elicit
support or involvement from other nobles. Thus, their conflict was contained. While
each would be unlikely to support an effort of his opponent, making their opposition in
the Chaseabout Raid not surprising, more important factors existed for each in ultimately
determining his position in the rebellion.
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As a Catholic and as Lennox’s close ally since his return to Scotland, Atholl was
one of only a few nobles who enthusiastically supported the Darnley marriage. Indeed,
he and Morton were the only nobles at the marriage banquet who were “willing to wait
on Darnley or serve his food.”156 Atholl did not join the rebellion since he genuinely
supported the Darnley marriage, particularly because of the special bond that had existed
between him and Lennox since Lennox’s return. The acknowledged friendship between
the two men meant that Atholl could rise in conjunction with Lennox, whose prospects
increased tremendously with the marriage of his son to the queen. In return for his
loyalty, Mary appointed Atholl Lieutenant of the North in late 1565.157 He remained
loyal to Mary throughout 1565, nor was he involved in the Rizzio plot.

Patrick, third Lord Ruthven (1520-66)
Ruthven’s volatile relations with many of the Congregationalists caused him to
abandon any religious concerns in favor of becoming an intimate of the new Darnleycentered court. He utilized the decreased number of experienced nobles to improve his
own position of political importance and, to ensure that he continued to rise, supported
Mary during the Chaseabout Raid. Ruthven was the eldest son of the second Lord
Ruthven. A longstanding feud existed between the Ruthvens and the Grays. Ruthven
possessed some pro-English tendencies, as evidenced by his first marriage in 1546 to
Janet, an illegitimate daughter of the Earl of Angus, who was at the time the leader of the
English faction in Scotland.158 He remarried in 1557 to another Janet, daughter of the
Earl of Atholl.

His pro-English stance led to protestant sentiments, and he was a

particular supporter of the vernacular Bible. He participated in the negotiations for the
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Treaty of Berwick, signed the bond of 27 April 1560, and attended the Reformation
Parliament. Shortly thereafter he absented himself from Edinburgh until the following
winter, which caused some suspicion as to the extent of his commitment to protestantism.
Though he returned to Edinburgh and served on Mary’s Privy Council, both Moray and
Mary disliked him; Randolph reported that “the Queen cannot abide him and all men hate
him.”159

Maitland, however, exerted his influence to keep him at the center of

government due to his defense of protestantism and support for Knox. Ruthven’s true
commitment to the protestant cause is evidenced by his appointment as one of the group
of men assigned to “oversee the said Book [of Discipline] diligently.”160
Unlike many of his fellow Congregationists, Ruthven closely aligned himself with
the new court that emerged in the early summer of 1565; indeed, he was “wholly theirs
and chief councilor among them.”161 In February 1565, his name had appeared on a list
of individuals who were considered to be friends of the Earl of Lennox.162 This peculiar
circumstance likely occurred because of the personal hatred that many of the
Congregationists felt towards him. He viewed the current court as being closed to him
because of this personal dislike. To Ruthven, the possibility of a new court centered
around Lennox and Darnley was a more tenable situation. Thus, by the end of May 1565,
Randolph viewed Ruthven as acting in a matter traitorous to his earlier defense of
protestantism, as Ruthven acted with Mary “to his utter shame and contempt of all godly
or honest[y].”163 Despite his earlier commitment to protestantism, therefore, Ruthven
supported the Darnley marriage. As he had hoped, Ruthven rose in prominence among
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the members of the council and remained loyal to Mary throughout the rebellion, but was
a key figure in the Rizzio plot.

William Maitland of Lethington (1525-73)
While not a member of the Scottish nobility, Maitland was an important courtier
and diplomat whose position as Mary’s personal secretary added to his importance; he
also maintained close associations with several leading noblemen. Though he moved in
the circle of nobility, his status as an outsider without an inherited position meant that he
remained dependent on Mary’s attitude towards him, and therefore he remained loyal to
her during the Chaseabout Raid despite strong sympathy towards the rebels. Maitland
had powerful friends at court throughout the 1550s, including his sponsors, the third Earl
of Cassillis and the Earl of Moray.

Moray’s sponsorship of Maitland marked the

beginning of their close working relationship; their subsequent partnership during Mary’s
personal rule would shape royal policy for most of her reign. Regardless, Maitland
provided service to Mary of Guise during her regency, occupying notable roles in both
royal administration and international diplomacy.

On 4 December 1558 he was

appointed royal secretary. Unlike Mary of Guise’s other close advisors, Maitland was
Scottish and a protestant, though he did not “openly defect to the [C]ongregation until
October 1559.”164 He was a “genuine and deeply committed Protestant.”165 Prior to his
open alignment with the Congregation, Maitland initiated diplomatic channels that
benefited the protestant party with two essential allies to the south, Elizabeth and Cecil;
his diplomatic correspondence led directly to the Treaty of Berwick. Though numerous
other factors contributed to the success of the Congregation, the protestant victory caused
164
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Maitland’s reputation to rise in England. In addition, he and Moray became the most
important figures in government following the success of the Congregation.
Due to his status as a servant of the crown, Maitland had no choice but to appease
Mary and her opinions regarding politics. In preparing for Mary’s return to Scotland,
Moray and Maitland worked together on a solution that differed greatly from the one
favored by Elizabeth and the Hamiltons. Rather than seeking a Mary-Arran marriage,
Moray and Maitland promised to gain Mary recognition in the English succession in
return for her maintaining the religious status quo in Scotland. This policy not only
allowed for the maintenance of the English amity and the continuation of the protestant
victory in Scotland, but also was “a policy which fitted in perfectly with Maitland’s
ambition for a union of the Scottish and English crowns.”166
Maitland remained at the center of Mary’s court from 1561 to 1565; he completed
several notable diplomatic missions to England and France and attended Privy Council
sessions.

He was also deeply involved with the negotiations for Mary’s marriage,

particularly in the discussion of the Dudley match. Though closely aligned with Moray,
by autumn 1564 when Moray had denounced Lennox’s return, Maitland was “well
friended” of Lennox.167 Maitland, with Moray, had advocated policies that favored
England, thereby demonstrating his support for the amity, and by December 1564
Randolph explicitly reported that he and Moray were “wholly bent towards England.”168
Though not a nobleman with a family embroiled in multi-generational feuds, Maitland’s
prominent political career produced new feuds.

For instance, “Lord Seton and

Lethington, from great friends, [have] become moral enemies.”169 Indeed, a few months
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later when Morton became enmeshed in the same conflict, he and Maitland mobilized
“against Lord Seton all the force” they could muster.170
Maitland, like his close political ally Moray, disliked and felt threatened by
Lennox; though he was bound by position to serve Mary, his position of influence was
significant and Lennox threatened the autonomy he and Moray enjoyed.

A list of

enemies of Lennox states that Moray and Maitland “in their hearts hath misliked Lennox
other times [and] only now in hope to continue their rule in [the] realm, they may be
changed.”171 While Lennox’s rise did cause a substantial change in Moray’s behavior, as
he refrained from constantly attending court, Maitland remained at the center of the
government.

The distance between the pair thus increased, and Maitland became

increasingly viewed as Mary’s special advisor and executor.

Indeed, Randolph

ruminated at the beginning of May that Maitland “is suspected to favor Darnley more
than he would seem,” suggesting that his devotion to Mary had become the foremost
factor influencing his actions. Also pointing to the split between Moray and Maitland
was Randolph’s observation that Maitland “arrived today and passed straight to Court
without speaking with Moray.”172
Unlike his frequent political partner Moray, Maitland thus remained at Mary’s
side. He did not act out of turn when the Dudley negotiations collapsed in March of
1565. Rather, following Mary’s instructions, he traveled to London to obtain Elizabeth’s
consent to the Darnley match, clearly demonstrating that he was not decidedly opposed to
the match. There is some indication, however, that he did not believe that Mary would
actually marry Darnley, but rather that Mary merely attempted to apply more pressure on
Elizabeth to recognize her claim to the succession. When Maitland was instructed to
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return to London to inform Elizabeth that Mary had decided to marry Darnley regardless
of Elizabeth’s feelings on the matter, Maitland defied his queen and continued to
Scotland.
Despite this defiance, and his sympathy for the rebels, Maitland did not join
Moray’s rebellion, choosing instead to remain loyal to the queen. A man “of sharp wit
and reasoning,” his lack of noble origins meant that he relied on his ability to perform
royal service for his place at court.173 His personal ambition to remain a central figure at
court superseded his commitment to protestantism and his earlier alliance with Moray. In
early October, he did make some remarks about “leaving her at the first call,” perhaps
due to his decreasing importance at court because of the rise of Rizzio, but Maitland
never acted upon these comments, particularly since the rebels crossed into England later
that week.174 His imprudent action, however, caused Mary to increasingly reject his
counsel; this alienation led to his involvement in the Rizzio murder in March 1566.

Hugh Montgomery, third Earl of Eglinton (1531-85)
Though a number of factors influenced Eglinton, he eventually determined to
support Mary during the Chaseabout Raid because of a strong dislike of the Duke of
Châtelherault and the Hamilton clan. Eglinton was the son of the second earl and
Marion, daughter of third Lord Seton. His actions prior to Mary’s return reveal a number
of critical alliances and tendencies. He signed a mutual bond of maintenance with the
sixth Earl of Angus on 12 April 1546, pledging “concord and amity in all times to
come.”175 In 1554 he married Jean Hamilton, daughter of the Duke of Châtelherault.176
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Although Eglinton remained a staunch Catholic, he followed his father-in-law and joined
in the group of nobles who gathered in Edinburgh in October 1559 to depose Mary of
Guise and appoint a protestant council. Marital problems, however, resulted in his
alienation from Châtelherault by February 1560, at which point he switched his political
alliance to reflect this personal issue, supporting Mary of Guise. The shift away from the
duke also resulted in Eglinton returning to his Catholic leanings. He and Jean Hamilton
were divorced in 1562; the divorce decree issued by Knox and the protestant church
elders notes that “the said Earl sometimes fought joining in the said band of
marriage…[and committed] detestable adultery.”177

After the divorce was finalized,

Eglinton quickly married his longtime mistress Agnes Drummond.

His first wife,

however, possessed “powerful kinsmen who helped get her a fair settlement.”178 Beyond
personal alienation, these prominent kin represented a political and material challenge for
the earl. A whole series of charters and precepts indicate that the powerful figures of
government supported Châtelherault and his daughter in this conflict, and thus Eglinton
suffered materially in the divorce as well.179
Though he had never stopped practicing Catholicism, after his divorce Eglinton
publicly revived his identity as a practicing Catholic. In defiance of the Reformation
Parliament, Eglinton continued to hear mass. At the General Assembly meeting of 27
December 1560, Eglinton was denounced as being an “idolater [deserving] of sharp
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punishment.”180 His return to Catholicism was noted by many, and in 1563 Randolph
reported that other nobles considered him to be the “most rebellious papist in
Scotland…and [that] a party [had been] taken against him by Lord Boyd.”181 Though
Boyd had vehemently opposed Eglinton’s actions with respect to his return to
Catholicism, a 1563 standard contract of friendship between the two men exists; the
rationale behind the bond is to preserve the “amity…betwixt them, their kin, friends, and
servants” that had existed in the previous generation.182 The two noblemen also signed a
mutual bond of defense on the same date, in which they pledged to support each other in
“whatsoever actions, causes, quarrels, debates, and controversies” in which either might
become embroiled.183
Despite his eventual approval of the Darnley marriage, Eglinton did not support
the Lennox restoration. There had existed “some troubles between the Earl of Eglinton
and [Lennox] for land”; the restoration could therefore negatively affect his landholdings,
and his land and resources had already been diminished by the divorce settlements
achieved by his first wife’s Hamilton kin.184

He remained an enemy of Lennox

throughout the winter of 1564-65, as a list of Lennox’s enemies records that “the Earl of
Eglinton was never good of Lennox.”185

This enmity had emerged from the

circumstances of Lennox’s exile, as Eglinton, a landowner in the southwest of Scotland,
had benefited greatly from Lennox’s absence.
When the issue emerged, however, Eglinton was one of a few nobles who
supported the Darnley marriage. Though not an ally of Lennox, Eglinton viewed the
match as being extremely detrimental to Châtelherault and the entire Hamilton clan. He
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was Catholic, but not so zealous as to view the marriage as a means of definitively
determining religion in the realm in favor of Catholicism. The marriage would, however,
effectively oust the duke from power and influence for the foreseeable future. He thus
approved of the Darnley marriage and was one of the few nobles who waited on Darnley
at the marriage banquet. During the Chaseabout Raid, he supported Mary and rode in the
vanguard of her forces.

William Keith, fourth Earl Marischal (1510-81)
Though the concept existed, the actual practice of remaining loyal to Mary during
the Chaseabout Raid for the sake of maintaining allegiance to the Scottish crown was
uncommon. The Earl Marischal, however, did possess this sense of absolute loyalty to
the monarchy. Marischal was the eldest son of the Master of Marischal and his wife
Elizabeth, daughter of the second Earl of Morton. His father predeceased him and so the
fourth earl succeeded to the title in 1526 or 1527 as a minor.186 Marischal maintained a
close relationship with James V, accompanying him on several journeys, including his
marriage trip to France. As early as 1542, however, he exhibited sympathy towards
religious reform.
A significant figure in politics, he was appointed to the Privy Council in 1543 and
attended frequently through 1566.

Marischal supported pro-English policies; for

instance, he signed a bond to Henry VIII “promising faithfully” to uphold the treaty of
marriage between Edward VI and Mary, pledging that Mary “shall be delivered at her
perfect age and the contract of marriage shall be fulfilled.”187 Despite his apparent
sympathy for the protestant cause, Masrichal did not provide any military assistance to
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the Congregation. While he attended the Reformation Parliament and accepted the Book
of Discipline, demonstrating his desire for theological reform, he “baulked at such secular
measures as subscribing the treaties of Berwick and Edinburgh with England.”188 The
year 1560 is also the first mention of his declining health, which caused him to retire
from public life around 1566-67.
In February 1565, his name appeared on a list of the enemies of the Earl of
Lennox, but he remained loyal to Mary during the Chaseabout Raid, in direct opposition
to his son-in-law Moray.189 His support for Mary stemmed from a long tradition of
valuing loyalty to the person of the monarch. His close relationship with James V and
actions throughout Mary’s reign that supported her position demonstrate this
commitment. Although Marischal was too ill by 1565 to fight, his heir, the Master of
Marischal, took his place with Mary’s forces.
The lack of support from Marischal must have been disappointing to Moray, if for
no other reason than for the sheer amount of resources he commanded. Marischal was
estimated as being one of the wealthiest men in Scotland with yearly rentals of 270,000
merks. “So widely was his property scattered that it was said he could journey from
Berwick to the northern limits of the country, eating his meals and sleeping every night
on his own estates.”190 Although most of these resources were not exploited by Mary’s
side, the lack of availability to Moray’s faction must have proved frustrating, particularly
given their bond of kinship. Though a couple competing factors could have persuaded
Marischal to join the rebels, particularly his protestant tendencies and kinship with
Moray, his sense of loyalty outweighed all other factors.
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John Erskine, seventeenth Earl of Mar (d.1572)
Though a number of factors were influential for Mar, ultimately he chose to
remain loyal to Mary based on personal reward—that is, the restoration of the earldom
held by his family in previous generations. Mar was the third born but eldest surviving
son of the fifth Lord Erskine and his wife Margaret, daughter of the second Earl of
Argyll. Through his mother’s side, Mar was also related to the Earls of Atholl. His
father was a prominent noble at court, and his sister Margaret was a mistress of James
V.191 When the Duke of Châtelherault resigned as regent in 1554, the fifth Lord Erskine
gained custody of Edinburgh Castle, a responsibility that came to Mar later that year
upon his father’s death. This responsibility forced him to play a crucial role in 1559-60
when Mary of Guise and the Congregation fought for control of Edinburgh. Although
Mar was a protestant, having met Knox in the mid-1550s and having signed the First
Band on 3 December 1557, he remained neutral during the actual fighting.192 He and the
fifth Lord Home offered to act as mediators between the two parties. Though he was
“accused of being a Papist and of being corrupted by” Mary of Guise, Mar shifted to the
protestant side with her death and the success of the Congregation.193
Mar’s relatively late conversion indicates not only his lack of purely religious
conviction, but also his desire to join the triumphant faction. His failure to commit
earlier to the Congregation, however, was not held against him; Mar attended the
Reformation Parliament and was elected one of the Lords of the Articles. Though certain
individuals believed that Mar remained a Catholic for some time thereafter, Mar
remained “committed for the rest of his life to protestantism and to political alliance with
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England.”

This commitment to protestantism, however, did not prevent him from

opposing reform on occasion, particularly when the right incentives were offered. For
instance, “on 27 January 1561 he was in the small minority of nobles who refused to
subscribe the Book of Discipline, but his motives seem to have been entirely secular.”194
Knox believed that this decision stemmed from the fact that Mar did not wish to
surrender revenues he collected from ecclesiastical holdings.
Mar had clearly prospered since Mary’s return to Scotland; he became a member
of her Privy Council and his wife served as one of her ladies-in-waiting. In addition to
retaining custody of Edinburgh Castle, he was given custody of Stirling Castle on 8
November 1560. In terms of Mary’s marriage negotiations, he had originally been a
proponent of the Dudley match. Indeed, Randolph reported in December 1564 that Mar
“wisheth [Mary] to marry with an Englishman before any other,” demonstrating his
commitment to the amity.195 Mar’s preference for an English match other than Darnley is
evident by his feelings of enmity towards Lennox, as a list from February 1565 includes
“Erskine [later Mar], allied to Argyll” as being among Lennox’s enemies.196 Through the
spring of 1565, Mar remained hostile towards Lennox and the idea of a Darnley match.
The two most likely factors influencing this animosity were his commitment to
protestantism and his kinship to Argyll.
He remained loyal to Mary during the rebellion, however, foregoing these ties
when offered a substantial reward for his allegiance. His support for Mary during the
rebellion was precipitated by Mary issuing him the earldom of Mar. The first Lord
Erskine had held the earldom in the mid-fifteenth century, but only for the duration of his
own lifetime. The sixth Lord Erskine had long sought the restitution of the title, and such
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a charter was issued on 23 June 1565 and took effect by 1 August. According to the
charter restoring him to the earldom, Mary had determined that “his predecessors were
kept out of the possession of the same partly by reason of the quarrels occurring at the
time and partly by the unjust refutation and hindrance made by obstinate and partial
rulers.”197 She had evaluated his service to the crown, however, and had determined that
the “good, faithful, and gratuitous” service rendered by him and his father to the crown
moved her “by conscience as behoveth us to restore the lawful heirs to their just
inheritances.”198 The charter was witnessed at Perth by a group of nobles including
Morton and Marischal.199 Though Mar had gained the title, the earldom was largely
honorific and did not result in more resources being added to his already extensive lands,
as “the lands of the medieval earldom had long since been dispersed by the crown.”200
Mar demonstrated his loyalty actively, even using his position as custodian of Edinburgh
Castle actively to fight the rebels when they attempted to take the city on 31 August. In
addition to acting for Mary during the Chaseabout Raid, a position he would have been
reluctant to take without the earldom of Mar, he did not play a role in the Rizzio murder.

George Gordon, fifth Earl of Huntly (d.1576)
Imprisoned for traitorous activities after his father’s failed 1562 rebellion, Huntly
was entirely dependent on Mary; he therefore actively supported her during the
Chaseabout Raid in exchange for personal restoration. Huntly was the second oldest, but
eldest surviving, son of the fourth earl and his wife Elizabeth Keith. In 1558 Huntly
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married Anne Hamilton, a daughter of the Duke of Châtelherault.201 In October 1562, his
father, the fourth earl, rebelled against Mary due to his disapproval of her compromises
with the reformed religion.202

“The real source of Huntly’s resentment was more

probably a grudge against Moray, for Huntly had been administering the earldoms of Mar
and Moray” before Mary had awarded them to her half-brother.203 Until that point, the
Earls of Huntly had, for several generations, “enjoyed a position of unchallenged
supremacy in the northeast.”204

Moray led the queen’s forces against Huntly; he

possessed “a vested interest in destroying his political rival, who by chance also
happened to be a Catholic.”205
The fifth earl had retained few alliances or even friendships with other important
nobles, resulting in a distinct isolation from his peers and further increasing his
dependence on Mary. The fourth earl suffered a disastrous defeat in his rebellion against
Mary, as he had nearly no supporters beyond the Gordon clan. A longstanding alliance
did exist between the Earls of Huntly and Sutherland, and in the aftermath of the
rebellion a proceeding of the “condemnation of the Earls of Huntly and Sutherland” was
enacted, showing the hazards of always maintaining traditional alliances.206 Though the
future fifth earl was with his father-in-law Châtelherault at the time of the battle of
Corrichie, he was tried for treason in February 1562 and condemned to death. He was
imprisoned and suffered forfeiture for his father’s treason, but the sentence was not
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executed. The extensive Gordon kin network thus survived the rebellion and remained an
important, united bastion of strength in the north.

During his confinement, Huntly

pragmatically converted to protestantism, but the extent of his commitment to the
Reformation remains unclear. In February 1564, when he was still imprisoned, a list of
the enemies of Lennox state that “the remnants of Huntly’s house will favor the Duke,”
that is, side with Châtelherault against Lennox.207
Though the extensive Gordon clan appeared to favor the duke, Huntly remained
imprisoned, so his future was completely in Mary’s hands. When the Moray-Hamilton
alliance emerged in opposition to the Darnley marriage in 1565, Mary restored the
imprisoned noble. In the days following Mary’s marriage when it became apparent that
Moray might publicly defy Mary, “it [was] determined that Lord Gordon shall be set at
liberty, and that process used against Moray that was used against his father.”208 Thus,
Huntly was freed from imprisonment, and the language used to justify the harsh treatment
of Moray was viewed in light of Moray’s own actions in 1562 against the fourth Earl of
Huntly. He was released from custody on 3 August and reinstated as Lord Gordon and
“restored to honors by proclamation” on 27 August as a reward for providing substantial
forces against the rebels.209 Randolph reported on 4 October that “a great force comes
from the north with my lord Gordon, who imputes the overthrow of his father only to my
lord of Moray, which is approved by the Queen’s self.”210 By “open proclamation at the
market cross of Edinburgh,…[he was] restored to all lands and annual rents” held by his
father and thus succeeded his father as the fifth Earl of Huntly.211 At this point, Randolph
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believed that “in him, Atholl and Bothwell is [Mary’s] chief trust.”212 The assistance he
provided royal forces during the Chaseabout Raid proved to be so valuable that Mary
rewarded him with the office of Chancellor on 20 March 1566 following Morton’s
involvement in the Rizzio murder.213 Huntly’s complete restoration in anticipation of
conflict ensured his absolute loyalty to Mary throughout the Chaseabout Raid.

James Douglas, fourth Earl of Morton (1516-81)
Like several other protestant nobles who supported Mary during the Chaseabout
Raid, Morton accepted a reward in exchange for remaining loyal to Mary; in his case, the
favorable settlement of the administration of the Angus earldom guaranteed his support.
Morton was the nephew, on his father’s side, of the sixth Earl of Angus. In spring 1543,
he married Elizabeth, the daughter of the third Earl of Morton and Catherine Stewart, an
illegitimate daughter of James IV; he became heir to the earldom of Morton as part of the
marriage settlement. Throughout the 1540s, his actions were largely determined by his
Angus Douglas relatives, particularly the powerful sixth Earl of Angus. Although for
much of the 1540s Morton and his family expressed pro-English sentiments as a result of
having completed diplomatic missions in England, Henry II of France settled pensions on
them in 1548, persuading them to support France instead.
Morton succeeded to his father-in-law’s earldom sometime before 4 November
1550 and returned to Scotland from England that year, at which point his position was
still determined by his interactions with Angus.214 He became a member of the Privy
Council on 14 October 1552, but his position was bolstered immensely in 1557 when he
became guardian to his minor nephew, the eighth Earl of Angus; substantial financial
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benefits accompanied the administration of his nephew’s lands and possessions.215 Upon
the sixth earl’s death, Mary of Guise, then Regent of Scotland, granted property that had
“pertained to the umquhile…[Angus to] our truest cousin James Earl of Morton…by
reason of ward.”216 Confirmed to him for the duration of the minority was “all right, title,
interest, and claim of right which he [the afore]said has…with full power.”217 This
position conferred upon him great “territorial power as the head of the Douglas
family.”218 His desire to maintain these properties is evident in several documents that
reiterate his lawful possession of them. For instance, a missive he wrote soon after
acquiring control over the Angus lands in 1558 commemorated the late king of France.
Among his expressions of sympathy lay the concern that Mary of Guise would at some
point favor Margaret, wife of Matthew, Earl of Lennox, despite her being born and
married in England. His immediate concern for these lands with respect to the Countess
of Lennox demonstrates that he felt that his claim lacked tenacity.219
Although Morton appeared to be a relatively early convert to protestantism,
signing the First Band in 1557, he pursued a vacillating position thereafter, indicating a
lack of absolute religious conviction in his conversion.220 Despite a lack of participation
in the activities of the religious reformers for the next several years, he signed the Treaty
of Berwick and from that point “committed himself wholeheartedly to the cause of the
Reformation.”221 His signature also appears on the first Book of Discipline.222 His
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commitment to the Reformation is also visible in a bond among the duke, the third Earl
of Arran, and himself, signed at Edinburgh on 31 May 1560. In this bond, Morton
promised to assist Châtelherault and Arran in the struggle for the reformed religion, “to
set forward the glory of God and free the realm…and to support them in all other
causes.”223
The importance of the earldom of Angus to Morton became evident at an early
date. Tellingly, however, a bond from Châtelherault and Arran to Morton was signed on
the same day in which the pair promised support to Morton and the Earl of Angus
“especially against Margaret Douglas, wife of Matthew, sometime Earl of Lennox.”224
That such a bond was signed in 1560 demonstrates that Morton, though clearly a
committed protestant, was not beyond attempting to use his faith as a bargaining tool. In
addition, in 1560 the Earl of Lennox had been exiled from Scotland for well over a
decade and showed no signs of returning. His wife Margaret had some claim to the
Angus lands which Morton administered, but she had not been in Scotland since she was
a small child, and remained unlikely to return to attempt to claim her property with her
husband under the process of forfeiture. The bond reveals that Morton viewed the Angus
lands, which he had been administering only since 1558, as lucrative property that
merited whatever protection he could muster.
Morton emerged as a leading figure during Mary’s personal rule, having gradually
increased in prominence since his own return primarily through the Congregation and
Angus. Following his late participation in the Reformation, he assisted Moray, first in
the border region in 1561 and again in quashing the Huntly rebellion in 1562. His
prominent participation in these challenges resulted in his being appointed Chancellor on
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7 January 1563; this appointment would help ensure his loyalty, and that of the powerful
Douglas clan, to Mary.225 In early 1565, Randolph reported that “a great cumber is fallen
between Lords Morton and Seton.”226 This is the same conflict in which Maitland sided
against Lord Seton. Indeed, later that same day Randolph wrote to the Earl of Bedford
that “this day there are against Lord Seton all the force that Morton and [Maitland] are
able to make upon the fields.”227
Morton disliked the Lennox restoration, as the possibility of Lady Lennox’s return
posed a threat to his lucrative position as Angus’s tutor. A list of Lennox enemies as of
February 1565 states that “the Earl of Morton, chancellor, the young [E]arl of
Angus…and all the Douglasses…if my Lady Lennox do[es] not relinquish her title to the
earldom of Angus” would remain enemies of Lennox.228 The importance of this dispute
in terms of Morton’s allegiance cannot be overstated. At the beginning of May 1565,
when Randolph reported on the various alliances and bonds being forged, he stated that
“Morton was absent [from court], and I have heard no man worse spoken of. He is now
in hope [that the Countess of Lennox] will give over her right of Angus, and so he will
become friend to that side.”229
The Countess of Lennox did relinquish her claims to the lands in an agreement
ratified over 12 and 13 May 1565 in which Mary acted as a mediator between the two
parties, providing Morton with the uncontested claim to Angus that he had sought for so
long. The contract was carefully worded, with all parties who might lay claim to the
lands consulted. The two signatories are described as being “Margaret Douglas lawful
225

Hewitt, Scotland Under Morton, 5. The office of Chancellor placed Morton in charge of the Great Seal
of Scotland, and he was also responsible for presiding at meetings of the Privy Council and parliament.
The position also provided financial benefits.
226
Randolph to Cecil (9 January 1565), CSPS II: 113.
227
Randolph to Bedford (9 January 1565), CSPS II: 114.
228
Memorial on the Enemies and Friends of Lennox (3 February 1565), CSPS II: 119.
229
Randolph to Cecil (3 May 1565), CSPS II: 153.

184
daughter of umquhile Archibald [sixth] Earl of Angus…with assent of Matthew Earl of
Lennox…and Archibald [eighth] Earl of Angus…with express consent, assent, and
authority of James Earl of Morton.” In addition, Morton, already firmed established as
Angus’s tutor, is further affirmed as possessing jurisdiction over the property: “by virtue
of the which infeftments the same Archibald now Earl of Angus is lawfully evaluated
presently and sessed heir male to the said James Douglas [Morton] of all the foresaid
earldom lands.” The most notable part of the document with respect to the Chaseabout
Raid is the caveat that “in case the said marriage betwixt our sovereign and the said Lord
Darnley shall happen to be accomplished, that there be a perpetual band of amity,
friendship, and kindness to be had, stand, and remain betwixt the said Earl of Angus, his
heirs male, [and] tutor…and the said Earl of Lennox, [and] his heirs.”230 This stipulation
clearly reveals that the Lennox relinquishment to Angus, and thus, for many years, to
Morton, was unquestionably an act to gain Morton’s support in the impending conflict.
Despite his commitment to protestantism and close political relationship to
Moray, Morton elected to support the Darnley marriage and remained loyal to Mary
during Moray’s rebellion. The critical component in achieving his support, however,
came in anticipation of the marriage, when the Countess of Lennox relinquished her
claim to the Angus lands and ensured that Morton would continue to administer the
lucrative Angus properties in their entirety. The resolution of this conflict guaranteed
Morton’s support; in fact, he was one of only a few nobles who demonstrated
“unreserved support” for the marriage.231 Despite his support, however, he remained
ideologically sympathetic to Moray and the rebels. By 9 September, Randolph reported
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confidently that “Morton has now also left her, and promised to take open part with the
others.”232 In March 1566, he was instrumental in the Rizzio murder.

James Hepburn, fourth Earl of Bothwell (1534-78)
The opportunity simultaneously to return to prominent Scottish society as well as
to antagonize his traditional enemy, the Earl of Moray, prompted Bothwell to support
Mary during the Chaseabout Raid. Bothwell was the son of the third Earl of Bothwell
and his wife Agnes Sinclair, daughter of the third Lord Sinclair. In 1556, he inherited the
earldom as well as the hereditary office of Great High Admiral of Scotland.233

A

committed protestant, he nevertheless was a proponent of an anti-English policy, strongly
supporting Mary of Guise and Mary’s marriage to Francis. Upon Mary’s return to
Scotland, he became a member of her Privy Council.
Bothwell possessed a tumultuous personal history with several of the figures who
rose to power at the outset of Mary’s personal reign, such as Moray. Following a 1562
street fight in Edinburgh between the Hamiltons and the Hepburns, the Earl of Arran234
accused him of attempting to kidnap the queen in “a treasonable conspiracy.”235
Bothwell escaped custody, however, and went into exile in France. He is listed in
February 1565 as being a supporter of Lennox, though he was “of no force now.”236 He
briefly returned to Scotland in March of 1565, but Moray, his old enemy, determined that
he should be outlawed: Mary agreed, and Bothwell fled back to France. Mary recalled
Bothwell on 16 July, however, due to her upcoming marriage to Darnley, to which she
knew Moray objected.
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Of his impending arrival, Randolph remarked that along with Lord Seton, “two
worse friends to England or greater enemies to this action there is not in Scotland.”237
Bothwell arrived on 17 September and assisted Mary in defeating the rebels. He was
“restored to his former offices…[and] was thenceforth in great and increasing favor” with
Mary.238 He and Moray had a longstanding grudge, and “by reason he bears ill will
against Moray, [he] has promised to have him die, [and]…therefore [Mary made] him
lieutenant.”239

Bothwell was thus recalled to Scotland for the specific purpose of

providing Mary with noble support in the event of a rebellion staged by Moray. His
loyalty was assured by the fact that it would enable him permanently to return as well as
by the fact that it permitted him to harm his longtime enemy, Moray. In a Scotland not
administered by Moray, Bothwell was able to prosper, as he contracted an advantageous
marriage and occupied significant offices. In February 1566, he married Jean Gordon,
sister of the reinstated Earl of Huntly, who had also supported Mary during the rebellion.
Although Huntly and his family were Catholic, Bothwell insisted on a protestant
ceremony.

John, fifth Lord Fleming (d.1572)
Though a protestant, his appointment to several lucrative offices persuaded
Fleming to favor Mary during the Chaseabout Raid. Fleming was the second son of the
third Lord Fleming and his wife, Janet Stewart, an illegitimate daughter of James IV. He
succeeded to the title upon the death of his elder brother. Through his mother, he was a
cousin of Mary and thus became a member of the intimate circle of illegitimate relatives
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at court. Though publicly a protestant, Fleming possessed some Catholic sympathies; his
protestantism, and its effect on his political decisions, was thus markedly different from
the more ardent form practiced by nobles such as Argyll and Glencairn. He opposed the
Lennox restoration in 1564; indeed, in February 1565 his name, like that of his cousin
Moray, appeared on a list of Lennox’s enemies.240
Mary believed that his outwardly protestant beliefs meant that he might be
convinced by Moray and his allies that the Darnley marriage posed a threat to
protestantism. She therefore bestowed on him possessions that he coveted so that he
would ignore any claims of religious threat. On 30 June 1565 she appointed him to the
office of great chamberlain of Scotland, a lifelong appointment, at which point he
obligingly declared his support for the Darnley marriage. In addition, he was further
rewarded on 25 July with the office of master usher of the queen’s chambers, also an
honor to be held for the duration of his life. For his service to the royal forces during the
Chaseabout Raid, during which he actively rode with Darnley, he received a commission
of justiciary in several counties on 7 November. Fleming was thus persuaded to forego
any protestant agenda he may have harbored; personal material gain determined which
side of the rebellion he supported.

Gilbert Kennedy, fourth Earl of Cassillis (1541-76)
The combination of his alliance with Lennox and commitment to Catholicism
prompted Cassillis to support Mary during the Chaseabout Raid. Cassillis succeeded his
father, the third Earl, in October 1562. His father had been a proponent of the English
alliance, as evidenced in part by his pledge to Henry VIII to uphold a marriage contract
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between Mary and Edward VI; the fourth earl, however, did not possess this sentiment.241
He had been contracted to marry a daughter of Châtelherault, the agreement stating that
he should “marry and have to his wife the said Jean Hamilton daughter to the said lord
governor and solemnized in the face of holy kirk how soon they be of lawful age,” but the
marriage did not occur.242 Though the failure of a marriage contract was not uncommon,
it is likely that Châtelherault’s reduced profile following his resignation of the offices of
regent and governor to Mary of Guise contributed to this matter. This explanation is not
completely satisfactory, however, as Châtelherault remained a prominent noble, and
some of his other children married around this time. Cassillis was contracted in 1566 to
marry Margaret, daughter of the seventh Lord Glamis.243
Cassillis remained a Catholic, and he was one of the few nobles who took no part
whatsoever in the Reformation. He “adhered to the Roman Catholic faith, as he was
condemned by the General Assembly of the Reformed Church.”244 At the 27 December
1560 meeting of the General Assembly, Cassillis was denounced as being “in contempt
of God, his true religion, and acts of Parliament.”245 He was recorded on a list of enemies
of the Earl of Lennox, and suffered as a southwest landholder during the Lennox
restoration.246 Despite the enmity with which Cassillis viewed Lennox in February of
1565, his perspective changed at some point over the next two months. On 4 May 1565
at Stirling, Lennox and Cassillis signed a bond of “continual friendship…[for] all time
coming…[because of] the example of our predecessors and willing with on our side the
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said Ancient Amity.”247 On 1 July 1565, Mary granted Cassillis a notable judiciary
position.248 During the Chaseabout Raid, Cassillis remained loyal to Mary.
***
Additional Nobles
A number of other nobles who played lesser roles in the Chaseabout Raid follow
patterns demonstrated by the major nobles already discussed. These individuals are Lord
Lindsay, Sir William Kirkcaldy of Grange, the Earl of Rothes, and the Earl of Caithness.
Their respective roles in the rebellion and prevalence in the sources merit attention, but
they are of lesser importance than the aforementioned nobles.
Patrick, sixth Lord Lindsay (1521-89), remained loyal to Mary because of
feuding; he remained in opposition to the Earl of Rothes, who fought on the side of the
rebels.249 He possessed ties of kinship to the Earls of Atholl and Moray.250 A committed
protestant, Lindsay was an active member of the Congregation, participating as one of the
commissioners who negotiated the Treaty of Berwick and signed the Band of Leith.
According to Knox, Lindsay subscribed to the first Book of Discipline.251 Lindsay also
participated in the military forces that vanquished the Earl of Huntly. More importantly,
however, a long-standing feud existed between the Lords Lindsay and the Earls of
Rothes; a dispute regarding the office of sheriff of Fife had been resolved in January
1565 in Rothes’s favor.252 Mary further secured Lindsay’s loyalty by manipulating his
resentment of Rothes, awarding him the lieutenantry of Fife. He supported Mary during
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the rebellion due to his feud with Rothes and a desire to better his situation with respect
to the Fife dispute.253
Sir William Kirkcaldy of Grange, a solider and politician, likely joined the rebels
due to his commitment to Protestantism. Though not an ardent ideologist such as the Earl
of Argyll, he did have serious concerns about the Darnley marriage. Grange was, along
with his father, an early convert to protestantism. He spent much of the 1550s in France,
where he became a skilled soldier and military tactician, but returned to Scotland and
joined Mary of Guise’s service around 1557. By 1559, he had become closely associated
with Maitland, who had been appointed royal secretary in 1558. Despite this service to
Mary of Guise, Kirkcaldy participated in the protestant uprising against her.254 When he
later viewed a potential threat to that religious achievement, namely in 1565, he joined
the rebellious faction.
Though Andrew Leslie, fifth Earl of Rothes (1530-1611) had an ongoing feud
with the Lindsays, his actions were determined by the related factors of his influential ties
of kinship to the Hamiltons and his commitment to protestantism. Rothes, the eldest son
of the fourth earl and Margaret, an illegitimate daughter of the third Lord Crichton and
Princess Margaret Stewart, married a Hamilton in 1548.255 A protestant, he joined the
Congregation in 1559 and actively participated in the military effort against Mary of
Guise.256 Rothes was made a member of the Privy Council upon Mary’s return to
Scotland but remained only peripherally active until 1565. A longstanding feud between
the earldom of Rothes and the Lords Lindsay existed. In 1563, the two nobles clashed
over the sheriffdom of Fife, for which “they had contended now a long time,” and a noble
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assembly “judge[d] in a controversy between the Earl of Rothes and the Master of
Lindsay, now Lord Lindsay.”257 Furthermore, in the middle of July 1565, Randolph
reported that “in Fife the Earl of Rothes and Lord Lindsay [are] at daily discord.”258 In a
February 1565 assessment of Lennox’s enemies, Rothes is noted as disliking Lennox, due
primarily to “the Leslies being protestants.”259 Rothes thus disapproved of the Darnley
marriage due to religion and his ties of kinship through marriage to the Hamilton clan,
and he therefore joined the rebels.
George Sinclair, fourth Earl of Caithness (1527-82), was a staunch Catholic who
supported Mary during the rebellion; not only did he welcome a Catholic marriage and
heir, but he would not join a rebellion whose rhetoric proclaimed that the movement
sought to defend the reformed religion. He first sat in parliament in 1542, and throughout
the 1540s and 1550s, Caithness instigated minor disorders in northeastern Scotland but
was granted full remission in 1556.260

Caithness did not attend the Reformation

Parliament and opposed the religious reforms that it enacted; he remained a devoted
Catholic. He was appointed to the Privy Council in December 1561 following Mary’s
return to Scotland and supported her during the Chaseabout Raid. For his loyalty, though
Caithness would not have joined a protestant movement regardless, “on 14 May 1566 his
commission of Justiciary was extended.”261
***
In the case of some of the more minor nobles, however, no clear distinction as to
their primary motivation exists. Such nobles deserve mention because they are cited
numerous times in the primary sources as having completed particular actions, but not
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enough information remains to determine their motivation definitively. In these cases,
those nobles who remained loyal to Mary often received a reward, particularly an
appointment to an office, but not until after the rebellion itself had ended. These nobles
include Lord Home, the Earl of Crawford, Lord Glamis, Sir Walter Ker of Cessford, Sir
Thomas Ker of Ferniehirst, Lord Seton, and Lord Somerville.262
Alexander, fifth Lord Home (1525-75), succeeded to the lordship in 1550. In
1558, he married Margaret Ker of Cessford, the daughter of a border laird, and secondly
married Agnes, daughter of the third Lord Gray, in October 1565.263 He had extensive
dealings with the English, as he spent time there as a prisoner after the Battle of Pinkie,
and also in his capacity as Warden of the East and Middle Marches. Unlike many of his
peers with similar backgrounds, however, he did not promote a particularly pro-English
policy. He did, however, participate in the Reformation Parliament of 1560. In February
1565, he is listed as being a friend of the Earl of Lennox, though it is also noted that
should a conflict arise, he would “choose the best side.”264 In June 1565, “it was reported
[that] he would be made Earl of March,” but this ennoblement never materialized.265
Though he claimed to have converted to protestantism, his political alliance wavered and
“he sometimes appeared to play each side against the other.”266
David Linsay, tenth Earl of Crawford (1526/27-74), served Mary as cupbearer at
her marriage banquet.

As reward for his loyalty throughout the Chaseabout Raid,

Crawford was appointed to the Privy Council in October 1565.
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John Lyon, eighth Lord Glamis (1544-78), was the eldest son of the seventh Lord
Glamis and his wife Janet, daughter of Lord Keith and sister of the fourth Earl Marischal.
He succeeded to the lordship in 1558, inheriting the extensive lands associated with the
lordship. Though he had initially supported the idea of the Darnley marriage, Glamis
“show[ed] his approval of the Earl of Moray’s subversive actions against the queen” by
participating in the Chaseabout Raid.267
Sir Walter Ker of Cessford (1510-82) was an important border chieftain whose
family maintained a bitter feud with the Scott family. He moreover maintained longstanding rivalries with the other Ker chiefs. Probably because the geographic position of
his lands afforded Cessford many opportunities to establish relationships with English
border chiefs, he maintained a pro-English policy. Cessford was knighted in 1552 by
Châtelherault, then governor of the realm. He joined the Congregation in April 1560 and
attended the Reformation Parliament later that year.

During the Chaseabout Raid,

however, Cessford remained loyal to Mary.
Sir Thomas Ker of Ferniehirst (d. 1586) was a border chieftain who married the
sister of Sir Walter Scott of Buccleuch, a match that attempted to settle the long-standing
blood feud between the Kers and the Scots.

Though Ferniehirst had converted to

protestantism and supported the Reformation in 1560, he converted back to Catholicism
by the mid-1560s, due in part to the influence of the queen. He remained loyal to Mary
during the Chaseabout Raid.
George, fifth Lord Seton (c.1530-1586), a prominent Catholic, opposed proEnglish policy, and was a close friend of the Earl of Lennox. Seton is cited as being,
along with Bothwell, one of “two worse friends to England or greater enemies to this
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action there is not in Scotland.”268 His name appeared on the list of friends of Lennox,
and when Mary and Darnley were secretly married on 9 July, they “went that day to their
bed to the Lord Seton’s house.”269 A firm Catholic, Knox determined him to be “a man
without God, without honesty, and oftentimes without reason.”270
James, fifth Lord Somerville, married first Jean Hamilton, an illegitimate
daughter of the first Earl of Arran; the marriage ended in divorce. He then married
another Hamilton.271 He favored a pro-English policy and supported the Elizabeth-Arran
match, but remained a Catholic despite having been involved in the Treaty of Berwick
and having signed the Leith bond. According to Knox, he was one of three peers who
voted against the motions of the Reformation Parliament. He remained loyal to Mary
during the Chaseabout Raid, during which he was “on 10 October, appointed to
accompany the King in command of the rearguard.”272
Carefully examining each noble to determine what factors influenced his actions
has also allowed us to draw conclusions regarding which factor ultimately determined his
course of action.

The numerous influences exerted on each noble, which included

reasons revolving around religion, alliance, feud, land, dynasty, and allegiances,
demonstrates the complexity of the situation. The singular factor that that served to
determine each noble’s course of action, and his reason for allowing that factor to
dominate his course, differs from those of his peers. The disparity of motivations that
presented themselves in the rebellion testify to the fragmentation of the Scottish nobility.
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CHAPTER V: THEMES AND CONCLUSIONS

Contrary to previous historical scholarship that dismisses the Chaseabout Raid as
a relatively insignificant event within the dramatic reign of Mary, Queen of Scots, the
rebellion, a notable episode in its own right, provides a unique opportunity to examine the
nobility in mid-sixteenth century Scotland. As the reconstruction of events in Chapters II
and III demonstrates, interactions and reactions among the nobles spurred the events of
the Chaseabout Raid. The nuanced factors that influenced each noble, as established in
Chapter IV, show that there existed in this rebellion no clear, firm factions governed by
ideology, but rather shifting allegiances in the midst of conflict determined by complex
and interrelated factors and personalities.
A nobleman’s ultimate decision in the Chaseabout Raid was conditioned in part
by the actions and motivations of other nobles, but the singular motivation for the
coalitions formed was selfish personal ambition. Each of the nobles examined had his
own personal ulterior motive that he placed about all other factors and issues. These
other matters included religion, ideology, political alliances, personality, group, clan, and
family feuds, and clashing land and dynastic claims. The steadfastness with which each
figure pursued his interest, actively or passively, varied, but at the end of the day, each
had a single determining issue that decided his position in the 1565 conflict. Thus, the
individual still superseded any other element in Scottish society.
The diverse interests and personal motivations not only indicate the important
factors present in 1565, but also clearly reveal the modern ideas that had yet to develop
fully or that did not even exist, including Scottish national identity, central government,
and notions of loyalty and allegiance. The specific events of the Chaseabout Raid
demonstrate the lack of development of the modern infrastructure of statehood. While
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the origins of such establishments are evident, they were not fully developed institutions
in 1565.
The crown in sixteenth century Scotland was still very much an instrument of
personal rule: Mary’s opinions and feelings influenced political events in overt ways.
The monarchy was truly centered on the person of the ruler; the government of Scotland
operated by means of irregular councils and parliaments summoned—and dismissed—by
the monarch. In part, the reason why the individual personalities and interests of the
nobility so determined the events of the Chaseabout Raid is that they were, along with
Mary, the actual rulers of Scotland. The actions of the monarch did not, for the most
part, extend to far-reaching territories where the person of the ruling lord possessed much
greater immediate importance and influence. The severe lack of centralization in Scottish
government becomes abundantly clear in a careful examination of the Chaseabout Raid.
Traditional historical views of the other cornerstone of Scottish governance, the
‘universal kirk’ of Scotland, assert its creation in 1560 and near-immediate
transformation into a far-reaching network that united localities and provided a common
ground for diverse clans and kin groups. The approach presented here to the Chaseabout
Raid demonstrates the cool reception that was actually given to the statues of the 1560
Reformation Parliament. While a few ardent protestants—mostly clerics—claimed its
almost unanimous and enthusiastic acceptance throughout the land, the prominence of
practicing Catholic nobles, as well as nobles who had converted to protestantism for
political and other non-religious reasons, or who appeared willing to support policies that
could result in a return to Catholicism, shows that the kirk as a communal religious
institution did not possess its subsequent strength as early as some traditional
historiography claims.
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During this period, the idea of a distinct Scottish national identity remained a
myth.

While foreign relations surrounding the Chaseabout Raid, including Mary’s

ongoing correspondence with France and the rebels’ requests and interactions with
Elizabeth and England, demonstrate a clear determination that the Scots were
emphatically not French or English, they did not assert that they were, in fact, Scots.
Personal interests and motivations easily trumped any vague ideas of wholly ‘Scottish’
interests; the notion simply did not exist. Scottish society in 1565 was a fragmented
network of local and personal interests, a reality nowhere more evident than among the
nobility, the peak of social and political hierarchy. While notions of allegiance to the
monarch, an ostensibly national figure, existed, base personal interest remained a strong
enough reason to rebel against that monarchy. This was so, and not just for an individual
or two. The lack of developed Scottish institutions and identity thus prevent us from
discussing Mary’s realm—before, during, or after the Chaseabout Raid—as a Scottish
state.
The consistent presence of a mixed set of causes demonstrates that neither
ideology nor developing national identity alone was enough to account for allegiances in
the Chaseabout Raid; rather, the individual personalities of the nobles and the natural
alliances they formed forced each man to negotiate conflicting circumstances and
motivations. These influences were then projected onto the political and religious culture
in which they found themselves. In 1565, this was a culture of religious change, of a
strong emphasis on kinship and clan, and of local power based in the hands of the elite.
The conclusions rendered from this evaluation of the Chaseabout Raid are firmly based in
the extant primary sources and indeed came only after a careful examination of a wide
range of documents. This historical causation is thus supported by empirical records and
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further confirms conclusions reached by historians regarding other conflicts across time
and geography.
This microcosmic study focuses on a small-scale rebellion in a smaller country on
the periphery of Europe, without much of a result either for the nobles or for the queen.
The question, however, of what causes a person or a group of people in any circumstance
to rise and take up arms against constituted authority may be most effectively examined
using small-scale risings, nor is the question limited to Scotland or to the British Isles.
Indeed, it is a question of larger significance throughout world history. The empirical
methodology with which I have examined the Chaseabout Raid is the approach that can
be applied profitably to other incidents of revolt and rebellion to shed new light on the
real underpinnings of those conflicts.
The multiplicity of causes in this small-scale rebellion gives us a historical picture
that is neither as neat nor clean as we might wish. Attributing such risings solely to a
singular, unifying ideology does have an appeal, but may often be too simplistic. Even
when a motivation as charged as ideology is at stake, less grandiose notions, such as
material self-interest, factor into the situation. Revolutionary writing often contains
highly elaborate rhetoric, enabling historians with a clear thesis in mind to approach the
materials and find evidence to support these preconceived notions. By empirically using
extant data to find minute contributing factors and synthesizing this disparate data, the
historian can create a more truthful and comprehensive examination of historical
motivation and causation.
Historians frequently view rebellions and revolutions as critical turning points in
history, but have we misunderstood many risings, both greater and lesser conflicts, due to
predetermined theories? A glance at another revolution in the British Isles, the English
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Civil Wars, demonstrates the risk of thesis-driven research.1 Marxist historians, for
instance, have mined printed sources to demonstrate theories of material causation
wherein the revolution arose from class conflict.2 Idealist historians of the English
Revolution have attributed causation to ideological and religious principles; revisionists
argued that the Revolution was rather an accident without long-term causation.3
Historians in a counter-revisionist movement have responded with different causes: some
view theology as cause for revolution, whereas others perceive in addition political ideas
and legal principles as being causative.4

They return to ideology, though, like the

revisionists, only after having taken a closer look than ever before at archival materials,
so that their causes are more complex, even if principled. Empiricism has come to the
fore for English historians, resulting in a more truthful picture of the English Civil Wars.
This method can be applied to conflicts both large and small, and must now be applied to
risings in Scotland. As determined through an empirical approach to the Chaseabout
Raid, an examination of the nuances of history can yield a more truthful picture of
rebellion and revolution.
The Chaseabout Raid is an instance of conflict in history, even though the
rebellion was not long-lived or successful. The rising was significant in its particular
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time and place—Scotland under Mary, Queen of Scots. The notion of taking up arms
against the anointed monarch was not a regular feature of late medieval and early modern
Scotland. The motivation and causation behind the rebellion is therefore of critical
importance for gaining a better picture of this particular polity in flux. Constructing a
detailed narrative and dramatis personae of the Chaseabout Raid reveals that self interest
remained the driving force behind this rebellion, always conditioning how other factors—
such as religion and politics—came into play. Nobles formed alliances based on which
coalition would allow them to perpetuate and satisfy their particular interests. The more
complicated, yet more accurate, historical account that this conclusion produces validates
the empirical approach to the study of historical riots, rebellions, and revolutions.
The results of this study should prompt historians to reconsider other incidents of
conflict throughout history.5 What might a similar empirical approach reveal about the
Bohemian Revolt, the Irish Rebellion, the Decembrist Revolt, the Revolutions of 1848, or
the Boxer Rebellion? For that matter, this approach might be even more helpful in the
examination of great revolutions, including the English, American, French, Russian, and
Chinese Revolutions.

Though each of these risings encompasses an enormous

movement, and accompanies social and political transformations, on an individual level,
the decision to rebel and take up arms against a constituted authority requires an absolute
determination of conviction. No matter the size of a rising, the momentous decisions of
individuals to denounce authority forms rebellions. Though it is the aggregate that
determines the course of insurrection, the individual level of charged behavior cannot be
ignored; historians must examine records to derive personalized explanations of risings.
5
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The belief that outright revolt will enact some measure of change requires that a rebel
“shirk…all due obedience” to authority, a severance that history demonstrates can occur
when a situation becomes so seemingly desperate that individuals feel forced to “invert
the very order of nature.”6
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